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This thesis critically analyses the development of Australian-New Zealand-American relations 
from the end of World War II in late 1945 to the end of the 1956 Suez Crisis. Surprisingly the 
current literature does not demonstrate the magnitude of problems and disagreements that 
occurred in the trilateral relationship, even after these countries concluded the 1951 ANZUS 
Treaty. This is at least partly attributable to the tendency in the existing literature to draw on 
documentary source materials of only one (or at best, two) of the ANZUS signatories. This 
thesis, in contrast, makes extensive use of Australian, New Zealand, and US archival materials. 
This approach has resulted in two broad conclusions, neither of which is given due 
consideration by the existing literature. Firstly, Australia and (particularly) New Zealand fretted 
about US leadership in the Pacific and what this meant for Britain’s future in the region. 
Secondly, the United States did not consult closely with its new partners (albeit junior partners) 
in the Pacific until at least the mid-1950s. This analysis reveals that US policymakers were not 
only disinclined to share leadership with Australia and New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific, but 
were in fact unwilling to consult on matters both great and small until at least the mid-1950s. It 
also reveals that the trans-Tasman countries struggled to cooperate closely, which was mainly 
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Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, Australian Prime Minister 
John Curtin signalled the future of Australian diplomacy and strategy. “Without any inhibitions 
of any kind,” he declared, “I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any 
pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”1 While not going as far 
as suggesting a closer US relationship would come at the expense of relations with Britain, 
New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser made similar comments about the importance of the 
United States to the future conduct of his country’s diplomacy. “New Zealand realises,” he 
said, “that the security and future development of the Pacific can only be satisfactorily achieved 
in co-operation with the United States.”2 Britain’s self-ruling Dominions in the South Pacific 
had come to the understanding that the United States had replaced Britain as the predominant 
power in the Pacific. US officials agreed. The Pearl Harbour attack had utterly discredited the 
                                                          
1 David Day, “27th December 1941: Prime Minister Curtin’s New Year Message, Australia Looks to America,” 
in Turning Points in Australian History, Joseph M. Siracusa and David G. Coleman eds. (University of New South 
Wales Press, 2009), 129-142. 
2 Fraser Statement, 17 April 1944, in New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and Documents, 1943-1957 
(hereafter NZFP: SD) (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), 65-67. 
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pre-war isolationist movement, and had set the United States on a path toward becoming a 
global superpower.3 Nowhere was this more evident than in the Pacific, where the United States 
maintained an almost complete monopoly of power. As US Secretary of the Navy James 
Forrestal put it in April 1945, “all discussions of world peace” rested on the assumption that 
“the United States [would] have the major responsibility for the Pacific.”4 
Once Japan had formally surrendered and World War II drew to a close, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States each confronted questions concerning the transfer of leadership 
from Britain to the United States. Superficial appearances notwithstanding, their responses 
were neither straightforward nor smooth. In the immediate post-war period, American 
policymakers rarely consulted with Australia and New Zealand in addressing mutual strategic 
issues. This trend slowly began to change by the early to mid-1950s, yet policymakers in 
Washington were still unwilling to award their Australian and New Zealand counterparts a 
significant voice in shaping regional strategies. This caused significant discord in the 
relationship, especially on issues such as the occupation of Japan, conclusion of a mutual 
defence treaty, and responses to crises in Indochina, the Taiwan Straits and the Suez Canal.  
US disinclination to consult closely with Australia and New Zealand might have impelled a 
closer trans-Tasman relationship, yet policymakers in Canberra and Wellington struggled to 
cooperate. This was due in some measure to mutual distrust, but it also stemmed from trans-
Tasman differences over Britain’s proper role in the post-war Pacific and Middle East. 
                                                          
3 See, for example, David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the 
Second World War (Ivan R. Dee, 2001). 
4 Forrestal Diary Entry, 17 April 1945, in The Forrestal Diaries, Walter Mills ed. (The Viking Press, 1951), 45. 
See also the discussion of forward defence in Melvvn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the 




Canberra continued to cooperate and consult closely with London, yet the Anglo-American 
power shift caused Australian diplomats to pursue actively a much closer relationship with the 
United States in order to meet their own security requirements. Wellington similarly continued 
to consult closely with London, yet New Zealand diplomats were ambivalent about the transfer 
of power from Britain to the United States. Policymakers in Wellington recognised the need 
for a closer security relationship with the United States, yet concerns remained over 
Washington’s capacity to avoid an economic collapse as well as maintain its hegemony in the 
Pacific. These policymakers were also concerned about the US possession of the atomic bomb 
and the catastrophic consequences involved in using these weapons. New Zealand remained 
sceptical of US leadership and tried, wherever possible, to align its policies with Britain. In 
short, while both countries maintained close British ties, active Australian efforts to pursue 
closer US-Australian strategic cooperation—often at the expense of cooperation within the 
British Commonwealth—caused significant discord in the trans-Tasman relationship. The 
Anglo-American rift that developed during the early to mid-1950s—arising initially out of 
different views over the question of recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and 
then deepening in the wake of crises in Indochina, the Taiwan Straits and Suez Canal—further 
exposed trans-Tasman differences over whether or not to prioritize US or British policies. 
Focusing on US-Australian-New Zealand efforts at recalibrating their relationships in the 
wake of World War II, this thesis argues that foreign policy disagreements between these 
countries stemmed from Britain’s role in the post-war Pacific and Middle East as well as the 
way in which each country handled the United States taking a leading role in the trilateral 
relationship. The first chapter examines immediate post-war relations concerning 
developments in the Pacific theatre between 1945 and 1948. It demonstrates that the United 
States was intent on establishing its dominance in the Pacific, and did not give much 
consideration to Australian and New Zealand concerns. It also demonstrates that Australia and 
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New Zealand initially struggled to adjust to American dominance over the Japanese 
Occupation and the control of key islands in the South Pacific. Moreover, through examining 
Australian-New Zealand-British discussions over defence arrangements in Southeast Asia and 
the British nuclear weapons program, this chapter also suggests that Australia and New Zealand 
were not yet ready to abandon entirely their close political ties to Britain in the face of US 
preponderance. 
The second chapter examines contrasting views surrounding the conclusion of the 1951 
ANZUS Treaty. The United States only seriously considered signing a mutual defence treaty 
with Australia and New Zealand after the outbreak of the Korean War and a subsequent need 
to secure quick trans-Tasman support for a Japanese Peace Treaty. Australia, in contrast, had 
always wanted as binding a commitment as possible that was similar in scope to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). New Zealand preferred a Presidential Declaration that 
outlined US preparedness to defend Australia and New Zealand if attacked. Even then, a 
defence arrangement with the United States was favourable insofar as it allowed New Zealand 
to continue its military commitments to the British cause in the Middle East. This chapter 
argues that ANZUS negotiations demonstrated the different motives of each signatory to 
conclude a mutual defence treaty. The treaty also served different purposes for each country. 
These differences stemmed from the way in which each country used ANZUS to adjust to the 
post-war Anglo-American transfer of power in the Pacific. 
The third chapter examines post-treaty issues and trilateral responses to the 1954 Indochina 
Crisis. By examining trilateral views concerning the ANZUS machinery, the possibility of 
British membership and potential treaty replacements for defending Southeast Asia, this 
chapter argues that the ANZUS powers remained divided about the way in which the United 
States should adopt a leading role and where, if at all, Britain might be involved. This chapter 
also argues that the Australian and New Zealand response to this crisis demonstrated that the 
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Tasman countries were not prepared to act unreservedly alongside an American-led multilateral 
intervention plan in Southeast Asia without British participation. 
The fourth chapter examines the question of recognition of China and the 1954-55 Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis. While all countries shared similar ideological views that tended to oppose 
awarding recognition to the PRC, the first section of this chapter suggests that Australia and 
New Zealand were more willing to reconsider recognition as a means to prevent future Chinese 
aggression. It was also a means to align their policies with Britain, which had already extended 
recognition to the PRC despite US protestations. In the context of trilateral views toward PRC 
recognition, the second section provides the first trilateral account of Australian, New Zealand 
and American responses to the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. While the Eisenhower 
Administration consulted more closely than the Truman Administration did with Australia and 
New Zealand during this crisis, the Tasman countries generally supported the British position 
and were extremely reluctant to commit to the US plan of defending the offshore islands. 
Australia and New Zealand also explored the idea of extending diplomatic recognition to the 
PRC in the hope that it would mitigate hostilities in the Taiwan Straits. On these issues, this 
chapter argues that divergent policies between the ANZUS powers largely stemmed from 
Anglo-American differences over the most appropriate way in which to contain a Communist 
government on mainland China. Moreover, as Australia and New Zealand ultimately avoided 
publicly rejecting the US position on China due to concerns it would compromise their security 
relationship with the United States, it exposes clear limits to unequivocal Australian and New 
Zealand support for either US or British policies. 
The fifth chapter examines Australian, New Zealand and US responses to the 1956 Suez 
Crisis. While President Dwight Eisenhower condemned Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
nationalisation of the Canal and wanted it to remain under international control, he hoped to 
achieve this through peaceful means. Australia and New Zealand, which held similar views 
11 
 
throughout the crisis, instead supported the British decision to retake the Suez Canal by force, 
even though many diplomats were privately horrified by this tactic. These responses provide 
an interesting insight into the contrasting views over Britain’s post-war role in world affairs. 
Moreover, it demonstrates a turning point in alliance diplomacy in Canberra and Wellington. 
By 1956, five years after the conclusion of ANZUS, Australia and New Zealand were not 
prepared to defer to US leadership when vital British interests were at stake. 
 
The Historiographies of the ANZUS Powers 
The most noticeable historiographical issue is the lack of a balanced ANZUS history that 
properly considers the perspectives of all three alliance partners, especially in relation to the 
transfer of leadership from Britain to the United States and the impact this transition had on 
each country’s foreign and defence policies. In other words, the literature is largely split into 
respective Australian, New Zealand and American diplomatic histories. This section examines 
these sub-fields individually and outlines how this thesis’s trilateral approach addresses some 
of the major gaps in the current literature.  
 
Australian Historiography of Early Cold War Foreign Policy 
In the context of examining the early stages of the ANZUS relationship, most Australian 
historians and commentators have focused on the Australian-American relations and the 
challenges Canberra faced in balancing closer ties with Washington alongside traditional ties 
with London. Yet despite the clear significance Australian policymakers attached to building 
close ties with the United States, the relationship was originally slow to receive the scholarly 
attention it deserved. Most early commentators were Australian diplomats, who tended to write 
descriptively about Australian policies and its relationship with the United States rather than 
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analytically about its intricacies and implications.5 Reflecting this scholarly oversight was the 
inattention, until the 1960s, of Australian universities to Australian foreign policy. This was at 
least partly because Australia’s fledgling Department of External Affairs—which was itself a 
“late starter” and only became a separate government division in 1935—had not yet established 
its own distinct character and traditions until the late 1940s and early 1950s. For Joan 
Beaumont, this culminated in something of a “Cinderella story” in the historiography of 
Australian foreign policy.6 Its study was originally neglected and often seen as boring and one 
dimensional, but evolved to become a captivating field of inquiry. 
After Australian participation in the Vietnam War during the 1960s and 1970s, Australian 
foreign policy began to receive greater historical examination. This early literature suggests 
that Australia, constantly fearing that it was vulnerable to attack after the Japanese attacks on 
Darwin and Sydney Harbour in 1942, acted as little more than Washington’s puppet to secure 
protection. For Alan Renouf, former Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Australian 
Ambassador in Washington during the mid to late 1970s, Australia gained a reputation of being 
an “American client state.” “There has been little innovation or originality in Australia’s 
                                                          
5 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy: 1938-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 1967); Richard 
Casey, Friends and Neighbors: Australia and the World (F. W. Cheshire, 1954); Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light 
(Penguin, 1969) (See, in particular, the chapter “Our Relations with the United States of America”). 
6 Joan Beaumont, “Not the Cinderella it Once Seemed: The Historiography of Australian Foreign Policy,” in Joan 
Beaumont and Matthew Jordan ed. Australia and the World: A Festschrift to Neville Meaney (Sydney University 
Press, 2013): 3-14; Joan Beaumont, “Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-1969,” in Joan Beaumont, 
Christopher Waters, David Lowe, with Gary Woodard ed. Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian 
Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969 (Melbourne University Press, 2003), 1-18. 
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attitudes abroad,” Renouf remarked, “like a child, Australia has shown a marked inclination to 
‘stay with mother,’ first Britain and then the United States.”7 
These views were not uncommon. In what he called the “web of dependence,” Joseph 
Camilleri, a senior political scientist at La Trobe University, argued that Australia’s “close 
association with the United States severely restricted its diplomatic freedom.” According to 
Camilleri, Australia had no independent voice and focused on its relationship with the United 
States at the expense of its own regional objectives. Because of the enormous disparity in 
economic and military power, the Australian-American relationship “made nonsense of any 
notion of diplomatic equality.” Moreover, Camilleri suggested that there was a “readiness of 
Australian governments to comply with American policies and perceptions, often with little or 
no thought to their consequences for Australia or the region.”8 
As relevant Australian and American archival records were opened during the 1980s, 
historians had greater evidence to challenge previous criticisms of the Australian-American 
relationship. However, these newer studies did not go as far to suggest that there was not a clear 
link between Australian dependency and support for US policies. Although these records 
demonstrated that the Australian-American relationship was more complex than first believed 
and was full of ambivalences, historians such as Glen St. John Barclay and Coral Bell still 
                                                          
7 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country (Macmillan, 1979), 3-14. See also John Hammond More ed. The 
American Alliance: Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1940-1970 (Cassell, 1970); W.W. Crocker, 
“Foreign Policy in Australia,” in David Pettit ed. Selected Readings in Australian Foreign Policy, 2nd edition 
(Sorrett Publishing, 1975), 17-18. One notable exception to this trend was Henry Albinski. While acknowledging 
that Australian foreign policy was “American reliant in content,” in Albinski’s view, it was still “independently 
constructed.” See Henry Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and 
Conscription (Duke University Press, 1970), 25. 
8 Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (Macmillan, 1980), 1, 10, 14. 
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described the relationship as “asymmetrical” and that they were “never true allies.”9 For Bell, 
Australian dependency on the United States had a substantial impact on the degree to which 
policies were similar or different to Washington. It was not always consistent—Bell, in fact, 
suggests the level of Australian dependency was a series of “rolling foothills”—but argues that 
such dependency connotes “a relationship humiliatingly thrust upon the weak, and one that the 
dependent nation must be anxious to slough off.”10 
In the wake of widespread reconsiderations of Australia’s allegiance to the United States in 
the early 2000s, a strong revisionist movement emerged that challenged directly Canberra’s 
history of subordination to Washington. Revisionist critics were particularly outspoken about 
the early Cold War, and sought to rectify the simplicity to which the literature dealt with 
Australia’s foreign relations during the period. Some historians, such as Joseph Siracusa and 
David Coleman, began questioning the existing literature’s emphasis on Australian 
subservience to the United States. Instead, Siracusa and Coleman argued that there was little 
evidence for such a claim when examining the Australian and American archival records.11 
Joan Beaumont made similar observations. She argued that Australian foreign policy during 
the 1950s actually “gained considerable maturity, and its capacity to act independently grew 
with the professionalism of its diplomatic service.” This contrasted directly to the “popular 
mythology,” particularly among Left-wing historians, that the 1950s was a “nadir of foreign-
policy dependency.” According to Beaumont, this “pervasive” understanding was “narrowed 
                                                          
9 Glen St. John Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations since 1945 (Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 56, 210; Coral Bell, Dependant Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 1-4. 
10 Bell, Dependent Ally, 1-4. 
11 Joseph Siracusa and David Coleman, Australia Looks to America: Australian-American Relations Since Pearl 
Harbor (Regina Books, 2006), 33. 
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to alliance relationships with “great and powerful friends,” and as far as its relationship with 
Washington was concerned, Australian foreign policy was little more than “fawning at the 
White House.” She rejects this historical paradigm, describing it as “grossly simplistic.”12 
In recent years, support for these characterisations of the Australian-American relationship 
has come largely through biographies of some of the most influential figures in the Department 
of External Affairs. These biographies demonstrate that views within the Department were not 
always in accordance with US policies or interests, nor were Australian diplomats always in 
agreement amongst themselves over Australia’s foreign policy objectives. In so doing, these 
works give credence to the notion that Australian foreign affairs during the 1950s were not only 
complex, but policies were considered to strategic calculations of its own interests. In 2006, 
Peter Edwards wrote the first biography of Department Secretary Arthur Tange, a long-time 
servant of Australian foreign affairs and one of the Department’s most important advisers.13 In 
2010 David Lowe followed suit and wrote the most comprehensive political biography to date 
of Percy Spender, Australian Minister of External Affairs (1949-1951) and Australian 
Ambassador in Washington (1951-1958). For Lowe, Spender was “one of Australia’s most 
internationally-minded politicians.” “[Spender’s] independent thinking about Australia’s future 
and the rise of the United States ensured political prominence,” according to Lowe, even with 
a “maverick status that was hard to throw off.”14 These studies challenge the idea that Australian 
post-war foreign policy was straight-forward and revolved entirely around Canberra’s 
relationship with Washington. 
                                                          
12 Joan Beaumont, “Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-1969,” in Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, 
David Lowe, with Gary Woodard ed. Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 
1941-1969 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 3. 
13 Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006). 
14 David Lowe, Australia Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (Pickering & Chatto, 2010), 1. 
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Even Richard Casey—Australia’s second longest serving Foreign Minister who sparked 
considerable historical interest throughout the preceding decades—has received further re-
examination in his Ministerial role. Drawing on papers from an Australian Institute of 
International Affairs Forum, the 2012 edited volume R.G. Casey argues that Casey’s 
contribution to Australian diplomacy during the 1950s was extensive, multifaceted, and perhaps 
most importantly, addressed Australia’s regional objectives as well its relationship with the 
United States. For James Cotton, Casey’s legacy is tied almost inextricably to his independent 
outlook even if it was not compatible to US policies and interests. Cotton reflects that Casey’s 
“policy advocacy while Minister for External Affairs suggests a more specifically Australian 
outlook that was cognisant of the power realities of the immediate region. More particularly, 
national outlook was consistent, in his opinion, with instances of disagreement with the United 
States.”15 
Overall, recent scholarly developments on Australian foreign policy during the early Cold 
War have shifted away from the idea of subservience to the United States. Instead, they focus 
on individuals and offer a more detailed understanding of the intricacies and complexities 
present in the Department of External Affairs, Prime Ministers Department and the Department 
of Defence in the post-war years. Similarly, recent works also suggest that one of Australia’s 
primary post-war difficulties was to balance its close ties to Britain and the United States 
alongside efforts to assert a more independent foreign policy agenda. As Christine de Matos 
pointed out in 2006, the challenge for Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley and External 
                                                          
15 James Cotton, “R. G. Casey’s Writings on Australia’s Place in the World,” in Melissa Conley Tyler, John 
Robbins and Adrian March ed. R.G. Casey: Minister for External Affairs, 1951-1960 (Australian Institute of 




Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt in the late 1940s was to “juggle both a more independent role 
within the Commonwealth without alienating Britain and the United States.”16 
This thesis aims to expand upon these recent examinations by examining Australian foreign 
policy as part of a balanced trilateral analysis of the ANZUS relationship. Put another way, it 
will draw upon New Zealand and American archival sources largely overlooked by Australian 
historians to provide a new understanding of how Australian diplomats worked with the other 
ANZUS partners and how they were perceived in Wellington and Washington. It will also 
provide a greater focus on New Zealand’s role and trans-Tasman relations in the conduct of 
post-war Australian foreign policy. Outside of objections to the Japanese Peace Treaty and 
ANZUS negotiations, very few Australian historians have included New Zealand in the 
development of the ANZUS relationship throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s. In building 
upon recent developments towards understanding the complexities of Australian foreign policy 
in the early Cold War, this thesis includes trans-Tasman relations as a major focal point. This 
will be explained in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
New Zealand Historiography of Early Cold War Foreign Policy 
While there have been fewer works that focus on New Zealand’s post-war foreign relations 
when compared to Australia, examinations into New Zealand foreign policy during the early 
Cold War note several similar features to their Australian counterparts. These studies 
acknowledge New Zealand’s small-power status and geographic isolation from most of the 
world as key features that shaped its post-war foreign policy. Some historians, such as 
Christopher Pugsley and Malcolm Templeton, focus on the development of New Zealand 
                                                          
16 Christine de Matos, “Diplomacy Interrupted? Macmahon Ball, Evatt and Labor’s Policies in Occupied Japan,” 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 52, no. 2 (2006): 193. 
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foreign policy in key regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East in an effort to explain 
the New Zealand response to critical international developments including the 1956 Suez Crisis 
and the Vietnam War.17  
There are two major overarching themes in historical works on New Zealand foreign policy. 
The first is that Wellington’s view of its role in the world was fundamentally shaped by its 
place in the British Commonwealth. This was because, in New Zealand Deputy High 
Commissioner in London Frank Corner’s own words, “New Zealand at heart [had] always been 
content with a ‘colonial’ position and had readily accepted the leadership of Britain.” Similarly, 
he suggested in 1954 that “if New Zealand entered the American orbit … this would be a great 
pity.”18 Wellington, in short, wanted US protection but was reluctant to align itself too closely 
with Washington lest it damage relations with London. As Australian National University 
historian T. B. Millar first concluded derisively in 1968, New Zealand was more inclined to 
“cling closer than did Australia to the skirts of Mother England.” As part of its clinging, “New 
Zealand have thus from the beginning looked at the world through different eyes, from an 
increasingly different viewpoint than Australians, and have seen as increasingly different 
world.”19 More recent historical works, such as those written by David Capie and Philippa 
Mein Smith, reach similar conclusions about New Zealand’s close British connections.20 
                                                          
17 Christopher Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and 
Borneo 1949–1966 (Oxford University Press, 2003); Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire: New 
Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis, 1947-1957 (Oxford University Press, 1994). 
18 Frank Corner to Joseph Saville Garner, 27 July 1954, as quoted in James Waite, “Contesting ‘the Right of 
Decision’: New Zealand, the Commonwealth, and the New Look,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (2006): 893. 
19 T.B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Angus & Robertson, 1968), 182. 
20 David Capie, “New Zealand and the World: Imperial, International and Global Reactions,” in The New Oxford 
History of New Zealand, Giselle Byrnes ed. (Oxford University Press, 2010); Philippa Mein-Smith, A Concise 
History of New Zealand (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 168-192. 
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The second major theme in the historiography of New Zealand’s post-war foreign policy is 
a focus on New Zealand efforts to establish an independent voice in international affairs. In W. 
David McIntyre’s estimation, there was little notion of New Zealand acting subserviently to 
either Washington or London. “From the earliest days,” McIntyre argues, “New Zealand began 
to assert an independent voice in international affairs and not simply in empire affairs.” 
McIntyre goes on to write: 
 
Although some of the trappings of British sovereignty had yet to be severed 
and dependence on great power protection continued for forty years, New 
Zealand expressed a new assertiveness and claimed a distinctive voice … In 
the immediate post-war years [New Zealand’s] external relations began to be 
more complex … The United States was the predominant power of the Pacific 
and, therefore, the ultimate backstop of New Zealand’s security. But, whereas 
New Zealand had long had a voice in Commonwealth affairs, the United 
States was a more aloof and unpredictable ally.21 
 
Malcolm McKinnon reached similar conclusions about New Zealand’s post-war relations. In 
the aptly named Independence and Foreign Policy, McKinnon suggested that ANZUS marked 
New Zealand’s “independent” status as a sovereign state. New Zealand chose to conclude a 
defence treaty outside of the Commonwealth in order to protect itself, even if “the United States 
did not fit neatly” into New Zealand’s British world.22 It is worth noting that other historians 
                                                          
21 W. David McIntyre, “From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free,” in G.W. Rice ed. The Oxford History of New 
Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1992), 520-527. 
22 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935 (Auckland 
University Press, 1993), 123-124. 
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have traced New Zealand’s independent approach to foreign policy even earlier than the post-
war period. In 2011, Gerald Chaudron described New Zealand’s activities in the early stages of 
the League of Nations as the beginning of an independent N.Z. foreign policy.23 
New Zealand has been generally accredited as an independent yet loyal Commonwealth 
power in the early post-war period. While some historians have criticized Australia harshly for 
its subservience to the United States, New Zealand historians have commended diplomats in 
Wellington for standing by its British ties, pursuing a more independent foreign policy and 
remaining sceptical of US intentions. Moreover—and, again, in direct contrast to the Australian 
historiography before the early 2000s—there was clear depth and complexity to its foreign 
relations. McIntyre was not alone in this assessment. In the context of the occupation and post-
war treatment of Japan, Ann Trotter described New Zealand’s early Cold War foreign policy 
as “developing a new depth and complexity.” Although looking through New Zealand eyes is, 
for Trotter, “looking at events through the least significant player … the New Zealanders were 
very independently minded observers … [and] made sharp criticisms from this position.”24 
This thesis will take no issue with the ideas that New Zealand’s close British ties or efforts 
to establish an independent voice fundamentally shaped its relations with the ANZUS powers 
and the wider world. It will, however, address other major gaps within the New Zealand 
scholarship. The first gap relates to little explanation in the current literature as to why New 
Zealand clashed with Australia on a myriad of policy issues in the early Cold War despite shared 
political interests, geographical positions and close social ties. The second gap relates primarily 
to a heavy focus in New Zealand on the study of relations during the Truman Administration 
(1945-1953) at the expense of other periods. As James Waite described the state of the field in 
                                                          
23 Gerald Chaudron, New Zealand in the League of Nations: The Beginnings of an Independent Foreign Policy, 
1919-1939 (McFarland, 2011). 
24 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 3-5. 
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2006, “historians have concentrated on New Zealand’s role in the Cold War during the Truman 
years … in contrast, historians have given less thought to New Zealand’s role in the maturing 
Cold War after 1953.”25 Through focusing more closely on trans-Tasman relations as well as 
extending the analysis beyond the end of the Truman Administration, this thesis will provide 
new conclusions about the extent of New Zealand’s close British ties in the conduct of its 
foreign policy as well as the post-war complexities involved in dealing with the Australians. 
 
American Historiography of Early Cold War Foreign Policy 
In regards to the US literature, a wide breadth of historical work already exists that extensively 
analyses almost all aspects of American foreign policy under the first two post-war US 
Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. These studies include debates surrounding 
the attribution of responsibility for the development of the Cold War, the emergence and 
implementation of global containment strategies, examinations into key individuals, and 
explaining how post-war US foreign policy shaped the international system for the duration of 
the 20th century and beyond.26 While it is important to acknowledge that these sub-fields of 
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historical scholarship exist, it would far exceed the scope of this thesis to attempt to 
meaningfully offer new insights about these debates and issues. 
Instead, this thesis aims to address significant gaps in relation to the historical coverage of 
the early post-war American relationship with Australia and New Zealand. Despite some minor 
exceptions, there is simply no substantial body of American scholarship that investigates 
American relations with Australia and New Zealand during the early Cold War.27 During this 
period, Australia and New Zealand played minor roles in the eyes of US strategists even though 
the United States played a pivotal role in Australian and New Zealand strategies. For this 
reason, Joseph Siracusa and David Coleman concluded that “Australian scholars have been 
talking and writing about the United States far more than American scholars have been talking 
and writing about Australia.”28 The same conclusion is certainly true for New Zealand. 
This, however, is a glaring oversight, especially because recent historians have begun to 
recognise the role small powers played during the Cold War and the unique historical insights 
available from such studies. For instance, not only do examinations into US relations with small 
overlooked powers offer new insightful conclusions about how Washington managed its 
alliances as part of the broader the East-West struggle, but they also provide a new means to 
assess US diplomatic and strategic efforts to use these small powers effectively to meet 
American global objectives. To this end, Tony Smith used the term “pericentrism” to describe 
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the role of junior members of Cold War alliances who “tried to block, moderate, and end the 
epic contest” but also “played a key role in expanding, intensifying, and prolonging the struggle 
between East and West.”29 Fitting neatly within Smith’s “pericentric” framework, Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s small but not insignificant role in US foreign policy during the early Cold 
War is certainly one area that requires further historical examination. 
Over the past several decades there have been only two major studies that have given a 
balanced analysis of the policies, issues and positions of all the ANZUS partners in order to 
reassess the nature and development of the trilateral relationship: Trevor Reese’s dated yet still 
influential book Australia, New Zealand and the United States and W. David McIntyre’s 
Background to the Anzus Pact. Even then, these works have their own specific limitations. 
Reese’s book was published well before the availability of most archival resources.30 McIntyre 
was able to draw upon archival resources from each country yet his main analysis ends with 
the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. He does include post-treaty issues and 
developments in Southeast Asia in the concluding section of his book, yet these topics are 
treated as an aftermath rather than the continuation of similar problems that existed in the lead 
up to the conclusion of the treaty.31 Since then, there has been no extensive archival-based 
study on all three ANZUS powers that also extends into the mid-1950s.  One of the primary 
aims of this thesis is to address this oversight. 
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This thesis contains five chapters that examine why the ANZUS powers disagreed so often in 
the early Cold War. Chapter One explores mutual post-war security issues between Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States in the Pacific theatre from 1945 to 1948. It examines initial 
post-war defence plans, contestation over the control of key Pacific Island bases, and Australian 
and New Zealand discontent over US dominance of the Allied Council, the Far Eastern 
Commission, and revisions to US occupation policies in Japan. Adding to the existing 
literature, this chapter’s trilateral approach demonstrates that by early 1949 differing post-war 
defence and foreign policy objectives left the Australian-New Zealand-US relationship on 
uncommon ground and not on any foundation for closer co-operation through a regional 
defence arrangement.32 Moreover, through examining Australian-New Zealand-British 
discussions over defence arrangements in Southeast Asia and the British nuclear weapons 
program, this chapter also suggests that Australia and New Zealand were not yet ready to 
abandon entirely their close political ties to Britain in the face of US preponderance. These 
issues considered, this chapter will argue that major foreign policy disagreements between the 
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ANZUS powers from 1945 to 1948 stemmed from the way in which they initially handled US 
preponderance in the Pacific and adjusted to a fleeting British presence in the region. 
Chapter Two examines trilateral views toward the negotiation and conclusion of the 1951 
ANZUS Treaty. It explores the international developments that made concluding a formal 
defence treaty more practical. It also critically analyses the type of commitment Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States were willing to conclude with one another. Finally, it details the 
ANZUS Treaty negotiations in early 1951 and exposes US military reservations about the 
desired scope of the treaty as well as the difficulties passing it through the US Senate before its 
formal conclusion in September 1951. In this way, this chapter critiques claims such as 
Panagiotis Dimitrakis’s that the treaty’s main shortcomings related to a lack of a “command 
structure and the commitment of its principal member, the United States.”33 
Instead, it suggests the conclusion that the ANZUS Treaty largely overshadowed the 
consistent disagreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States about mutual 
security issues and the overall nature of the relationship. While the United States did indeed 
only seriously consider signing such a treaty after the outbreak of the Korean War and a 
subsequent need to secure quick trans-Tasman support for a Japanese Peace Treaty, Australia 
had always wanted as binding a commitment as possible that was similar in scope to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). New Zealand preferably wanted a Presidential 
Declaration that outlined the United States was prepared to defend Australia and New Zealand 
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if attacked. Even then, a defence arrangement with the United States was favourable to New 
Zealand insofar as it allowed it to continue its military commitments to the British cause in the 
Middle East. In the context of the post-war trilateral relationship, these differences support the 
idea that Australia, New Zealand and the United States disagreed over ANZUS primarily due 
to contrasting views about accepting the United States as the principal treaty member as well 
as what the treaty represented with regards to Britain. Canberra and Washington accepted that 
through ANZUS the United States would take the leading role in the relationship, whereas 
Wellington was reluctant to follow the American line. Policymakers in Wellington also 
believed that ANZUS would meet its security concerns in its own region, and in turn, allowed 
New Zealand to defend British interests in the Middle East.  
Chapter Three examines relations between the ANZUS powers in the aftermath of the 
treaty’s conclusion from 1952 to 1954. It contains two sections. The first section examines 
post-treaty issues including ANZUS’s consultation machinery, the possibility of British 
membership, and potential replacements such as the Five Power Staff Agency. It also explores 
changes in US national security strategies when Dwight Eisenhower replaced Truman as US 
President and how these changes affected ANZUS relations. An examination into these issues 
suggests that the ANZUS powers were still divided about the way in which the United States 
would take a leading role in this relationship and where, if at all, Britain might play an intimate 
role in this partnership.  
The second section of this chapter examines responses to the 1954 Indochina Crisis. This 
section will argue that through consulting with Australia and New Zealand on the plan for 
multilateral intervention, the United States (intentionally or otherwise) enabled these countries 
to play a more influential role in shaping US strategy. During this crisis, US consultation with 
Australia and New Zealand not only aimed to gather support for the US plan but also aimed to 
get Canberra and Wellington to convince London to participate. Historians such as Roberto 
27 
 
Rabel, Peter Edwards and Fredrik Logevall have all pointed out that British participation was 
a crucial element in each country’s response, yet these works overlook how Britain’s response 
impacted the ANZUS relationship.34 This chapter argues that the Australian and New Zealand 
response (particularly the latter) demonstrated that the Tasman powers were not prepared to 
act unreservedly alongside the United States in Southeast Asia without British participation. 
From an American perspective, it also highlights that the United States saw one of Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s primary roles in the ANZUS partnership as acting to influence British 
policy to suit US interests during times of crisis.   
Chapter Four examines Australian, New Zealand and American views toward recognising 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1954 as well as respective responses 
to the 1954-1955 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. The first section of this chapter focuses on the issue 
of PRC recognition between 1949 and 1954. While all countries shared similar ideological 
views that tended to oppose awarding recognition to mainland China, this section suggests that 
Australia and New Zealand were more willing to reconsider recognition as a means to prevent 
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future Chinese aggression and reach greater policy solidarity with Britain.35 In the second 
section, this chapter provides the first trilateral account of Australian, New Zealand and 
American responses to the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis.36 While the Eisenhower 
Administration consulted more closely with Australia and New Zealand during this crisis, the 
Tasman powers generally supported the British position and were extremely reluctant to 
commit to the US plan of defending the offshore islands. Overall, this chapter suggests that 
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divergent policies between the ANZUS powers on China largely stemmed from tensions in the 
Anglo-American relationship about extending diplomatic recognition to Beijing. Tensions 
were also caused by concerns in Australia and New Zealand that the Eisenhower 
Administration’s brinkmanship-like approach to rebuffing Chinese aggression could spark a 
major war. Moreover, despite trans-Tasman concerns about the US approach to China and 
growing support for British views, Australia and New Zealand were unprepared to risk 
isolating themselves from the United States and compromise the US commitment to the 
ANZUS Treaty. This demonstrates that there were clear limits to unequivocal Australian and 
New Zealand support for either US or British policies in regards to China and the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis. 
The final chapter focuses on Australian, New Zealand and American views toward 
defending the Middle East and responding to the 1956 Suez Crisis. In a similar format to the 
previous chapter, Chapter Five also contains two sections. The first section examines 
Australian, New Zealand and American security interests in the region prior to the Suez Crisis. 
While Australia was originally committed to the defence of the Middle East and agreed in 
principle to the formation of a Middle East Command in the early 1950s, by the middle of the 
decade Australian defence and strategic policy centred increasingly away from the Middle East 
and toward the Asia-Pacific. New Zealand followed a similar trajectory, except Wellington 
remained more committed to the defence of the Middle East and strongly supported British 
dominance in the region.37 Across the Pacific, US post-war interests in the region increased 
gradually. By the mid-1950s, the United States had two primary interests in the region: 
defending the Middle East from Soviet control, and maintaining a free flow of resources 
through the region to the West. The second section provides the first extensive trilateral 
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examination into Australian, New Zealand and American responses to Nasser’s nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal and the Anglo-French Israeli invasion in mid to late 1956.38 While President 
Eisenhower condemned Nasser’s actions and wanted the Suez Canal to remain under 
international control, he hoped to achieve this through peaceful means. Holding similar views, 
Australia and New Zealand instead supported the British decision to retake the Suez Canal by 
force, even though many diplomats were privately horrified by such a reckless response. In this 
context, Australian-New Zealand-American responses to the crisis provide an interesting 
insight into contrasting views between the ANZUS powers toward Britain’s post-war role in 
world affairs. Moreover, this trilateral analysis of the Suez Crisis demonstrates a turning point 
in alliance diplomacy in Canberra and Wellington. In this instance, Australia and New Zealand 
were not prepared to defer to US leadership when vital British interests were at stake. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the next five chapters, this thesis aims to address the historiographical gaps that this 
introductory chapter has outlined. It will ultimately argue that foreign policy disagreement 
between Australia, New Zealand and the United States during the early Cold War period was 
ultimately shaped by two main factors: close Australian and New Zealand ties to Britain and 
contrasting views about U.S leadership. The next chapter, Chapter One, provides a contextual 
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understanding of the nature of trilateral relationship by examining immediate post-war relations 
in the Pacific theatre between 1945 and 1948. Based on the issues that Chapter One explores, 
disagreements based on US unwillingness to share leadership in the Pacific and continued 


















Australian, New Zealand and American Post-War 







In April-May 1946, Australian and New Zealand representatives attended the second 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London to discuss post-war defence and 
foreign policy cooperation between Britain and its former colonies. As it stood, any meaningful 
cooperation looked bleak. War-torn Britain was no longer able to provide the defence 
provisions necessary to protect post-war Australian and New Zealand interests in the Pacific.  
Writing from London, New Zealand External Affairs Officer Frank Corner described this dire 
situation to his colleagues in Wellington. “What do we do now?” Corner asked rhetorically in 
a lengthy letter to New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh during the 
Conference, “the British stated quite frankly that they are no longer able to defend the whole 
Commonwealth.”1 
Meanwhile, the United States, the country that almost single-handedly defeated the Japanese 
in the Pacific theatre during WWII, moved ahead swiftly with its post-war plans for the Pacific 
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without any serious thought of cooperating closely with Britain or Commonwealth countries. 
Based on US Joint-War Committee plans drafted a year earlier, US Chief of Naval Operations 
Chester Nimitz and Chief of the Army Dwight Eisenhower agreed that the United States must 
set up a Pacific Command (stretching from the main Japanese islands through to the 
Philippines) and a Western Command (covering the “rest of the Pacific”) solely under the 
leadership of American naval officers.2 For New Zealand, the only solution to the contraction 
of British power in the Pacific was that it must now look towards the United States to meet its 
post-war security requirements. “Britain is resigning her leadership in the Pacific out of 
weakness,” Corner conceded, and the only “logical development of this trend was to push 
Australia and New Zealand steadily towards the US.”3 Reporting back from the Prime 
Ministers Conference, the Australians made similar observations. In an address to the 
Australian Parliament on 19 June, Prime Minister Ben Chifley stressed that Australia’s post-
war relationship with the United States would now form “a cornerstone of our foreign policy.”4 
These conclusions reached during mid to late 1946 were indicative of the major immediate 
challenges Australia, New Zealand and the United States faced respectively in the post-war 
Pacific theatre. The United States was intent on establishing its dominance in the Pacific 
without much consideration for issues like cooperation with its wartime allies. Australia and 
New Zealand, on the other hand, had to accept the reality of US leadership and find new ways 
in which to search for security in the region without a significant British presence. Even then, 
trans-Tasman cooperation towards these issues was conspicuously lacking despite their shared 
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circumstances. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the Australians were generally more 
accepting than the New Zealanders of US leadership. They were also far more vocal about their 
claims for close consultation with the United States. This caused significant discontent in the 
New Zealand External Affairs Department. 
As part of this thesis’s examination into why the ANZUS powers disagreed so often about 
mutual problems in the early Cold War, this chapter explores issues between Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States in the Pacific during the early post-war period. It examines their 
respective post-war defence plans, disagreements that occurred over the control of key Pacific 
Islands, and Australian and New Zealand discontent over US dominance of the Allied Council 
and Far Eastern Commission in Japan as well as later revisions to occupation policies. It also 
explores Australian-New Zealand-British discussions over defence arrangements in Southeast 
Asia and the British nuclear weapons program, both of which suggest that Australia and New 
Zealand were not yet ready to abandon entirely their ties to the British Empire in the face of 
US preponderance. These issues considered, this chapter argues that major policy clashes 
between Australia, New Zealand and the United States during the immediate post-war years 
stemmed from the way in which they dealt with US leadership in the Pacific. 
 
Australia, New Zealand and American Post-War Defence Plans 
As the world’s most powerful nation, initial US post-war foreign and defence policies were 
global in nature. Moreover, all policies (including those in the Pacific) were considered in 
relation to its impact on the Soviet Union and the global balance of power. As part of these 
global post-war strategies, relations with Australia and New Zealand were low on the list of 
US priorities. As US Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy told Secretary of the Navy James 
Forrestal in November 1945,  the “post-war problems are global; that is, the conditions of 
anarchy, unrest, malnutrition, unemployment … the economic dislocations are profound and 
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far-reaching.” For the Departments of War and the Navy, the US had to devise and develop 
broad defence policies to meet these challenges and prepare for war against the most likely 
post-war enemy, the Soviet Union. The United States must respond to the “universal fear of 
the Russian colossus, both in terms of the size of that country and the locust-like effect of their 
occupation wherever they may be,” McCloy reasoned.5  
Reflecting McCloy’s global outlook, the US Joint Post-War Committee concluded that in 
the Pacific, the United States must take a global perspective. In essence, this meant the United 
States must consider Pacific strategy and defence policy in relation to its effect on the Soviet 
Union and other regions of primary US interest, such as Europe and the Middle East. A report 
produced by the Committee in July 1945 outlined that in the Pacific theatre, the United States 
should maintain an island barrier of bases stretching from Japan’s northern islands down to the 
Philippines and the Southwest Pacific. These defence plans aimed to safeguard US territory 
from again being attacked from Asia, but also to prepare a global fight against the Soviet 
Union.6 Further reports for US global defence policy were drawn up by the Committee in May 
1946. These plans were code-named “Pincher.” Based on the assumption of war with the Soviet 
Union, the Pincher Series assessed defence capabilities for the United States and its allies. The 
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plans concluded that the United States must prepare for potential war with Moscow, and 
outlined contingencies for a “contest of Russian land power against Allied sea and air power.”7 
In assessing Allied post-war defence capabilities, Australia and New Zealand did not feature 
in US plans for a future war with the Soviet Union. This was largely due to Australia and New 
Zealand’s respective geographic isolation and limited military potential, but also because 
Washington thought that their defence plans were largely shaped by British defence priorities. 
In late 1945, US Envoy in Wellington Kenneth Patton told US Secretary of State James Byrnes 
described that New Zealand was still “strongly inflicted with the Mother Country complex.”8 
Similarly, US Ambassador to Canberra Nelson Johnson outlined that “Washington [dealt] with 
Australia as part of the Empire.” Before the war ended, he even went as far as suggesting that 
post-war discussions between Australia and the United States “would not be settled in Canberra 
but in consultation at 10 Downing Street.”9 
In fact, as a British Dominion in the Southwest Pacific, Australia faced its own set of unique 
problems in the post-war period. Unlike the United States, Australia was not a global power 
and did not possess a sizeable military force or industrialised economy. Under these limited 
circumstances, initial post-war Australian security rested on US leadership in the Pacific. As 
Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt told US Secretary of State James Byrnes on 
20 October 1945, US leadership was the “basis” for peace in the region. Accordingly, 
Australian defence interests in the Pacific “depended upon [American] leadership.”10 
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At this early stage, however, Australia did not play a significant role in post-war defence 
plans in the Pacific. Much to Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt’s frustration, 
the United States did not give “countries like Australia and New Zealand” the opportunity to 
contribute meaningfully to the post-war defence of the Pacific.11 Reflecting this lack of 
consideration by US policymakers, Australian post-war security also loosely rested on the 
creation of the United Nations to maintain the peace and uphold the rights of small powers. At 
the United Nations, Evatt aimed to increase Australia’s prestige as well as champion the rights 
of other small powers. In pursuing these objectives, he earnt a reputation as being one of the 
most “formidable and successful” representatives of non-great powers.12 
As far as Australia’s defence capabilities were concerned, Australian military personnel 
were still returning from overseas deployments throughout late 1945. This delayed finalising 
more concrete objectives for Australian post-war defence policy. As Australian Prime Minister 
Ben Chifley outlined in November 1945, early defence policy considerations were also affected 
by: 
  
The delay in establishing an effective world security organisation, the 
international difficulties that have arisen in establishing cooperation in the 
immediate post-war world, [and because] any present estimated strength of 
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post-war forces would be very provisional while demobilisation at present 
leaves a doubt as to the ultimate strengths to which forces can be reduced.13 
 
Once Australian personnel returned from overseas and better estimations could be made 
about Australian military strength, defence policy was first outlined publicly in November 
1946. This outline revolved around the concept of Empire cooperation. In an address to the 
Australian Parliament on 2 November, Australian Governor-General Prince Henry Albert 
suggested that Australian forces be used in three roles: for UN peace-keeping forces, under old 
British Empire arrangements and in national defence. It was also announced that Australia 
would make a larger contribution to Commonwealth defence in the Pacific. This outline was 
then built upon by Australian military planners in a 1946 proposal titled the “Nature and 
Function of Post-War Defence Forces,” which suggested that the “basic ingredient” of the 
defence of Australia was “Empire Co-operation.”14 In short, despite the clear decline in British 
power in the Pacific over the preceding decade, Australia was committed to retaining defence 
ties with Britain due to personal networks and loyalty to empire. 
 Australian defence policy did not begin to take a clearer shape until 1947. On 6 March, the 
Australian Council of Defence (consisting of the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary the 
Chief of the Australian Defence Forces and other service chiefs) summarised that the post-war 
security of Australia rested on “cooperation with Empire Defence and the development of 
regional security with the United States.” Australian cooperation with larger powers was 
crucial, as the Australian Chiefs of Staff concluded that Australia was “an isolated smaller 
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power with limited manpower and resources … it is not able to defend itself.”15 Later that 
month, the Joint Intelligence Committee (a sub-organisation of the Department of Defence) 
approved the Defence Council conclusions and planned for potential war scenarios that might 
involve Australian troops. As the Committee could see no immediate threat to Australia “in its 
own theatre,” the most likely threats to Australian security would be in either the Middle East 
or the Far East. These areas were determined to be the most likely to threaten vital British 
interests and consequently result in Australia becoming involved because of its ties with the 
United Kingdom.16 From these initial reports, it appeared that Australian post-war defence 
policy was to set to take a similar shape to previous wartime policies insofar as it centred on 
British cooperation and fighting for Commonwealth interests rather than depending completely 
on US policy. 
Six months later, the Australian Defence Committee (a sub-organisation that advised the 
Defence Minister on matters relating to defence policy) agreed with these recommendations 
and produced the “Strategic Position of Australia” report. In the 1947 report, the Australian 
Chiefs of Staff insisted on preparing Australian troops to be deployed in either the Middle East 
or the Far East, depending on how desperately British forces needed Australian support and 
whether such support would serve Australian interests. In each scenario, it was suggested that 
Australian defence preparations should be orchestrated in co-operation with the British 
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Commonwealth.17 Again, the Australians appeared to prioritise British cooperation over and 
above potential cooperation with the United States. 
Across the Tasman, New Zealand post-war defence policy rested on two pillars. Firstly, like 
Australia, New Zealand defence planners recognised that the country was too small to defend 
itself and wherever possible it would have to co-ordinate its defence policy with Britain and 
the United States. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff outlined on 30 October 1945 that local 
defence would be linked to a system of forward island bases in the Pacific. In short, the Chiefs 
concluded that the United States would probably take responsibility for the island bases in 
Northeast Asia, so New Zealand should contribute to the defence of the Southwest Pacific 
through co-ordination with British occupied bases in the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, and 
Fiji.18 
The major problem with adopting this strategy was that Wellington had very little 
information regarding American post-war policies in the Pacific. Without these plans, New 
Zealand could not properly co-ordinate its own defence plans with the United States. As New 
Zealand Minister in the United States Carl Berendsen told US Representative for the Allied 
Commission on Japanese Reparations Isador Lubin on 15 October 1945, New Zealand could 
not support US foreign policy in the Pacific unless the New Zealand Government “knew what 
American policy was.”19 Facing this lack of information exchange, US Envoy in Wellington 
Kenneth Patton suggested that New Zealand should be informed of US defence plans. Even 
while New Zealand generally followed the lead of the United Kingdom, Patton’s interpretation 
of New Zealand’s defence policy suggested that New Zealand objectives in the Pacific were 
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“nearly identical” to the United States and that Wellington would support US plans “if they 
were communicated to the New Zealand Government.”20 
At this stage, however, Washington was not seeking a closer consultative arrangement with 
Wellington. That being the case, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff concluded that while there was 
no immediate threat to New Zealand in the Pacific theatre, the second pillar of New Zealand’s 
initial post-war defence policy should be to assist in an Allied victory in the event of war in the 
Middle East. Under this plan, New Zealand was prepared to send its largest military 
contribution to the Middle East so that its limited military potential would make the greatest 
contribution to the outcome of a future war. As with the Australians, New Zealand defence 
policy was tied to British defence planning. On the advice of the British Chiefs of Staff, New 
Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser and his Defence Chiefs agreed that New Zealand should 
make its primary military contribution to the defence of the Middle East.21 Such a contribution 
was outlined clearly and with a specific time frame: an army expeditionary force would be 
deployed within ninety days after the decision to do so was made, and air squadrons within 
seventy days.22 
 
Contestation in the Pacific Islands 
American dominance in the Pacific first became a problem for Australia and New Zealand 
during the post-war settlement of the Pacific Islands. For Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States, each island held a different strategic value for each country and were considered 
for different purposes. John Minter, the US chargé in Canberra, relayed to the State Department 
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early in January 1946 that Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt was “directly 
interested in security and welfare arrangements in the whole Pacific area” and that the 
“Australian government [felt] that both countries should participate in any talks which are held 
on this subject.”23 Evatt’s thoughts were based in part on the ANZAC Pact, an Australian-New 
Zealand agreement reached in January 1944 that formally declared that the two countries have 
common interests in the South Pacific and that “any disposal should effected only with their 
agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement.”24  
Evatt’s demands reflected his frustration at being left out of the 1943 Cairo Conference 
(Allied powers had determined in Cairo the fate of Japanese seized territories after the war was 
won). It also reflected his determination to get Australia’s viewpoint considered more seriously 
in Washington. In truth, Australia’s realistic Pacific ambitions lay in only a select number of 
islands. Australia negotiated with Britain the post-war control of Nauru, the Cocos Islands, 
Christmas Island, the New Hebrides and the British Solomons, all of which have been dealt 
with extensively elsewhere.25  
As far as the Australians were concerned, the key island was Manus, the largest island in 
the Australian-mandated Admiralty Island group just north of modern day Papua New Guinea. 
In early 1946, the State Department approached Australia to enter into discussions over joint-
base rights on Manus and the Admiralty Islands. As part of the US proposal, Australia would 
remain the administering authority of the trust territory and have full legislative control. The 
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United States made it clear that it wanted no obligations or military costs: in a draft agreement 
sent to the Australian Legation, it proposed that the US was “not hereby committed to maintain 
military forces or facilities in the Admiralty Islands when it judged that military forces or 
facilities are unnecessary.” The US only wanted rights to be able to “import, station, store in 
or remove from the Islands, personnel, material and supplies.”26 To Australian eyes, it looked 
as though the United States wanted the right to do whatever it wanted on Manus but without 
obligating itself to do anything.  
Evatt took this approach as a means to pursue his own goals: establish a regional defence 
arrangement with the United States and strengthen Australia-US defence relations. He was 
prepared to allow the US Navy to establish a base on the island but in return wanted reciprocal 
base rights for the Australian Royal Navy in American ports. He also demanded that an 
agreement over Manus should be concluded as part of a broader settlement over the Pacific 
Islands and “develop a regional defence arrangement which would include New Zealand” 
rather than “discuss individual bases such as the Admiralty Islands.”27 Joint agreement on 
bases, at least as far as Evatt was concerned, could be reached “more easily” if it was 
“developed within [a] framework [of] an overall arrangement for the defence of Australia and 
New Zealand as well as the United States” and give strength in numbers to the defence of the 
Pacific.28 US President Harry Truman, in fact, got word that Evatt “refused” to consider a joint-
base solution unless it was part of an overall defence arrangement.29 Evatt was also “very 
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keen,” according to US Secretary of State James Byrnes, for an international conference on the 
settlement of the Pacific Islands rather than pursuing these negotiations privately.30 
The United States strongly opposed Evatt’s counter-terms. According to Byrnes, the only 
reason the United States was interested in Manus was because they had spent 156 million US 
dollars on the Manus Island base during the war and did not want to do “anything more than is 
absolutely essential for defence purposes.” As Manus was not a high US priority, Byrnes 
thought that it was better not to have a formal meeting because “it would only serve to create 
a lot of talk.”31 For its part, New Zealand was likewise uninterested in partaking in Manus 
Island discussions or a formal conference over the settlement of Pacific Islands. “This question 
of bases has to be dealt with very discreetly,” New Zealand Minister in the United States Carl 
Berendsen told New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh on 4 June 1946, “the 
worst possible thing we could do … would be to embark on a course of public polemics.”32 
A formal conference also proved unnecessary because the State Department rejected 
categorically Evatt’s suggestion that the settlement of the Pacific Islands should be undertaken 
as part of broader discussions toward a regional defence arrangement. On 25 April 1946, Under 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised that any regional defence arrangement was 
“premature” and “inadvisable.”33 The US military agreed wholeheartedly with Acheson. 
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Robert Dennison thought that since the United States was 
“not discussing the larger question of reciprocal use of bases,” the “present negotiations have 
no relation whatsoever to a mutual defence arrangement or a regional security pact. Such a plan 
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would be artificial and impossible under present conditions.”34 George Lincoln, US Military 
Adviser to the Secretary of State, added that Evatt’s Pacific plan was “strategically unsound 
and contrary to the accepted military concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” to avoid binding 
military obligations in the Pacific.35 Instead of pursuing a joint-base on Manus further, the US 
preferred ultimately to abandon the project and leave the island in Australian hands. “At the 
suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” US Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett later 
advised President Truman, the United States “has no further interest in having bases in territory 
under Australian jurisdiction.”36 
The reality was that the United States had little interest in the entire Southwest Pacific. 
While there was “undoubtedly some strategic interest” in the Southwest Pacific for defensive 
purposes and civil aviation, the United States only made serious claims for exclusive rights to 
three islands: Canton, Christmas and Funafuti. The United States actually staked a claim to 
twenty-five islands, but Washington was prepared to abandon these claims if it could acquire 
exclusive rights over these three islands.37 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that “these 
islands were somewhat more important from a purely strategic and military standpoint than the 
others.”38 Outside of these islands, the United States pursued joint rights for territory under the 
administrative authority of other countries.  
At the same time the United States approached Australia for joint-base rights to Manus, the 
State Department was in advanced negotiations with New Zealand over a joint trusteeship for 
                                                          
34 Dennison to Hickerson, 22 April 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 32. 
35 Lincoln to Byrnes, 1 May 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 35-36. 
36 Lovett to Truman, 7 October 1947, NARA, RG 59, 711.47/10-747. 
37 Lovett to Forrestal, 23 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 811.014/9-2048. 
38 Hickerson Memorandum, 19 March 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 15. See also Furber Memorandum, 22 March 
1946, NARA, RG 59, 811.24590/3-2246. 
46 
 
Western Samoa. These negotiations progressed more smoothly than with the Australians over 
Manus, but was not without its share of disagreement. Like Manus, Western Samoa was a New 
Zealand mandate and the only New Zealand territory to which the United States wanted rights. 
The United States had built an airfield there during the war and spent several millions on 
defence installations. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for joint operating rights but wanted 
New Zealand to cover airfield operation at its own expense and demanded that any defence 
installations fall under a “strategic area trusteeship.” 39 
New Zealand did not respond favourably to this US proposal. Prime Minister Peter Fraser 
was “not too happy” about the proposal for Western Samoa to become a US “strategic area,” 
nor did External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh agree that the settlement of a trusteeship 
go ahead before negotiations for military bases were settled. “While it was perfectly apparent 
that we all wanted to achieve the same ends,” McIntosh told Deputy Director of the Office of 
European Affairs John Hickerson, “[I] do not feel that we were in agreement.”40 McIntosh 
suggested that a military base agreement should be settled before a trusteeship was put into 
effect in Western Samoa because he was concerned about what might happen if the joint US-
NZ trusteeship failed to be approved by the UN.41 McIntosh, in other words, was concerned 
that New Zealand’s views would be ignored.  
After raising these concerns with Hickerson, McIntosh and Fraser were eventually able to 
work out an acceptable solution and a joint US-NZ trusteeship for Western Samoa and the UN 
General Assembly approved the trusteeship on 13 December 1946. The Australians, for their 
part, were “extremely angry” with New Zealand for not reaching the Western Samoa 
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trusteeship solution co-jointly with their Manus Island problem.42 Before the General 
Assembly, the Australian government cabled New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser on 26 
August, stating that Australia was “anxious to ensure mutual full support at the next General 
Assembly.” The cablegram continued to stress that it was “desirable to [Australia] to attempt 
to attempt to remove without delay any point of substantial difference between us” over the 
settlement of trusteeships in the Pacific Islands, and hoped for an “early expression of [New 
Zealand] views.”43  
No New Zealand reply was sent to Australia. Although this lack of a response was unusual 
and difficult to explain, it is plausible that at least part of New Zealand’s unwillingness to 
cooperate with Australia in the UN was its recent frustration that Australia appeared only to 
cooperate with New Zealand when it suited Australian interests. “I am getting very fed up with 
Australia,” Minister in the United States Carl Berendsen told McIntosh in April 1946 after 
helping Australia’s bid for the UN Security Council. “I don’t remember any single instance 
where Australia has supported any action that I have taken … I am bound to say that [Australia-
New Zealand consultation] appears to be a validity (sic) only when it involves the support of 
Australian policy, and I am getting a little tired of it.”44 Berendsen—who, incidentally, was 
Australian by birth—recorded similar comments about this abrasive and non-consultative style 
of Australian diplomacy in his memoirs.45  
McIntosh shared Berendsen’s frustrations with Australian diplomacy toward settling the 
post-war control of South Pacific islands. In this instance, New Zealand’s unwillingness to 
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cooperate undercut Evatt’s diplomacy on working towards a broader regional defence 
arrangement. It also highlighted that Australia and New Zealand were not at all working 
together in the Southwest Pacific but at cross-purposes. “I get more and more fed up with 
Australia,” McIntosh replied to Berendsen later in May 1947 over Australian diplomacy in the 
UN and the Pacific Islands, “you simply don’t know where they are except that they will be 
following their own interests in every case.”46  
Irrespective of Australian-New Zealand differences, New Zealand and the United States 
were eventually able to come to an agreement over Western Samoa even though many 
politicians in the Fraser Cabinet were uneasy about US activity in the South Pacific. The New 
Zealand government “strongly opposed” the transfer of sovereignty of Canton, Christmas and 
Funafuti to the United States for exclusive rights, believing that this was “unnecessary” for the 
strategic and civil aviation reasons the State Department contended.47 In the end, there was 
clearly no agreement or acceptable solution to all of Australian, New Zealand and American 
ambitions in the Southwest Pacific. Each country’s primary interests lay in different islands, 
and when these interests overlapped, agreement was not easy to come by. Although Evatt tried 
desperately to secure a broader American commitment through its settlement, Manus remained 
in Australian hands. New Zealand was eventually able to work out an acceptable trusteeship 
solution with the United States for Western Samoa. The US eventually secured access to the 
three islands (Canton, Christmas and Funafuti) it considered to be most valuable for strategic 
purposes through negotiations with Britain.48 
                                                          
46 Berendsen to McIntosh, 21 May 1947, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 125. See also McKinnon, Independence and 
Foreign Policy, 50-56. 
47 Acheson Memorandum, 11 July 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 48. 




Japan, the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission 
Outside of the South Pacific, Australia, New Zealand and the United States also shared a keen 
interest in the post-war treatment and occupation of Japan. The United States led the occupation 
and dominated the organisations put in place to oversee the Japanese surrender terms (the 
Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission). This US domination of these organisations 
caused considerable indignation in Australia and New Zealand. Then, once the US abandoned 
its initial occupation policies and began planning for a Japanese peace settlement in mid to late 
1947, Australian and New Zealand protestations at American actions in Japan grew louder. The 
post-war treatment of Japan quickly became one of the major divisive issues in the early 
Australian-New Zealand-American post-war relationship. 
 In the aftermath of Japan’s surrender, the United States, which bore the overwhelming brunt 
of the war-effort against Japan during World War II, took charge of the post-war occupation. 
Although this was nominally an allied occupation, the United States assumed what diplomat 
George Kennan later termed a “totality of responsibility” in Japan.49 Secretary of State James 
Byrnes made it clear that unlike in Germany, Japan would be an American-led occupation and 
retained the right to make final decisions on post-war policy. As Assistant Secretary of State 
Charles Dunn told Byrnes, under no circumstances would Washington allow a “control Council 
in Japan” to diminish American influence.50 
Initially, the United States pursued two basic objectives in the occupation of Japan: 
demilitarisation and democratisation. These policies ensured that “Japan [would] not again 
become a menace to the peace and security of the world.”51 As far as war reparations were 
concerned, President Truman’s Personal Representative Edwin Pauley outlined in late 1945 
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that the United States would seek a complete industrial disarmament of Japan and pass on much 
of Japanese industrial equipment and plants on to countries entitled to reparations. Japan, in 
turn, would be only left with access to industries that were absolutely essential, such as food 
production.52 Australia and New Zealand had no objections to these plans. They ensured that 
Japan was completely unable to threaten Australia and New Zealand in the short-term future. 
The major objections Australia and New Zealand raised during the occupation’s early stages 
related to the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission. The Council acted as an advisory 
body intended to ensure Japan’s surrender, occupation and control plans were met, whereas the 
Commission was an organisation based in Washington that oversaw the Council. Both 
Canberra and Wellington argued that their voices were silenced by the Americans, who were 
unwilling to consult seriously with their allies about occupation policy. Indeed, whilst it 
appeared that these committees might offer the Allied powers a shared voice in the Japanese 
occupation, the United States refused to consider seriously any views that differed or criticised 
US policy.53 
In Wellington, New Zealand policymakers were in fact initially pleased with their position 
on the Far Eastern Commission. A place on the Commission offered New Zealand diplomats 
an opportunity to ensure that Japan’s capacity and desire for aggressive expansion would be 
completely removed, and in so doing, protect New Zealand from the possibility that Japan 
would again come close to threatening its borders like it did in 1942. After the first Commission 
meetings were held in early 1946, New Zealand Secretary in Washington Guy Powles reported 
to Prime Minister Peter Fraser that “there seemed to be a general feeling of pleasure” in 
Ministry that New Zealand was “able to do something” in regards to overseeing the Japanese 
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occupation.54 New Zealand’s position on the Commission also offered its main diplomat 
Minister to the United States Carl Berendsen a unique opportunity to discuss New Zealand’s 
post-war security interests as it related to Japan with all the great powers.55 Berendsen was 
even appointed Chairman of the Steering Committee, an organisation that aimed to organise 
the Commission into various sub-committees and make recommendations about each aspect of 
the Occupation (including reparations, economic problems, legal reforms and war criminals). 
At this early stage, policymakers in New Zealand were unlikely unaware about the 
powerlessness of the Commission and these sub-organisations. 
The Australians, in contrast, were not satisfied with a position on the Far Eastern 
Commission. Japanese attacks on Australian soil had spurred a strong sense of hatred towards 
Japan and its people. As both a punishment for wartime misdeeds and in an effort to prevent 
future Japanese aggression, the Australian people urged their leaders to demand a tough peace 
with Japan. Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt charged that Australia could not 
address these issues if it was not awarded a significant voice on Allied post-war Japanese 
policy. More specifically, Evatt believed that the British government was at fault for not 
pressing upon the Americans that Canberra should be involved more closely in occupation 
plans because of its primary strategic interest in preventing a resurgence of Japanese 
militarism.56 Evatt simply did not think Britain understood fully Australian concerns about 
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Japan. “Japan is an enemy who tried to destroy us,” Evatt told British Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin bluntly in May 1946.57 
Canberra did secure one concession from the great powers. It was agreed in Moscow that a 
fourth member of the Allied Council would be a member representing jointly Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand and India. Responding to Evatt’s claims to Attlee and Bevin, London conceded 
that Australia should be the Commonwealth representative. Christopher Waters argues that 
Britain’s decision was motivated by its desire to encourage Australia and New Zealand to 
accept a greater share of the burden of Commonwealth commitments in their own regions. As 
Britain had so few military and economic resources to spare for the Japanese occupation, 
Waters argued that “British prestige could be best projected through a combined 
Commonwealth effort rather than by its own small contribution.”58 
The Chifley Government appointed William Macmahon Ball as the British Commonwealth 
member of the Allied Council of Japan in January 1946. With Ball’s appointment, Australia 
hoped it might influence Japanese policy, establish its status as a Pacific power and to 
strengthen its claim to be “Britain’s representative” in the region. The Americans, however, 
were unwilling to offer Australia (or any other power) a chance to meaningfully influence the 
policymaking process for the Japanese occupation. In short, the United States was not pleased 
with Ball’s appointment. Chairman of the Allied Council George Atcheson even complained 
that Ball’s early criticisms of occupation policy were “palpably designed to cause 
embarrassment” for the United States.59  
Indeed, Ball had immense difficulty in getting Australian views—and, by extension, 
Commonwealth views—considered seriously by the Americans. When he proposed slight 
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alterations to these policies in mid-July, Ball noted with frustration that “during most of the 
time I was talking Atcheson paid no attention but was turning over papers and talking with his 
State Department assistant.” When Ball finished, he complained to Evatt that Atcheson “looked 
up and said that he could not understand my line of argument and expressed disappointment 
that ‘no specific and concrete’ proposals had been made.” Ball concluded that “the intention 
seems either to bog the Council down in a series of matters … [of] routine administration which 
it could only get further advice from SCAP’s (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) 
own officers.”60 
As the weeks progressed, Ball grew further frustrated at American attempts to sideline the 
Allied Council. “I am sure there is a quiet and effective campaign to minimise in Japanese eyes 
the influence and prestige of all Allied Powers but the American,” Ball complained again to 
Evatt on 23 July 1946. Because of this reality, Ball even recommended that the Allied Council 
be abolished. “If [the Council] is to be exclusively American,” Ball continued to Evatt, “I 
regard it advisable to remove the pretence of an Allied Council.”61  
Ball’s inability to get Commonwealth views considered in Japan even began to cause serious 
repercussions for Anglo-Australian relations. As the Australian Government urged Britain to 
support Australian efforts to find appropriate resolutions on the Allied Council, London 
stressed that it simply had more pressing matters and needed US support elsewhere. As British 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Viscount Addison told Canberra, 
 
Our collaboration with the Americans in other parts of the world (e.g. at this 
juncture in the Middle East and the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers) is 
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of such outstanding importance that we are not prepared to be committed in advance 
to a general policy of mediation in Japan. This might well fail to achieve its purpose 
in Japan and at the same time cause friction with the United States Government.62 
 
In other words, even though Australia was tasked with representing British interests as well 
as Indian and New Zealand interests, Canberra was unable to find any support from London 
for its views on the Council in Japan. Annoyed that the Americans were ignoring every 
proposal he made, in July 1947 Ball resigned as the British Commonwealth Representative 
on the Allied Council. Even with Ball’s resignation, however, Christine De Matos argued that 
there was no fundamental change in the main elements of Australian foreign policy towards 
Japan.63 
New Zealand came to share Australian concerns with the US disinclination to consult its 
allies in Japan. “There is resistance to any proposed course of action which will involve the 
slightest deviation from the line that has been adopted” by the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Forces in Japan Douglas MacArthur, Berendsen told McIntosh on 31 May. He added 
that “I cannot over-emphasise the degree of exasperation and frustration which this attitude 
presents to New Zealand and other members of the Far Eastern Commission.”64 
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Adding Berendsen’s frustration was that his efforts to change this US dominance were 
unsuccessful. In late May, Berendsen candidly told Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission 
Frank McCoy about his “extreme dissatisfaction with the lack of progress” on the Commission 
but doubted whether even sharing this view “served any useful purpose.”65 As a result, 
Berendsen concluded that the Commission was “nothing but a joke.” The Commission was not 
“allowed to decide on any questions of policy at all,” Berendsen later told McIntosh, but rather 
it “follow[ed] behind [MacArthur] in every step, and merely applauded him.”66 
Berendsen was equally annoyed that Australia did not support New Zealand and instead 
opposed all of its proposals. Even after speaking with Evatt and agreeing that Australia and 
New Zealand had similar concerns about the futility of the Commission, there was no 
subsequent trans-Tasman cooperation towards these issues.67 “On the Far Eastern Commission, 
[the Australians] seem to go out of their way to oppose our views,” he complained to McIntosh 
on 2 April 1946, citing protestations about the timing of Japanese elections and proposed 
wording of the Japanese Constitution.68 Taking these concerns one step further, McIntosh 
thought that Australia aimed to be the Commonwealth representative for all matters relating to 
the American occupation the Japanese peace settlement.69 
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Revised Japanese Policies and a Troublesome External Affairs Minister 
By 1947, growing Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union and fears over the global threat of 
Communism forced Washington to reconsider its policies in Japan. The United States 
abandoned its twin demilitarisation and democratisation objectives and instead planned for 
rebuilding Japan’s economy so that it might become a powerful American ally in Northeast 
Asia. In August 1947, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) expert on Asian affairs John Davies told 
Kennan that they should propose to the National Security Council that the US encourage a 
“stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the US, and in case of need, a 
ready and dependable ally of the US.”70 As a result, the US began an intensive economic 
recovery program in Japan to revive the war-ravaged nation as a powerful American ally and 
ultimately push the balance of power further in America’s favour. 
Among other US allies and partners, Australia was concerned by a US revision to Japanese 
occupation policies. As the future of Japan was vital to Australian security interests, any 
movement towards an economic recovery could put Australia at risk. At least as far as the 
Australian military were concerned, its own interests were best served by a continued American 
presence in Japan. Therefore, the occupation should continue under present conditions. As the 
Australian Defence Committee concluded in June 1947, the “most important single strategic 
question affecting Australia’s security in the Pacific is the continuance of the present 
favourable balance of power in the Pacific brought about by the United States participation in 
the occupation of Japan.” The Australian military believed that US should continue the Allied 
occupation of Japan “until such time as Japan is considered unlikely to endanger the peaceful 
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aims of the United Nations.” As part of this hope for a continued Allied occupation, it was also 
concluded that there should also be a continued “destruction of Japanese war potential.”71 
In the External Affairs Department, Australian policymakers argued similarly that a change 
of policy afforded Tokyo the possibility of returning to its imperialistic ways and threatened 
the security of Australia. Even after his position somewhat softened after visiting Japan in late 
1947, Evatt reported that 
 
The first principle of our policy has always been the safety and security of the 
Pacific, including our own country … Australia has called for the 
disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan, destruction of its capacity to wage 
war, and a sufficient degree of supervision under the peace treaty to prevent 
the regrowth of war-making capacity. The second principle has been the 
encouragement of democracy in Japan, which involves the gradual growth of 
the social, political and economic system.72 
 
In other words, Evatt’s public position appeared to match closely America’s original post-war 
Japanese policy insofar as it urged complete disarmament and demilitarisation, but was 
reluctant to accept any immediate change to policies for Japan. 
On top of Evatt’s outline of Australian policy for Japan, the Chifley Government also 
demanded that Japan award reparations to Canberra for its war waged against Australia during 
World War II. These demands became especially urgent in light of potential revisions to US 
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policy in Japan that focused on economic development, as Australian diplomats feared that any 
delay might mean that Australia would not get fairly compensated. “The Australian 
Government feels that [the] total amount and distribution of reparations from Japan should be 
settled urgently,” a Department memorandum to New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser 
specified. The message warned that “it is possible that the United States may go ahead now 
and issue an interim directive on reparations” which might entail that there might be “no 
reparations at all from Japan.”73  
Australian pronouncements against an immediate revision to Japanese economic and 
reparation policies were causing considerable headaches for the United States. While the US 
began redrafting its Japanese occupation plans, US Political Adviser in Japan George Atcheson 
Jr. complained on 5 July 1947 to US Secretary of State George Marshall that Australia’s 
“distorted pronouncements and unwarranted criticisms have been so violent and so widely 
publicised” that it threatened US prestige in Japan and throughout the Far East. He also warned 
Marshall that “any appeasement of [the] Australians will without question seriously undermine 
American prestige in this part of the world.”74 
Complicating problems further was Evatt himself, whose abrasive and demanding 
personality grated on the Americans. Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett was particularly 
scathing of Evatt, telling Truman in October about 
 
[Evatt’s] aggressive, egocentric manner … He has been accused of self-
seeking, and it is not always clear whether he is motivated by true patriotism 
or simply by egotism. He has great self-confidence and determination, is 
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anxious to have a finger in every pie, is slow in giving his confidence, and 
insists on receiving full credit for his achievements.75 
 
While Lovett was indeed concerned by the way in which Evatt acted, there remained hope 
in the State Department that his egocentrism could benefit the United States if properly 
cultivated. This was especially true in relation to Evatt’s efforts to purposely champion the 
voices of smaller powers in the United Nations rather than always support US policies.76 In the 
instances when Evatt’s views and American views aligned, the State Department later 
concluded that “Evatt’s egotism [should] be turned into constructive channels … When we are 
satisfied that the Australians will follow our line of thinking he, as Australia’s spokesman, 
should be encouraged to take the initiative.”77 
New Zealand had similar problems with Evatt, who all too often spoke on New Zealand’s 
behalf or ignored their point of view entirely. “If [Evatt] ever stops to think,” McIntosh once 
told one of his External Affairs Officers Frank Corner, he will sometimes “go out of his way 
to consider New Zealand’s viewpoints.” The problem was that Evatt’s “laundry [was] so large 
that he sometimes forgets our irons amongst the others he has in the fire,” McIntosh added, 
mixing his metaphors.78 
So far as revising Japanese policies were concerned, the Americans found New Zealand 
diplomats much easier to deal with than Evatt and the Australians. Although Wellington also 
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feared that a soft peace treaty and an economic revival might reignite Japanese aggression—as 
Anne Trotter points out, New Zealand “at all times” viewed Japan as a potential threat to the 
South Pacific—New Zealand policymakers realised that Evatt’s antics were doing little to help 
the Americans. It would be better, so far as Wellington were concerned, to keep quiet on the 
issue.79  
Nevertheless, reaching a common position on Japan became urgent after the United States 
issued invitations to the eleven countries on the Far Eastern Commission to attend preliminary 
talks for the Japanese settlement in July 1947. In an effort to find some degree of policy 
solidarity between Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries in the face of 
revised US Japanese occupation policies, a Commonwealth Conference was held in Canberra 
from 26 August to 2 September 1947. Although Australian policymakers had been very vocal 
in their support for long-term demilitarisation and democratisation policies in Japan, it was 
agreed that a peace treaty could be finalised so long as Japan remained demilitarised. It was 
also agreed that there should be strict controls over Japanese imports and exports and that there 
should be some form of supervisory commission established to implement the terms of the 
treaty.80 In other words, the Commonwealth delegates hoped for a virtual continuation of strict 
early occupation-era controls. 
Overall, the communique that was issued after the Conference urged support for an early yet 
hard-line demilitarised peace treaty for Japan. In Wellington, the agreements reached at the 
Conference were “commended” by the New Zealand External Affairs Department. A report by 
the External Affairs Committee on the Japanese Peace Settlement concluded that as far as a 
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potential peace treaty was concerned, Japan “must be completely disarmed and demilitarised 
for an indefinite period.” The report also concluded that “post-treaty economic controls will be 
required” so that a peace conference could be held at an early date.81 In other words, if an early 
peace settlement was reached, New Zealand made it clear that it favoured a hard-line settlement 
with Japan.  
This sentiment was shared in Australia. As Evatt said to US Secretary of State George 
Marshall after the Conference, if the Commonwealth was to support a peace treaty, special 
provisions must be made to ensure that Japan could not access “certain industries with obvious 
war potential” such as steel and iron ore.82 External Affairs Advisor to the Australian 
Delegation at the Commonwealth Conference Frederic Eggleston went one step further, arguing 
that the Conference did not properly demonstrate how important it was for Australia that Japan 
remained demilitarised if it was to agree to any Japanese peace settlement. “Conferences of this 
kind do not approach the crucial issues,” he told Assistant Secretary of External Affairs Alan 
Watt in September, “to agree on negatives is a waste of time.”83  
Eggleston warned Evatt directly against reaching a speedy settlement in Japan and the 
possibility of the country becoming truly democratic. “I feel somewhat disturbed at the views 
which appeared to predominate at the British Commonwealth Conference,” he told Evatt, 
adding that “there seems to be a feeling that nothing could be done except to demilitarise [Japan] 
and that the democratisation of Japan was desirable, but the Allies could not impose it and it 
was futile to try.” According to Eggleston,  
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If these views prevail, a position of instability will develop in the Pacific which will 
be very disappointing to the Australian people. Japan will be free to resume her 
superiority in East Asia and will then be available to move with all her economic 
and strategic power into the orbit of the highest bidder … under these 
circumstances, I strongly urge that we ask for a prolonged occupation or control of 
Japan.84 
 
Evatt had no serious problems with Eggleston’s claims about the risks associated with a 
militarised Japan. The crucial issue, especially in Australia, was Japanese remilitarisation. At 
the time, Australia and the Commonwealth was only open to a peace settlement as long as 
Japan’s war potential was completely denied or strictly controlled. Evatt, assuming that no 
movement had yet been made towards remilitarising Japan, told US Secretary of State George 
Marshall and MacArthur that the Commonwealth agreed with US policy in Japan and supported 
movement towards a peace settlement.85 However, the State Department was in the middle of 
reconsidering the idea of a demilitarised Japan. In September 1947, the Policy Planning Staff 
drafted a top-secret paper titled “US Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan” which 
outlined that “a major shift in US policy toward Japan [was] being talked about under cover.” 
The paper suggested that the “idea of eliminating Japan as a military power for all time [was] 
changing” and that a peace treaty “would have to allow for this changed attitude.”86 This drastic 
change in US policy would have serious ramifications for the movement towards a peace 
settlement, as Australia and New Zealand vehemently opposed the idea of post-occupied Japan 
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having its own military power without assurances from the United States that their countries 
would be protected. This critical issue between Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
subsequently formed one basis for the ANZUS Treaty negotiations, which will be examined at 
length in Chapter Two. 
Under these policy changes, Australia would still not be afforded the opportunity to 
influence the decision-making process. The United States, in short, remained intent on 
dominating the Japanese occupation without seriously consulting with its allies in the Pacific. 
Even while it was “highly desirable” to procure Australian support for its policies in Japan, the 
State Department advised that the United States should do little more than explain the reasons 
for these new policies to its allies rather than involve them in the decision-making process. 
“Whenever possible,” the State Department suggested on 18 August 1948, “announcements of 
new policy decisions should be preceded by [a] frank explanation of our motives to the 
Australians both here and in Canberra” in order to avoid any measures being “misunderstood 
by the Australian Government.” Since the Australian public took a “lively interest” in Japan, 
the Department advised that “every effort should be made to brief Australian correspondents 
both [in Washington] and in Japan on reasons for SCAP policies.”87  
Similarly, the State Department recognised that efforts should also be made to explain 
American policies to New Zealand diplomats and journalists. As a State Department policy 
statement outlined on 24 September 1948, “New Zealand shares Australia’s certain 
dissatisfaction with present relations between the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP and has 
been critical of many of General MacArthur’s policies.” The United States, in turn, should “be 
careful to prepare the ground through diplomatic channels before new measures are adopted in 
Japan” and “unheralded interim directives by SCAP should be avoided wherever possible.”88 
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Again, these conclusions concisely demonstrated US disinclination to consult with Australia 
and New Zealand in Japan. US policymakers aimed to explain American policies as clearly as 
possible to Australian and New Zealand policymakers after decisions were made in Washington 
and Tokyo, yet these diplomats would not be accommodated a place in the decision-making 
process. 
 
Britain, ANZAM and the Joint Anglo-Australian Rocket Project 
As discussions over the Japanese occupation and a potential peace treaty progressed, Australia 
hoped to secure a regional defence pact with the United States in order to safeguard against the 
possibility that it might be attacked from Japan or elsewhere. “What [Australia] needs is an 
appropriate regional instrumentality in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific,” Evatt 
announced in Parliament on 26 February 1947 as part of his endeavours to conclude a regional 
pact with the United States over the settlement of Manus Island. He also suggested Australia 
needed access to US military planning so that it might better prepare for its own defence in the 
event of another world war. “The proposed regional instrumentality,” Evatt announced, “will 
at least facilitate the free and rapid exchange of basic information … and plans for regional co-
operation.”89 As explored earlier in this chapter, the United States were unwilling to consider a 
formal pact during negotiations over Manus Island and refused to share military information. 
As a result, Australia’s attention turned to co-ordinating defence planning more closely with 
Britain. This manifested itself in two ways: the formation of ANZAM and the Anglo-Australian 
Joint Rocket Project. 
 
 
                                                          




The Formation of ANZAM 
Britain’s dire post-war economic situation forced London to look for allied assistance in regions 
that were not in its primary interests. Against this backdrop, it became wholly practical for 
Britain to work more closely with Australia and New Zealand in the defence of bases in 
Southeast Asia. In the Pacific, Britain’s major post-war concerns centred on Hong Kong, 
Singapore and security issues resulting from Communist insurgencies in Malaya. The Foreign 
Office and British Chiefs of Staff realised that in the event of a global war the defence of the 
Far East and Southeast Asia would be a low priority. That being the case, London was open to 
the possibility of co-ordinating strategic planning more closely with Australia and New 
Zealand. As Communist activity in Southeast Asia became one of the most immediate post-war 
threats to Australia and New Zealand, both Canberra and Wellington welcomed closer strategic 
co-ordination with Britain. Australian, New Zealand and British security interests in Southeast 
Asia coincided and the informal agreement known as ANZAM was established. 
On 1 April 1947, the Australian Defence Committee considered reports from the Joint 
Planning Committee about plans for co-operation with Britain for Commonwealth Defence in 
Southeast Asia. These reports were based on discussions during the Prime Ministers Conference 
in May 1946 which considered a Joint Australian-New Zealand-British Liaison Staff to deal 
with mutual defence problems. The Australian Defence Committee report suggested that the 
Australian government should undertake greater responsibility in strategic planning relating to 
regional security matters in the Pacific. Such planning would have to be derived, the Committee 
concluded, from a broader world-wide strategic plan in which the British Commonwealth 
would participate.90 One month later, a memorandum on “Commonwealth Defence 
Cooperation” was produced on 23 May that outlined Australia was prepared to make a larger 
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contribution to Commonwealth defence in the Pacific through co-ordination with Britain. In so 
doing, the report advised that a Joint Defence Committee with British and New Zealand 
representatives would be established.91 This Committee also formed the basis for trilateral 
discussions relating to the activities of Commonwealth forces stationed in Occupied Japan.92 
Five days later, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley sent a letter to British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee that outlined his government’s plans for this Committee. At a meeting chaired 
by Attlee in June, the British agreed to appoint three lower-rank representatives of their Chiefs 
of Staff to attend Australian Defence Committee meetings. Attlee then replied formally to 
Chifley’s offer on 17 August, welcoming Australia’s willingness to chair defence council 
meetings and take primary responsibility for strategic planning in Malaya.93 
After Britain was agreeable to the Australian proposal, Chifley contacted Wellington in 
October to enquire whether New Zealand would also accept its joint strategic plan. New 
Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser responded on 13 November, saying that his government 
was agreeable to Australia’s proposals for co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence. “I 
have no doubt that the arrangements will prove satisfactory,” Fraser noted after he told Chifley 
that New Zealand was appointing Chief of Staff Colonel Duff as the NZ Joint Service 
Representative.94 With Britain and New Zealand accepting Australian plans, the revised system 
of defence cooperation for Malaya and Southeast Asia (which was later termed the ANZAM 
area) began on 1 January 1948. 
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The Joint Anglo-Australian Rocket Project 
Once joint-planning began in 1948, the Australians raised the perennial question of the 
relationship between Commonwealth planning and American planning. Australian Prime 
Minister Ben Chifley argued that Australia needed concrete information from the British Chiefs 
of Staff about US plans in the Pacific. Australia would need to know, as a minimum, about 
American plans for the Pacific in relation to Australian security, the southern boundaries of the 
US zone of responsibility and the extent to which any assistance might be required from 
Australia in the Pacific.95 The British joint planners appreciated Australian concerns, but also 
realised that sharing American information involved confidentiality issues. British reluctance 
to share American military information stemmed from issues arising during the Anglo-
Australian Rocket Project, in which Australia hosted and assisted British efforts to acquire its 
own nuclear arsenal. This project had a sizeable impact on US relations with Britain and the 
Dominions in the South Pacific.96 
British interest in pursuing a joint rocket project with Australia began after the United States 
changed its stance on Anglo-American nuclear cooperation. British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill had convinced US President Franklin Roosevelt to sign the Quebec Agreement as 
early as 1943. This agreement enabled Britain to participate in the US nuclear weapons project 
                                                          
95 Chifley to Attlee, 7 February 1949, NAA, A5954, 1626/6; McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, 216-217. 
96 See Peter Morton, Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project, 1946-1980 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989); Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: British 
Atomic Weapons Trials in Australia (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1987); Wayne Reynolds, 
Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, (Melbourne University Press, 2000); Wayne Reynolds, “The Wars that were 
Planned: Australia’s Forward Defence Posture in Asia and the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1967,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 295-309; Wayne Reynolds, “Loyal to the End: The 




known as the Manhattan Project as well as set up arrangements for joint exploitation and 
purchase of uranium supplies. After the war, the Truman Administration reversed its previous 
stance on nuclear co-operation with Britain. In August 1946, the US Congress passed the 
Atomic Energy Act—also known as the McMahon Act—which prohibited sharing classified 
atomic information with any foreign country, including Britain.97 
Britain’s new cabinet, led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee, was left to pursue its nuclear 
weapons project alone. The project could not be undertaken on British soil—nowhere in the 
British Isles could rockets be fired safely over even a tenth of the required distance.98 After 
deciding between two possible Commonwealth testing sites large enough to support the 
project—Canada or Australia—Attlee cabled Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley on 20 
September 1946. He suggested that “an experimental range and supporting development 
establishment should be set up in Australia” for atomic guidance missiles.99 By January 1947, 
Britain’s commitment to the project was all but confirmed when the Cabinet agreed to make 
atomic bombs and the decision was endorsed by both major political parties.100 
Australia was eager to take part in a British-led nuclear weapons project. Before Attlee 
approached him in late 1946, Chifley requested Australian High Commissioner in London 
Stanley Bruce on 4 September 1945 to ascertain whether Britain was open to Australian 
participation in development work in the atomic field. Chifley’s inquiry was supported by his 
External Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt. In October, Evatt wrote directly to Attlee and 
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requested that Australia contribute to an empire defence scheme of research and 
development.101 For Chifley and Evatt, participation in a joint project would be a major step 
forward for the industrialisation of Australia. It would also allow Australian scientists and 
Defence Department officials to gain privileged access to modern British defence technologies. 
Finally, Australian participation offered the country an unparalleled opportunity to contribute 
directly to the defence of Europe and the Commonwealth without committing any of its limited 
manpower. Australia, in other words, saw clear advantages to nuclear weapons for strategic 
purposes in Commonwealth hands. As a 1946 Australian Defence Appreciation Report 
concluded, “the advent of the atomic bomb … may revolutionise the organisation, equipment 
and employment of armed forces.”102 
With these benefits in mind, Chifley responded to Attlee’s proposal on 23 November 1946 
and accepted in principle the British plan for a joint rocket project in Australia. The joint project 
came into formal existence on 1 April 1947. A little over one year later on 7 May 1948, the 
Australian Defence Committee even began contemplating a proposal for an Australian atomic 
stockpile. The Australian Department of Defence, Army, Navy, Air Force and Supply and 
Development that Australia should develop “atomic energy from the viewpoint of Defence.” 
Australian Atomic energy development would also have advantages for “industrialisation, 
scientific and technological development.”103 
While New Zealand tended to be an ardent supporter of British foreign and defence policy, 
New Zealand External Affairs Department officials were particularly apprehensive over the 
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joint rocket project and the proliferation of atomic weapons. London did not approach 
Wellington because New Zealand’s land mass was not large enough to support a testing site, 
but even if it was, New Zealand strongly objected to the development of atomic weapons due 
to the risk of worldwide nuclear war. At the same time Chifley and Evatt were negotiating with 
Britain over a possible joint project in late 1945, New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Carl 
Berendsen expressed to New Zealand External Affairs Secretary McIntosh that he “heartily 
dislike[d] the look of the world” which was especially grim because of America’s recent 
discovery of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb’s “completely destructive power,” Berendsen 
said, “just completes my cup of doom.” “[The bomb] will certainly be discovered very quickly 
by others” including Britain, Berendsen added, and he “did not see anything to be gained, and 
perhaps a good deal to be lost, by such a course.”104 
McIntosh shared Berendsen’s concerns and was fearful of Attlee’s determined pursuit of the 
bomb. “This damned atomic bomb is certainly the worst thing that has ever happened,” he 
wrote in reply to Berendsen, suggesting almost jokingly that Attlee’s talks with Truman and 
the Australians were about “nice and friendly … ways and means of devising bigger and better 
slaughters by atomic methods in the future.”105 Berendsen and McIntosh’s sentiments 
regarding the bomb were shared by most New Zealand people. Even later during the 1950s 
when the Sidney Holland government announced it would assist the British in tests on 
Christmas Island by monitoring their results, the majority of public opinion strongly opposed 
any form of New Zealand participation.106  
The State Department and Pentagon were also anxious about closer Anglo-Australian 
defence relations, especially when they involved the production of atomic weapons outside of 
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American control. Recent US relations with Australia were chilly, not least because of Evatt’s 
abrasive diplomatic style and his demands for closer US-Australian co-operation and exchange 
of military information. Relations with respect to the joint rocket project took a further hit once 
the Australian media found out about present and planned military projects through a series of 
“indiscreet statements” and “leaks.” Australian Defence Minister John Dedman was 
particularly fearful as to what these leaks would mean for Australia’s relations with the United 
States and Britain. The leaks will “increase the distrust in the safeguarding of secret information 
in Australia, and may have a serious effect on the readiness of the United Kingdom and the 
United States to furnish information to Australia,” Dedman told a fellow minister.107 His fear 
soon materialised after the US, which became convinced these leaks confirmed Australia could 
not be trusted with its own military secrets, banned Australia from receiving classified 
information from the United States. Although its motives were not entirely clear, the Central 
Intelligence Agency concluded that there was an “unsatisfactory security situation” in Australia 
and demoted the country to a “Category E” recipient of US military information.108 This was 
the lowest category among all nations with diplomatic representation in Washington. 
The US ban on classified information to Australia was an embarrassment for the Chifley 
government, which had argued both publicly and privately in Washington that Australia and 
the United States shared a lot of common ground and that both countries should work together 
in tackling mutual threats in the Asia-Pacific. Australian Ambassador to the United States 
Norman Makin speculated that it “placed [Australia] on a basis little better than the USSR.” 
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Although Makin was briefed on 3 July 1948 that the ban was temporary, he was concerned that 
there was no certainty when the United States might reverse this decision. “In [the] United 
States,” Makin told Chifley apprehensively, “‘temporary’ arrangements frequently extend over 
an indefinite period.” In any case, Makin was certain that the ban would “seriously hinder” the 
joint-rocket project and Australia’s relationship with the United States.109 
Determined to upgrade Australia’s reliability in the eyes of the Americans, Chifley realised 
that Australia wanted to play a greater role in world affairs but could not do so effectively 
unless this ban was reversed. “Australia should assume a large share of defence 
responsibilities,” according to Chifley, especially because Australia’s defence expenditures 
were large in comparison to its small population. His Defence Secretary, Frederick Shedden, 
reiterated this point later to the State Department, pointing the difficulties during the joint UK-
Australian rocket projects being launched in Central Australia because of a ban on classified 
information. “In addition to the difficulties in connection with the rocket range project, defence 
planning in the Pacific was being hampered by the lack of exchange of information,” Shedden 
remarked. So far as he was concerned, all Australia needed to fix these difficulties was 
“information which would enable her to shape her plans for Australia’s role in Pacific defence” 
that the State Department and US Department of Defense was refusing to pass over.110  
The US position on the exchange of military information with Australia highlighted its 
overall reluctance to treat Australia as an equal and trustworthy partner. Australia did not even 
receive information on US atomic projects first hand. Evatt, after telling the State Department 
in February 1949 that it was his “understanding that information on rocket projects at the 
present time passed through a third country” (presumably Britain), argued that this arrangement 
was unsatisfactory and hoped that the “mutually beneficial cooperation between the two 
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countries which had obtained during the recent war might be continued.”111 Even after these 
protestations State Department officials did little to re-evaluate US security ties with Australia, 
preferring instead to pass information through other countries which were then relayed to 
Canberra. The United States simply did not trust Australia with classified military information.  
 
Conclusion 
In the Pacific theatre, US President Harry Truman’s early post-war strategies generally hinged 
upon US preponderance in the region without significant thought to cooperating closely with 
its wartime allies. New Zealand instead continued to defer to the leadership of Britain, most 
notably in the creation of ANZAM and general Empire cooperation for the defence of the 
Commonwealth. Australia also continued to cooperate closely with Britain, but simultaneously 
pursued the closest relationship possible with the United States. By early 1949, differing post-
war defence and foreign policy objectives left the Australian-New Zealand-US relationship on 
uncommon ground and certainly not on any solid foundation for closer co-operation through a 
regional defence arrangement. 
It was only through rapid changes in the international situation in 1949 and 1950—such as 
the Soviet Blockade of Berlin and its first successful test of an atomic bomb, Mao’s Zedong 
Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the outbreak of the Korean War—that 
Australian, New Zealand and American interests began to coincide more closely. This 
convergence of interests culminated in conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Yet, as the next 
chapter explores, the build-up and conclusion of the this treaty did much less to bring Australia, 
                                                          



























Conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty on 1 September 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States represented a formal commitment by each signatory to meet the common danger 
in the Pacific area. Signed against the backdrop of escalating Cold War tensions, the Japanese 
Peace Treaty and the outbreak of the Korean War, ANZUS, at least as far as its preamble 
suggests, represented a “sense of unity” between the signatories and their objective of 
maintaining the peace in the Asia-Pacific. There was a clear “strength” to the ties between each 
party, Australian Secretary of External Affairs Sir Alan Watt wrote several years after the treaty 
was concluded. According to Watt, these ties were an important and often “underestimated” 
reason as to why ANZUS came into being.1 
This chapter provides an integrated, trilateral examination of Australian, New Zealand and 
American strategies with respect to the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty. It first examines the 
international circumstances that made a concluding a formal defence treaty practical for all 
three countries in 1949 and 1950. Then, it critically analyses the type of defence commitment 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States wanted to conclude with one another. Finally, it 
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details the ANZUS Treaty negotiations in early 1951 and exposes divergent views about the 
desired scope of the treaty in the build up to its formal conclusion in September 1951. Through 
an examination of these issues, this chapter argues that ANZUS was not just a culmination of 
shared broad security interests or merely a trade-off for US protection in exchange for 
Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty.  
Instead, this chapter argues that the ANZUS Treaty largely overshadowed the consistent 
disagreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States about mutual security 
issues and the overall nature of the relationship. Until mid-1950, the United States refused to 
consider seriously the conclusion of a formal defence treaty. Indeed, the United States only 
became willing to become Australia and New Zealand’s chief protector after the outbreak of 
the Korean War and an increased need to secure trans-Tasman support for a Japanese Peace 
Treaty. Even then, the United States did not want an explicit military commitment to defend 
Australian and New Zealand interests. Australia, on the other hand, wanted as binding a 
commitment as possible that was similar in scope to NATO. Across the Tasman, New Zealand 
wanted a much looser commitment—namely, a Presidential Declaration that outlined the 
United States was prepared to defend Australia and New Zealand if attacked. For Wellington, 
a defence pact allowed New Zealand to continue its military commitments to the British cause 
in the Middle East. In the context of the post-war trilateral relationship, these differences 
support this thesis’s assertion that Australia, New Zealand and the United States disagreed over 
a number of post-war issues because of competing views surrounding US leadership and ties 
to Britain. 
 
Movement toward a Pacific Pact in light of Drastic International Changes, 1949-1950 
As Chapter One explored, there was little agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States on mutual post-war security issues. Yet after a number of rapid international 
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changes during 1949 and 1950—such as the Soviet Blockade of Berlin and its first successful 
test of an atomic bomb, Mao’s Zedong Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the 
outbreak of the Korean War—Australian, New Zealand and American interests began to 
coincide more closely. Against this backdrop the United States began to seriously consider the 
concept of a mutual defence pact with Australia and New Zealand, an idea first proposed by 
Australian diplomats. Under the new Australian External Affairs Minister Percy Spender, 
Canberra pushed for a binding commitment with the United States. His New Zealand 
counterpart Frederick Doidge initially thought along similar lines, although this was a minority 
view in Wellington. Most other New Zealand diplomats and military officers did not want a 
formal commitment with the United States. Across the Pacific, policymakers in Washington 
refused to consider the idea of a Pacific Pact until the outbreak of the Korean War. This event 
made obtaining Australian and New Zealand support for a speedy peace settlement in Japan 
highly valuable, and the State Department reasoned that concluding a defence pact with the 
Tasman powers was a practical trade-off. 
Under the Ben Chifley Government (1945-1949), one of Australia’s primary foreign policy 
objectives was to secure a formal defence pact with the United States. This plan was 
spearheaded by Australian External Affairs Herbert Evatt. A regional defence scheme had 
always been Evatt’s “pet plan,” US Chargé in Canberra John Minter commented as far back as 
1946. He wanted to “keep the United States and Australia in the closest association,” Minter 
noted, adding that Evatt proposed a regional pact not once but “many times.”2  
Over the next two years, the State Department grew frustrated by Evatt’s persistent efforts 
to conclude a defence pact with the United States. Diplomats in the US Embassy in Canberra 
were especially concerned that Evatt wanted a pact purely to allay domestic criticisms that the 
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Australian-American relationship had soured during the Chifley years. These growing 
concerns were made public when a Melbourne Herald article published in May 1949 suggested 
that incoming US Ambassador in Canberra Peter Jarman “will have a difficult job because of 
the persistent efforts to make election-eering [sic] capital out of Australian-American 
relations.” After the article was published, interim US Chargé in Canberra Andrew Foster told 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson that he had trouble “dismissing the whole matter.” While 
he publicly denied the report, Foster also conceded to Acheson privately that he “did not regard 
the Australian Government as the most cooperative on Earth.”3 
Across the Tasman, New Zealand policymakers did not share Evatt’s views on a formal 
defence arrangement with the United States. On 6 July 1948, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Peter Fraser told British High Commissioner in Wellington Charles Duff that a regional pact 
would only “effectively contribute to our security” if Britain was a member.4 A few months 
later, Fraser backed away further from the possibility of a formal defence arrangement. A pact 
would only develop “if the need arose” for New Zealand, Fraser announced in January 1949. 
In his view, that need “had not yet arisen.”5 
The State Department was unconvinced by Australian arguments for any kind of regional 
defence scheme. The State Department had been “luke-warm” to the idea of a Pacific Pact, 
Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs John Allison told New Zealand 
Ambassador in Washington Carl Berendsen in August 1949. Under the present conditions—
for example, no “community” or “culture” of mutual interests or settling political conflicts 
collectively in the Asia-Pacific—Allison stressed that such a pact would be “premature.”6  
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In a bid both to reassure Western Europe that the US remained committed to NATO and to 
deter unwanted pressure for a pact in the Asia-Pacific, Secretary of State Dean Acheson also 
dismissed a NATO-type pact in the Pacific. “While [NATO] does not mean any lessening of 
our interest in the security of other areas,” Acheson announced at a press conference on 18 
May 1949, “the United States is not currently considering participation in any further special 
collective defence arrangements.” In his view, NATO was the product of a “solid foundation” 
of defence collaboration with Western Europe, whereas no such foundation existed in the Asia-
Pacific region. Yet beyond any foundation for a defence partnership in the region, Acheson 
feared that if the United States committed to a defence treaty in the Asia-Pacific it might 
overextend US forces into areas that were not primary interests (such as the long simmering 
conflicts in Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia). “A Pacific Pact could not take shape until 
present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved,” Acheson said. He simply thought that “the 
time was not ripe for a pact.”7 
The time for a regional defence arrangement with Australia and New Zealand might not 
have seemed “ripe” for Acheson in May, but by late 1949 to mid-1950, a number of events 
drastically changed the situation for Australia, New Zealand and the United States in the Asia-
Pacific. The declarations of Indonesian and Vietnamese independence from Dutch and French 
colonial control presented two uncertain security challenges to Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Communist insurgencies in Malaya and the 
establishment of a Communist government in China also made the Asia-Pacific region appear 
increasingly unstable and treacherous. Increased Communist activity and the de-colonisation 
of Southeast Asia prompted Australia, New Zealand and the United States to begin to 
reconsider the possibility of a formal defence commitment. 
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New Governments, Diplomats and Agendas in Australia and New Zealand 
Appropriately responding to the threat of Communist aggression became a hotly debated topic 
in Australia and New Zealand. This resulted in changes of government in both Canberra and 
Wellington. In New Zealand, after fourteen years in power, the Labour government was 
defeated at the polls in November 1949. Sidney Holland led the newly-formed conservative 
National government, with Frederick Doidge as his External Affairs Minister. Berendsen and 
McIntosh, two long-serving diplomats in the New Zealand Department of External Affairs, 
were hopeful that the incoming National government would be easier to work with than Peter 
Fraser’s Labour government which had been in office since March 1940. “I will be very glad 
when the poor old boy (Fraser) has gone,” McIntosh told Berendsen soon after the election.8 
Fraser had been passionately interested in international affairs, but often to the point where 
he took on many of the responsibilities that otherwise belonged to the External Affairs 
Department. As United Kingdom Deputy High Commissioner to New Zealand Arthur Snelling 
noted in August 1949,  
 
Fraser alone determined the policy of the New Zealand government on every 
question of foreign affairs … [he] rarely consulted his colleagues and did not 
inform them when he made important decisions … thus New Zealand’s policy 
on international political issues is as personal as that of any dictatorship.9 
 
After the election, Holland turned out to “dominate the NZ Cabinet,” as “one man or two 
men” often do, Berendsen complained. Yet, in contrast to Fraser, Holland had “almost no 
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interest in foreign affairs.”10 Revealingly he took the Finance rather than the External Affairs 
portfolio in addition to the prime ministership, and when he did intervene in foreign affairs, he 
“frequently made gaffes.”11 
The new External Affairs Minister, Frederick Doidge, was better equipped to handle New 
Zealand’s foreign relations than was Holland. McIntosh, one of the most respected and 
experienced officers in the Department, actually recommended Doidge to Holland, suggesting 
he would make an “excellent” Minister of External Affairs.12 In contrast to long standing 
convictions in New Zealand against a US guarantee for New Zealand’s security, Doidge, at 
least in the early stages of his time as External Affairs Minister, was one of the strongest 
advocates for a Pacific Pact with the United States. Doidge, was “very pact-minded” and was 
convinced that the United States had to be a signatory to any regional arrangement.13 
For Doidge, pressing such an agenda was not easy in New Zealand. Even after PRC 
Chairman Mao Zedong claimed a Communist victory in China, McIntosh told Berendsen and 
Shanahan in mid-November 1949 that New Zealand still “did not favour regional pacts” 
because they seemed to be “devised more for artistic symmetry than for any practical 
purpose.”14 Nevertheless, Doidge raised the idea of a pact at the Colombo Conference in 
January 1950. He suggested that a pact would be useless without the inclusion of the United 
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States, Canada and India. According to Doidge, the security of Australia and New Zealand 
could not be ensured without the United States to “wall in the tide of Communism.”15  
In Australia, the Liberal-Country Coalition led by Robert Menzies won the 1949 election. 
Menzies’s victory ended Evatt’s term as External Affairs Minister. He was replaced by Percy 
Spender, a move that signalled a new era of Australia’s external relations with the United 
States.16 The new Menzies Government recognised that Australian security interests in the 
region rested squarely with the United States. As part of this assessment, External Affairs 
Minister Percy Spender continued Australia’s push for a formal defence pact with the United 
States. US policymakers certainly recognised early on that Spender was determined to secure 
a closer relationship with the United States. After “differences of opinion rising from dissimilar 
views of the Japanese occupation policy … and by the difficult personality of Evatt,” the State 
Department concluded, “Spender is desirous of establishing the closest and most cooperative 
relations with the United States and has in effect made this a cardinal point in his foreign 
policy.”17 
The Holland Government likewise recognised that a close relationship with the United 
States was important to New Zealand, but policymakers in Wellington described the 
relationship in less fundamental terms to its security interests in the Pacific. While the 
American-Australian relationship was described as a “cardinal point” of Australian foreign 
policy by the State Department, Counselor of the New Zealand Embassy in Washington George 
Laking told US Assistant Secretary of State William Butterworth on 18 November 1949 that it 
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was just “very sensible” for New Zealand to have a “close association between the United 
States [and] New Zealand.”18 
Meanwhile, New Zealand responses to Spender’s appointment and its impact on trans-
Tasman relations were mixed. “I don’t know much of him,” Berendsen told McIntosh, “what 
we saw of him in Australia left us with the impression that he was at least intelligent.” 
Berendsen was concerned that Spender might be a mere successor to Australia’s 
“irresponsible” and “hoodlum” behaviour in international affairs that he witnessed with Evatt. 
When it came to Spender, he was afraid that like most Australians, either by nature or by 
upbringing, they seemed to be “impossible people.”19 
McIntosh and Doidge were less praiseworthy of Australia’s new External Affairs Minister, 
fearing that he would be just as difficult as Evatt. Spender was an “absolute little tick,” 
McIntosh told Berendsen on 1 February 1950, complaining that he was just as “great an 
exhibitionist as Evatt” and that “Doidge took an instant dislike to him.”20 Spender and Doidge’s 
relationship—and, consequently, Australia and New Zealand’s relationship—did not improve 
in the immediate future. Less than four months later, McIntosh noted that not only do Spender 
and Doidge “not get on,” but that there is “no common link” between the Australian and New 
Zealand Cabinet.21  
No common link between the Australian and New Zealand Cabinet’s stemmed in part from 
Spender’s relentless pursuit of a regional defence arrangement with the United States as well 
as his ambitious Colombo Plan (a multinational initiative to assist in the economic recovery of 
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South and Southeast Asia) that he introduced at the Colombo Conference in January 1950.22 
These objectives were not pursued as vigorously by the Holland Government. For instance, 
after US Assistant Secretary of State William Butterworth told Laking at a meeting in 
Washington in mid-November 1949 that the United States would not “undertake any firm of 
formal commitment” to New Zealand’s security, Laking suggested that New Zealand might 
merely commit to an “act of faith” with the Americans and hope that “they (the United States) 
will support us [New Zealand] if we should be menaced from Asia.”23 
Spender might not have been the ideal man to improve Australian-New Zealand relations, 
yet as far as the pursuit of Australia’s foreign policy objectives were concerned, he was a more 
than capable replacement for Evatt. He was, as Berendsen predicted, a man of “intellectual 
gifts,” but Spender was also blessed with an “incomparably more attractive personality” than 
Evatt. On first glance, he also seemed more “ideally equipped to succeed” where Evatt could 
not in securing a US guarantee.24 He was head-strong, experienced, and more than willing to 
stand up to Menzies—or anyone in Washington for that matter, should he think it was in 
Australia’s interest—to ensure that Australia’s post-war protection was secured; namely, 
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through a pact with the United States. The “future peace of the whole Pacific rested, almost 
entirely, upon the United States,” Spender had argued shortly before his appointment.25 
Spender also recognised that Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia presented just as 
clear a threat to Australia as did a potential resurgence of Japanese imperialism and aggression. 
Upon being handed the External Affairs portfolio, Spender’s primary task remained clear: 
enlist the United States as a guarantor of Australian security to repel either of these threats. His 
first job was to ensure that all of his officers, diplomats and staff members understood his vision 
for Australia’s relations with the world that revolved around a closer relationship with the 
United States. Before departing for the Commonwealth Conference in Colombo in January 
1950, he made his position clear to all Australian diplomatic posts on the future of Australia’s 
relations with the world. There was a clear “shift of the centre of gravity of the world’s affairs 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific,” Spender declared, adding that “[Australia’s] destiny is 
irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia.” He went to argue that the “rising and 
menacing tide of Communism in the East” presented a “definite threat” to the existence of 
Australia and New Zealand, and both nations had to “develop a dynamic policy” to respond 
effectively.26 
At the centre of this proposed policy was a closer relationship with the United States. 
Because of their “common British heritage” and “greater technical and industrial 
development,” Australia and the United States were the “two countries which can, in co-
operation one with the other, make the greatest contribution to stability.” In Spender’s view, it 
was only by “concerted action” that this was possible. Later, during a comprehensive speech 
in the Australian House of Representatives, Spender made his vision for Australia’s external 
relations clear to both the Parliament and general public. As part of Spender’s outlook, 
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maintaining Australia’s peace and security rested on four pillars: the Pacific, in Western Europe 
through cooperation with the British Commonwealth, the United Nations, and the United 
States. In outlining this last pillar, Spender said 
 
I have emphasised how essential it is for Australia to maintain the closest 
links with the United States for vital security reasons … we propose 
actively to maintain the official and personal contacts and interchanges 
which resulted from the urgent needs of a common military effort. 
 
To maintain these links at the highest level possible, Spender had a clear idea in mind: 
 
What I envisage is a defensive military arrangement having as its basis a 
firm agreement between countries that have a vital interest in the stability 
of Asia and the Pacific, and which are at the same time capable of 
undertaking military commitments … I fervently hope other 
Commonwealth countries might form a nucleus … [but] I also have in 
mind particularly the United States of America, whose participation would 
give such a pact a substance that it would otherwise lack. Indeed, it would 
be rather meaningless without her.27 
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On top of convincing the Americans, Spender had to persuade his own Prime Minister, 
Robert Menzies, that Australia needed a formal pact with the United States. Such a task was 
perhaps surprising, as during Menzies’s first term as Prime Minister (1939-1941) he had 
hoped for some form of US security guarantee and appealed to President Franklin Roosevelt 
for American aid during World War II.28 When it came to foreign policy during his second 
term as Prime Minister from 1949 onwards, however, Menzies changed this stance and 
appeared to believe firmly in the strength of the Commonwealth—or to be more precise, the 
strength of Australia’s relationship with Britain—as the most appropriate instrument for post-
war peace and security. The only other alternative, the United Nations, seemed unable to 
resolve disputes effectively enough for Menzies’s satisfaction. In Menzies’s view, the UN 
Charter appeared more like a “suicidal doctrine.”29 
Menzies dismissed a formal guarantee with the United States as an appropriate pursuit for 
Australia. A quintessential Anglophile and self-confessed to be “British to the boot-heels,” 
Menzies was unconvinced that a formal agreement with the United States had to be reached 
even though he had previously explored the possibility during World War II.30 For Menzies, 
such a pact might compromise Australia’s close relationship with the United Kingdom and 
the British Commonwealth. Moreover, he thought that the Americans were “uneasy about the 
stability of most Asiatic countries,” so a Pacific Pact should “not at present be on the map.” 
Australia “did not need a pact with America,” Menzies told his Deputy Prime Minister Arthur 
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Fadden in August 1950, because “they are already overwhelmingly friendly to us.”31 A pact 
with the United States, at least as far Menzies was concerned, was not the necessity that 
Spender proclaimed and was sceptical about a pact until it was nearly completed. At one stage, 
while Spender was straining every effort to conclude the alliance, Menzies remarked 
provocatively that “Percy is trying to build a castle on a foundation of jelly,” much to the 
annoyance of Spender and his wife Jean.32 
New Zealand Minister to the United States Carl Berendsen shared Menzies’s misgivings 
about a pact with the United States. He was not a believer in regional arrangements for peace 
and defence. For Berendsen, a Pacific Pact as it had been spoken about so far was 
“superficially attractive” and “ambiguous, imprecise and completely impracticable.” He 
feared the result might be Australia and New Zealand having to “defend the indefensible” in 
areas outside of their primary strategic interests. The New Zealand Military was equally 
unconvinced. The Chiefs of Staff in Wellington produced a defence report in April 1950 which 
outlined strategic thinking from a purely military perspective. It concluded that there was “no 
reasons on military grounds” to approach the United States for a Pacific Pact because they 
could see no direct threat to New Zealand. Europe clearly took priority for Washington, so 
New Zealand commitments to the Middle East were more likely needed over any deployment 
in the Far East. The United States, the Chiefs of Staff maintained, would certainly “prefer to 
see a New Zealand Division and RNZAF (Royal New Zealand Air Force) tactical forces 
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employed in the Middle East rather than tied down in the Far East in operations which would 
have no decisive effect on the ultimate outcome of the war.”33 
In reaching this verdict, the report considered New Zealand defence strategy as part of 
global Allied war against the Communists rather than specific to New Zealand’s defence 
requirements. “Strategy must be considered on the broadest possible basis,” the report 
concluded, “there can be no question of considering Atlantic strategy, Middle East strategy or 
Pacific strategy separately.” As a result of this broad assessment of the world situation and 
global strategy, there were only two scenarios in which a Pacific pact might be practical: an 
“inclusive understanding” between the United States, British Commonwealth countries and 
all non-Communist Southeast Asia countries, or a “limited arrangement” between the United 
States and British Commonwealth countries. The first scenario was dismissed on the basis that 
Southeast Asian countries were “not materially or mentally ready to enter into a collective 
defence pact.” With respect to the second scenario, the New Zealand Defence Chiefs argued 
that there was already a “like-mindedness” in meeting the Soviet threat between the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand which made a formal commitment unnecessary in a global 
Allied fight against the Soviet Union.34 
Berendsen, however, thought there was some merit to a limited arrangement that the New 
Zealand Defence Chiefs proposed. He recognised, for instance, that Australia and New 
Zealand’s limited defence capabilities and the grim realities of the world in the early 1950s 
left these countries little choice other than to secure a formal guarantee with the major sea 
power in the Pacific, the United States. Convinced that society was moving toward a third 
world war which would be brought upon by the “thugs and gangsters” of the Soviet Union, 
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Berendsen thought that Asia was a “boiling cauldron” that was “vibrant with resurgent 
nationalism.” In this cauldron, the situation seemed ideal for Soviet “fishing in muddy 
waters.” Since the dangers were so great and a world system of collective security so distant, 
he was “entirely ready” to accept a regional system as the best compromise available.35 To 
this end, Berendsen recognised that Spender and Doidge’s efforts to reach some sort of pact 
with the United States were perhaps in Australia and New Zealand’s best interests. “We are 
forced to look for something more real, more actual, more practical,” Berendsen told Doidge. 
“From our point of view,” he went on to suggest, “the logical conclusion which is so simple 
and obvious that it is present in everybody’s mind, and has been frequently advanced by 
Spender, is that what we essentially need in our defence is the assistance of the United 
States.”36  
As a compromise between his reservations for a complete defence arrangement and 
meeting New Zealand’s security requirements, Berendsen proposed a limited pact. Under this 
pact, the United States would commit to the defence of Australia and New Zealand in return 
for their support in defending Japan and the US position in Northeast Asia. The response in 
Wellington was disappointing. Doidge had not discussed the idea for over a month after 
Berendsen’s proposal was sent. When Doidge finally replied, he said he would be “very happy 
to consider it” because he regarded an American guarantee of New Zealand’s security as “the 
richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy.”37  
Doidge did not give much more consideration to this proposal. Instead, he remained 
convinced that New Zealand needed a full commitment from the United States. McIntosh 
informed Berendsen on 12 April that Doidge had not given his idea any consideration, writing 
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that “[Doidge] had not thought the thing out, indeed none of them (the Cabinet) will.”38 
McIntosh himself was also reluctant to pursue Berendsen’s limited pact proposal. He was 
particularly “appalled” by the prospect that New Zealand would have to take part in a 
guarantee for Japanese integrity so soon after fighting a major war against them.39 
 
The Dulles Appointment and the Outbreak of the Korean War 
In any event, up until mid-1950, there was no sign that talk of concluding a defence agreement 
with Australia and New Zealand, either limited or full-scale, had been considered seriously in 
the United States. As Second Secretary of the East Asia Section in the Australian Department 
of External Affairs David Dexter noted, “between the end of 1947 and mid-1950 the 
Americans showed little inclination to be involved in … a Pacific pact.”40 In Far Eastern 
matters, the Japanese Peace Treaty and its impact on the US-Soviet balance of power in East 
Asia had been the major subject of deliberation between the State Department and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. The former favoured moving toward a peace treaty, whereas the latter wanted 
no diminution of a “regime of control” in Japan.41 In a deadlock between restoring normal 
political and economic relations with Japan and a continued occupation—neither of which 
were “wholly desirable” for the United States—US Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
appointed John Foster Dulles as a special advisor for reaching a suitable peace settlement.42  
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Dulles’s appointment was crucial for three reasons. As a Republican, it allowed Truman and 
Acheson to fend off criticism that the Democrats were failing in Asia and were unwilling to 
take a bipartisan approach to meet their objectives. As a specialist in international affairs—he 
had been on the US Counsel for the Versailles Peace Conference in 1918, an adviser at the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945, and helped draft the preamble for the United Nations Charters—
Dulles brought considerable experience to the role and was able to reach a settlement in Japan 
in little over a year. From a historian’s vantage point, it is also possible to see that as a future 
US Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, his relationship with Australian and New Zealand 
policymakers would be pivotal in shaping the contours of the relationship for most of the 
decade. Dulles’s first task was to visit Tokyo to discuss a Japanese peace settlement with SCAP 
Commander Douglas MacArthur and as well as members of the Far Eastern Commission. His 
second task was to get Australia and New Zealand, the two most outspoken opponents of a soft 
peace treaty, to agree to a settlement that was also acceptable to the United States. Although 
their support was not essential, the State Department believed that Australian and New Zealand 
support for American policy in Japan was still “highly desirable.”43 
Obtaining Australian and New Zealand support for the Japanese Peace Treaty as quickly as 
possible became all the more urgent after mid-1950. In the early morning of 25 June, North 
Korean (DPRK) forces crossed the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula and began a full-scale 
invasion of South Korea with the support of the Soviet Union.44 The United States, believing 
that the North Korean advance was Soviet-inspired aggression, was quick to commit US 
ground forces which were readily available in Japan. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson put 
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it, decisive action was necessary “as a symbol [of the] strength and determination of [the] 
west.” To do less would encourage “new aggression action elsewhere and demoralize 
“countries adjacent to [the] Soviet orbit.”45 
Acheson was concerned that the outbreak of the Korean War put Japan within striking 
distance of the Communist advance. He was also concerned that such aggression, and a US 
failure to meet and repel that aggression, would encourage Communist aggression elsewhere 
in Asia. Determined to meet this challenge, the US Government approved relocating military 
divisions from Japan to the Korean peninsula immediately. Truman also approved a sizeable 
increase to the US defence budget. On 19 July, he announced plans to increase army personnel 
from 630,000 to 834,000, naval warships from 238 to 282, and attack planes from 48 to 58. To 
fund this program expansion, he asked Congress for ten billion dollars and requested 260 
million dollars from the Atomic Energy Commission.46 
With an American need for an increased war effort, Australia and New Zealand were 
uniquely placed to provide much needed military support to the United States. It was the perfect 
opportunity to demonstrate that Canberra and Wellington were prepared to support the US bid 
for UN intervention in Korea, which was approved shortly after the North Korean invasion 
(The Soviet Union could not veto the resolution because at the time it was boycotting the UN 
over the non-recognition of Communist China). Both Acheson and MacArthur urged Canberra 
to supply material aid and battalions to Korea.47 Menzies was in London where he argued that 
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Australian troops should not be sent to Korea because of their small number and would prevent 
an Australian contribution to the Commonwealth defence in the Middle East.48  
Spender, however, saw Korea as a blessing in disguise with respect to his Pacific Pact 
ambitions and pushed for a speedy Australian response. Spender cabled Menzies in early July, 
warning that the “heat may be put on us for further aid” after UN Secretary General Trygve 
Lie urged over fifty UN members to supply more ground forces in Korea. Receiving no 
response and growing agitated, Spender wrote to Menzies again on 17 July arguing that from 
“Australia’s long-term point of view, any additional aid we can give to the US now, small 
though it may be, will [be repaid] in the future one hundred fold.” Spender added that “if we 
refrain from giving any further aid, we may lose an opportunity of cementing friendship with 
the US which may not easily present itself again.”49 
Menzies was unconvinced. After attending a British Cabinet meeting, he pointed out that 
for Australia there was a “great danger in allowing the Korean affair to disturb our strategic 
planning based on the importance of the Middle East and on our national service scheme.”50 
Menzies’s stance on Korea became increasingly isolated, especially after the Australian 
Embassy in Washington suggested “the Korea attack has given fresh impetus to the 
consideration of Spender’s initiative and ideas.” Embassy staff also suggested that “prior 
consultation between Australia and the United States would have been helpful in meeting the 
sudden crisis” and that “some machinery for automatic consultation would be helpful in 
meeting future crises.”51 Determined not to let this opportunity slide, Spender phoned Acting 
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Prime Minister Arthur Fadden to issue a statement that Australia had decided to send troops to 
Korea, who agreed reluctantly. Even without their Prime Minister at home to object, Spender 
was able to push for an Australian contribution to Korea in the hope that it might encourage 
the State Department to better see the benefits of a Pacific Pact with Australia. 
Australia’s quick support for the US response in Korea was welcomed in the United States. 
There was “genuine gratification at Australia’s prompt response” in the United States, the 
Australian Embassy in Washington cabled to Canberra.52 Moreover, Spender suggested to 
Menzies that Australia should capitalise on this response and seek a formal defence pact. “This 
immediate action by Australia made a strong impression on official and unofficial American 
opinion which has resulted in the closest of friendly relationships,” Spender argued. He added 
that in order for Washington to realise the benefits of a pact, Australia should demonstrate to 
the United States that it was wholeheartedly prepared to support US policy in the Pacific. 
Otherwise, the “Australian attitude might be misunderstood and the genuine warmth of [the] 
present relationship since the opening of the Korean conflict may be diminished.”53 
Meanwhile, New Zealand also announced quickly that it would support the US and UN to 
repel the North Korean advance. On 1 July, Holland announced that two warships, Pukaki and 
Tutira, would be sent to the Korea area. He later committed a special combat unit to the fighting 
in Korea. In so doing, Wellington demonstrated that New Zealand was likewise willing to 
support the global fight against Communism and that it was a reliable ally in the Pacific theatre. 
Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador in Washington, was particularly praiseworthy of 
this quick response: “we have got kudos and widespread appreciation [in the United States] for 
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this immediate indication that we are one of those who do not confine our support of the 
principles of freedom to words alone.”54  
Yet over and above any benefit this move had in Washington, New Zealand’s hasty response 
was primarily through British consultation and consideration of London’s attitudes. 
Wellington’s decision to make a naval deployment into Korean waters and subsequent land-
force contributions was because New Zealand was “unprepared to undertake a military, and 
through it a political commitment which required it to act independently of a familiar and 
secure British-led Commonwealth.”55 It is therefore a “stretch,” as Ann Trotter points out, to 
suggest that New Zealand went to Korea purely to achieve an alliance with the United States.56 
After incessant pressing by the Australian Government, the New Zealand military response 
was likewise not part of a combined ANZAC Brigade. “That is the very thing we do not want 
to do,” McIntosh told Berendsen on 7 August, “we can supply artillery, [and] we would feel 
safer in having this particular type of unit and my own view is that we should stick to it.” In 
response, Berendsen agreed and thought such a plan would be “disastrous.” If New Zealand 
co-operated with Australia militarily in Korea, “there [was] no doubt at all about it that the 
Australians would shove us right into the background and we will get no credit whatsoever for 
this force which will be represented as, and certainly accepted as, Australian.”57 
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ANZUS Negotiations, 1950-51 
By late 1950, concluding some form of a defence arrangement became more practical for 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. American policymakers saw a treaty with 
Australia and New Zealand as a means to reach a speedy settlement of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty. In Australia, Spender accepted this trade off and hoped to conclude as binding an 
arrangement as possible with the United States. New Zealand, however, continued to favour a 
limited arrangement through a Presidential Declaration. There was in fact significant 
apprehension amongst New Zealand diplomats and military officers about concluding a 
binding arrangement with the United States. This section explores these views through 
examining negotiations for the ANZUS Treaty in late 1950 and early 1951. 
The outbreak of the Korean War signalled to American policymakers that Communism was 
a growing danger in the Asia-Pacific and stronger efforts must be made to prevent its spread. 
It could not, however, continue to do so alone. The US was bearing the overwhelming brunt of 
the war effort through both the financial cost of funding military equipment and loss of lives. 
“Ninety percent of the casualties were American,” the US Joint Committee on Armed Services 
and Foreign Relations recorded, adding that “the plain truth is that the United States has footed 
most of the bill in money and has furnished most of the men and equipment.”58 
In consideration of this heavy burden, the State Department was particularly praiseworthy 
of Australia’s quick response to the Korean War. “The prompt reaction of Australia to the 
invasion of Korea and the unanimous vote of approval given by the Australian parliament to 
the military measures taken by the Government,” a State Department memorandum noted on 
24 July, “afforded a good indication of the close identity of views between the United States 
and Australia on matters of fundamental importance.”59 It is interesting to note that little 
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mention was made of New Zealand, suggesting that perhaps Berendsen was correct in his 
concerns that Wellington’s contributions to Korea would get overshadowed by the Australian 
contribution. 
In any event, the State Department opened its doors for discussions towards concluding a 
formal defence treaty.  Allen Brown, Australian Secretary for the Prime Minister’s Department, 
reported this change in US policy in early August 1950. While visiting Washington, he cabled 
Spender on 3 August to say that in a meeting with Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs 
Dean Rusk and other members of the US Far Eastern Bureau, Rusk told him that the State 
Department’s views toward a pact were now “very fluid” and were “willing to exchange 
ideas.”60 This willingness stemmed from an increasing need to finalise a suitable peace 
settlement in Japan as the situation in Korea worsened. As Chapter One examined, Australia 
and New Zealand were outspoken opponents of a soft peace treaty without suitable assurances 
that Japan would not again be a menace in Asia. In September 1950, the United States entered 
into discussions with other governments in the Far Eastern Committee about the Japanese 
Peace Treaty. Dulles, charged with the primary responsibility of reaching an agreement over 
Japan, made it clear that the basic American aim was a treaty that restored Japanese sovereignty 
and kept Japan as an American ally. American desire for a multilateral peace treaty with Japan 
offered Australia an opportunity to achieve its own objectives; namely, an American guarantee 
of its security in exchange for Australian acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty. 
Spender was excited by the prospect that the United States was now more open to 
discussions for a Pacific Pact. As a result, he worked harder than ever to “sow the seeds” for a 
formal defence commitment from the United States.61 Spender undoubtedly saw such a 
commitment as vital to Australian security interests, but in his discussions with American 
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policymakers after the Korean War had begun, Spender also stressed that Australia desperately 
needed a pact in order to be more closely involved in the global planning and international 
decision making processes by Western powers. Meeting with President Truman on 15 
September, Spender stressed that in the Japanese war Australia had “thrown all she had into 
that conflict.” He added that its recent commitment to Korea demonstrated further that 
Australia “could be counted upon in an emergency to give the utmost of her manpower and 
equipment to meet all new crises.” This, according to Spender, “should merit a greater degree 
of consideration in matters of consultation among the great powers.” “Australia did not have 
any say in most of the important international decisions now being made by the friendly 
powers,” Spender told Truman, suggesting that it was a “great handicap to his country.”62 
Truman sympathised with Spender and the Australian position, but suggested that this was 
a matter that he should take up with Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Disappointed by this 
response from the President, Spender commented publicly at a UN General Assembly in New 
York that Australia was keen for a regional defence pact and had clear ideas about what scope 
it should take. He told Alan Watt on 15 September a Pacific Pact should be as wide as possible, 
“including the countries of the Indian Ocean capable of entering into firm commitments, but 
that if that were not possible, then an area generally including Australia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, North America and Great Britain.” He also had no objection to including South 
American countries.63 
Spender soon received a clearer idea on US thinking towards Japan and a regional pact. On 
22 September, Dulles pulled Spender aside during US negotiations with Far Eastern 
Commission nations for the peace settlement in Japan. Dulles presented a seven-point 
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memorandum which outlined that the United States had plans to revitalise Japan as a military 
power that was friendly to the United States. According to Dulles, this was because Japan was 
no longer one single problem but part of a broader struggle against Communism.  It was in 
America’s self-interest that “Japan should be denied to [Russia] and attracted to the side of the 
Western democracies.”64 Spender was not pleased by this memorandum. Recalling the 
meeting, John Allison, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, penned 
that “[Spender’s] face grew more and more suffused with colour. At one point, I thought he 
would burst a vessel.”65 Spender told Dulles that Australia could not subscribe to a Japanese 
treaty unless there were adequate assurances for Australia’s protection. In other words, to “allay 
Australia’s fears,” he wanted a “formal commitment by the United States.” In response, Dulles 
told Spender that Australia’s security was assured through a continued US presence in Japan. 
Nevertheless, he recognised Australian trepidations and suggested “some compromise might 
have to be found.”66 
At the same time, Doidge surprisingly cooled towards the idea. Although Doidge had 
initially been a strong supporter of a Pacific Pact, his enthusiasm dropped once the war in Korea 
began. Again, unlike Spender, he also had no clear idea of what form a pact should take. In 
September 1950 Doidge proclaimed in the New Zealand Parliament 
 
My own view now, and I think the view of the government, is the pact is not 
as necessary as we thought it was six months ago. It is unnecessary now 
because of what is happening in Korea. Today the United States of America 
                                                          
64 See Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, 45. 
65 John Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1973), 151. 
66 Australian Mission to the United Nations to External Affairs, 22 September 1950, NAA, A816, 19/304/451; 
Cablegram to the Department of External Affairs, 22 September 1950, NAA, A1838, 532/11 part i. 
101 
 
is in the Pacific. I think she is there now as a permanent partner in the policing 
of the Pacific.67 
 
There was equally little enthusiasm by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs to 
collaborate with Australia on the matter. It was not a surprise that Spender complained that 
“even New Zealand displayed little active interest” in the pact proposals he made in late 1950.68 
Doidge, nevertheless, left for Washington in October to discuss a regional defence pact with 
the United States. While in Washington, New Zealand-American talks appeared to reignite 
Doidge’s interest in a pact but did not take the shape he had advocated previously. Doidge 
recalled that after the discussions in Washington, the US was still a crucial signatory to any 
regional agreement but suggested different treaty signatories than did Spender. He told 
Parliament on 2 November that there can be “no satisfactory pact without the United States, 
Canada and India,” and that the “Pacific pact should be the natural corollary to an Atlantic 
Pact.”69 This was not the same view he had several months earlier when he thought such a pact 
was unnecessary. A pact similar in scope to the Atlantic Pact would most likely entail a direct 
New Zealand military commitment to defend US interests in the region. 
This was also not the pact Spender was suggesting. A month earlier, Spender had stressed 
to US Assistant Secretary of State John Hickerson in a meeting on 12 October that Indian 
inclusion was “unlikely” and that the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and 
possibly the Philippines were the only “essential” potential treaty signatories. Spender also 
dismissed Canada because it had “heavy obligations in Europe” and was “not deeply interested 
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in the Pacific.”70 Disagreement over the scope of membership aside, Spender’s impetus for 
pursuing a regional pact had an additional layer that Doidge was not considering. On top of 
reassuring against future Japanese aggression, Spender wanted a Pacific Pact because Australia 
was not associated with any “body of nations dealing with global strategy or similar questions.” 
If there were a Pacific Pact with Australia as a member, it could be “brought into consultation” 
with US military planning that the Pentagon was currently unwilling to share with Canberra.71 
Dulles’s task to find a solution in Japan became all the more urgent once Chinese forces 
intervened in the Korean War in late November 1950. With Chinese involvement in Korea and 
the situation fast deteriorating, Dulles informed New Zealand that he hoped to devise “some 
satisfactory means of assuring the government and people of New Zealand” as soon as possible. 
At the same time, the State Department told Spender that they were giving “active 
consideration” to his proposals for a Pacific Pact.72  
Further interest came from Undersecretary Dean Rusk, who appeared more sympathetic to 
Australia and New Zealand’s interest in securing US protection. As a means of enlisting 
Australian and New Zealand support for the Japanese Peace Treaty, Rusk proposed a plan for 
a Presidential Declaration that announced both countries were defensively tied to the United 
States. “There is merit in tightening our relationship with Australia and New Zealand,” Rusk 
told Deputy Under Secretary of Political Affairs Elbert Matthews on 9 October, and the US 
should consider “a more formal statement of mutual security commitments.” This statement, 
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Rusk thought, would be welcomed by Spender and the Australian government. “It is unlikely 
that the Australians would press for more than this,” Rusk added, “[Australia and New Zealand] 
appear to be interested not so much in written assurances of military protection as in an 
opportunity to participate more closely in military and political planning.”73 Doidge and New 
Zealand would have been content with such a statement, but Spender wanted a more binding 
commitment. He later told Rusk that while he appreciated Rusk’s sincerity toward establishing 
a closer Australian-American relationship, a Presidential Statement was “not sufficient at all.” 
Australia, in Spender’s view, required “something of more substance.”74  
 After Spender rejected a Presidential Statement, Allison suggested to Dulles in early 
December that he and the US should give greater consideration to a formal defence 
arrangement with Australia and New Zealand. For Allison, a security treaty was a worthwhile 
commitment to ensure a speedy Japanese settlement after the recent intervention of Chinese 
forces in the Korean War. “In my opinion,” Allison told Dulles, the United States should 
consider concluding “mutual defence arrangements with New Zealand, Australia and the 
Philippines.”75 Five days later, Allison again raised the pact idea with Dulles. Allison’s general 
proposal for a Pacific collective security pact would “have the dual purpose of defending Japan 
from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that Japan would be on their side and not 
a menace to them.” After these discussions, Dulles wrote to Acheson and stressed that the US 
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must consider all measures that might hasten an acceptable settlement. In other words, Dulles 
thought that a Pacific Pact with Australia and New Zealand “may be necessary.”76 
Allison also told David McNicol, Australia’s Second Secretary in its Washington Embassy, 
that discussions for a formal defence arrangement were now being given greater consideration 
in the State Department. “There was now considerably more support in the State Department 
for a Pacific Island Pact,” he told McNicol confidentially on 9 December, adding that Dulles 
had “come around to the support of a Pacific Pact.”77 In response, Spender and the Australian 
government increased its demands for a pact with the United States in exchange for agreeing 
to the Japanese Peace Treaty and remilitarisation plans. After Spender was informed of 
Allison’s briefing, he announced publicly that the need for a regional pact has become “more 
urgent.” Australia was “not satisfied that Japan [could] be trusted with military power,” 
Spender said on 11 January 1951, because it was “too great a gamble for Australia to be asked 
to take [without] effective regional security.”78 
At the 1951 Prime Minister’s Conference in January, Australia continued to take a 
noticeably hard line toward the Japanese Peace Treaty. Australia was alarmed at the “tendency 
to slip into an easy treaty” Australian High Commissioner in London Eric Harrison said. 
Australia objected to the possibility of Japan’s military resurgence and distrusted Japan to 
remain a loyal ally. Australia, he said, needed security against future Japanese aggression.79 In 
London, New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland took a similar line but was more flexible 
than the Australians. While he conceded that New Zealand interests were “much the same” as 
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Australia’s, its fear of Japanese aggression was “slightly less.” In terms of opposing a soft 
peace treaty for Japan, Holland was “not prepared to push this point too far.”80 
Holland’s reluctance to follow the Australian line in London and press hard for a 
comprehensive Pacific Pact reflected a growing belief in the External Affairs Department that 
New Zealand’s political and military interests would be best served by concluding as an 
informal an arrangement as possible with the United States. Shortly after the Prime Minister’s 
Conference, an External Affairs Department memorandum that was prepared for the New 
Zealand Chiefs of Staff in late January considered three possible types of arrangements with 
the United States in exchange for agreeing to the Japanese Peace Treaty. The report concluded 
that the disadvantages resulting in a comprehensive NATO-type pact that the Australians were 
pursuing would outweigh any advantages for Wellington, citing that it would “provide little 
reassurance against the long-term threat from Asia … and impair the ability of Australia and 
New Zealand to meet that threat.”81 Alternatively, the usefulness of a “limited” pact similar to 
the idea Berendsen proposed could not yet be determined because further studies needed to be 
made into New Zealand’s military capacity while its commitments continued in the Middle 
East. Dismissing these two possibilities, the report concluded that the best outcome was a 
declaration from President Truman that the United States would defend New Zealand, even 
though the Australian attitude to such an arrangement would be unfavourable. “Such an 
undertaking,” the report conceded, “would be insufficiently precise to afford Australia real 
assurance of American assistance in the event of hostilities in the Pacific.”82 
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Meanwhile, the State Department proposed to the Australian and New Zealand External 
Affairs Departments that Dulles visit in mid-February to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty and 
the question of a Pacific security arrangement. Holland and his External Affairs Department 
were unsure of whether Dulles would also stop in Wellington or whether there would be joint 
talks in Canberra. When his visit was first proposed, New Zealand got word that Dulles thought 
combined talks in Canberra would be better in case “time did not allow him to visit both 
countries.”83 As the weaker party, New Zealand thought joint talks were best and proposed that 
Doidge and the New Zealand delegation would meet Spender and Dulles in Canberra. From a 
New Zealand perspective, joint talks potentially disposed of the possibility that major policy 
differences between Australia and New Zealand would be noticeable to Dulles. There was also 
a danger that if Dulles met with Doidge after he did with Spender, Australia would make 
“impossible demands” and it would be difficult for Doidge or anyone else in New Zealand to 
argue against them.84 If the discussions proceeded independently in Canberra and Wellington, 
New Zealand could be faced with an agreement it did not like and which it would find difficulty 
in changing.85 
For their part, the Australians feared that having Doidge at the talks with Dulles would be 
inhibiting. While his presence might project solidarity between Australia and New Zealand, it 
could also prevent Spender from putting forward his point of view as forcefully. New Zealand 
had not, after all, shown the same level of opposition to Japanese rearmament at the recent 
Prime Ministers Conference in London. In other words, New Zealand and Australia did not 
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approach the Dulles talks with the sense of solidarity and confidence in one another that might 
have been expected from two neighbouring countries importuning the United States.86  
Allison drew up US plans for Dulles’s visit. These drafts were then forwarded from Dulles 
to US Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup. So far as membership for a pact was concerned, the 
draft proposed six signatories: the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia 
and New Zealand. Dulles explained in early January that one major consideration was to “give 
significant reassurance to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines so that they will consent 
to a peace treaty with Japan which will not contain limitations upon rearmament.” To alleviate 
these fears, Dulles raised the possibility of a defence council, where Australia and New Zealand 
could be afforded a “voice in how Japan’s defence forces progressed.” Above all else, however, 
Dulles stressed that it was essential that the US “should not become committed to the Pact 
unless it is assured that the other Parties will agree to the kind of Japanese Peace Treaty the 
United States feels is necessary.”87 
Allison forwarded Dulles’s plans to Australian Second Secretary in Washington David 
McNicol on 21 January. The confidential brief emphasised strong US support for a Pacific 
Pact. The Department of Defense “favoured” a pact and some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
“very keen.” The Far Eastern sub-committees of the House and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee also both approved of the idea. Allison stressed that Dulles had in mind “an 
arrangement not quite as formal as [NATO].” In other words, US thinking did not necessarily 
contemplate an “attack upon one, attack upon all provision” and an “organic link” with 
NATO.88 
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Meanwhile, the New Zealand military reconsidered the preferred structure and scope of a 
defence arrangement with Australia and the United States. It was concluded amongst the New 
Zealand Defence Chiefs that an informal guarantee of New Zealand’s security in the form of a 
Presidential announcement seemed to best suit its interests. In reaching this conclusion, it was 
decided that a formal pact could never be confined to the Southwest Pacific. Rather, a pact 
would only serve US interests in Northeast Asia and commit Australian and New Zealand 
forces there. “The United States cannot give a direct and precise guarantee to New Zealand and 
Australia which are in any case remote from the centre of the danger,” the Chiefs concluded, 
adding that “only in connection with [American] arrangements in the Philippines and Japan 
that sufficient Congressional and public support could be given for an extension of American 
commitments to Australia and New Zealand.”89 
As New Zealand policymakers decided that a formal defence arrangement with the United 
States did not meet their strategic interests, the External Affairs Department agreed that a 
Presidential Declaration announcing a US commitment to the defence of Australia and New 
Zealand was the best course of action. The Department suggested that Doidge should keep this 
possibility in mind during talks with Dulles later in February.90 Since Wellington did not feel 
“any immediate threat to New Zealand or the Pacific,” no formal pact was required. Instead, a 
“Presidential Statement would be useful.”91 Doidge left for Canberra with the proposal for a 
Presidential guarantee as his first preference. 
Australia wanted no part in the Presidential Statement, nor could it accept any arrangement 
other than a formal commitment from the United States. In Spender’s view, any agreement 
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short of a formal guarantee of US protection in the Asia-Pacific would be “worthless” to meet 
its security needs.92 Spender argued that the preferred arrangement was a “treaty in solemn 
form.” Dulles’s visit might be the “last opportunity” Australia and New Zealand had to secure 
an American guarantee, he told Doidge, so it was imperative that they co-operated and did not 
squander the opportunity.93 In the end, it was agreed that it would be counterproductive to 
propose different things to Dulles. Spender and Doidge finally agreed to push for the same 
tripartite pact, to which Spender commented later that New Zealand had finally “seen the 
light.”94 
After meeting with Japanese representatives in Tokyo to finalise the arrangements for a 
peace treaty, Dulles flew to Canberra where official talks began on 15 February. Dulles stressed 
immediately to both Spender and Doidge the US plans for post-occupied Japan and unlimited 
rearmament. According to Dulles, a continued US military presence in Japan should quell 
Australian and New Zealand concerns over revived Japanese aggression. Moreover, according 
to Dulles, any restrictions on Japanese rearmament were counterproductive for American 
efforts to prevent the spread of Communism. In Dulles’s words, the United States saw Japan’s 
role in the Cold War as a “screen of power” against Communist aggression in Northeast Asia, 
thereby justifying its plans for a speedy peace treaty that allowed for rearmament.95 
Spender seemed unconvinced. Whether he truly disagreed with Dulles or was cunningly 
using “the negotiating value of Australia’s agreement to sign a peace treaty as a lever to obtain 
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an effective security guarantee,” he told Dulles that Australia could not so easily accept a soft 
policy toward Japan. He argued that Australia needed adequate assurances that it was safe from 
any future Japanese aggression. “[Australia] is not satisfied that in the long-run, it was whole 
unlikely that [Japan] would not … present any menace to peace” Spender replied.96  
New Zealand had always been more pessimistic about Australia and New Zealand’s chances 
of influencing a Japanese Peace Treaty. For example, in regards to Japan, McIntosh had long 
thought “all [New Zealand] could do is to plug the old line and see what, if anything can be 
salvaged.” For McIntosh, it seemed unrealistic to hope for the demilitarisation of Japan based 
purely on Australian and New Zealand objections. The only acceptable compromise was a 
“guarantee against Japanese aggression.”97 In a similar spirit, Doidge expressed New Zealand’s 
reservations about the long-term possibility of revived Japanese aggression. Doidge told Dulles 
that his explanation for the US plan for Japan in the short term was “highly convincing,” but it 
“did not seem to cover the long term possibilities.”98 Australia and New Zealand needed some 
other guarantee to cover themselves against the long-term prospects in Japan. 
Doidge also raised concerns about New Zealand military commitments elsewhere. Holland 
had told him that he was concerned about what a Pacific Pact might mean for its obligations in 
the Middle East if its provisions did not adequately protect New Zealand’s security concerns 
closer to home. “We cannot do both,” Doidge said to Dulles passing on Holland’s reservations, 
“a Pacific Pact [cannot] lead us into obligations which would conflict with those we took to 
fulfil in the Middle East.” Doidge added that it was “folly of securing the front door and leaving 
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the back door open.” New Zealand’s military commitment to global strategy could only be met, 
as Doidge stressed, with a “guarantee from the United States” in New Zealand’s “back door.”99 
As a possible compromise, talks moved towards a trilateral regional security pact. When 
Spender and Doidge argued for a pact on 16 February, Dulles spoke about the difficulties it 
would cause for the Philippines, which only had an informal US guarantee.100 He also raised 
Britain’s clear objections to a pact, as the British Foreign Office did not want to see a US treaty 
with two Commonwealth nations that excluded Britain as a signatory. Spender, who was 
unaware Britain had pressed the United States to reconsider discussions for a pact with 
Australia and New Zealand, protested vehemently. He pointed out that Britain was no longer a 
major Pacific power and its objections were not relevant.101 In Spender’s view, Australia 
needed a formal security arrangement as most in the fear that Japan might again become a 
“spearhead of aggression.”102 
After lengthy discussions, Dulles agreed to examine possible draft tripartite pacts. Ralph 
Harry, part of the Australian delegation during the talks, prepared a possible treaty. Harry had 
studied the NATO treaty and hoped to model his draft on its provisions, suggesting that Dulles 
was more likely to accept its clauses if “every point … [had a] precedent in some other treaty 
to which the US was a party.”103 Harry’s draft, although amended to meet Dulles’s more 
specific demands about the scope of any commitment, provided a solid base for discussions 
between Spender, Doidge and Dulles on 17 February. At the conclusion of the meeting, the 
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Even after a draft treaty was agreed upon, there were still three potential issues that threatened 
to derail the entire project. The first was getting the treaty through the US Senate. In the lead 
up to its presentation to the Senate, Spender and Berendsen were still discussing with Dulles 
changes to the wording. Berendsen was particularly apprehensive about what these discussions 
might entail. “Here we have been offered on a platter the greatest gift that the most powerful 
country in the world could offer to a small and comparatively helpless group of people and we 
persist in niggling and naggling about what seems to me to be the most ridiculous trifles,” 
Berendsen told McIntosh on 25 June. He added that this sort of “stupid pin-pricking” could 
“cost us very dearly.” Berendsen feared that late objections to the treaty’s provisions would 
prevent getting it through the Senate. “It is not Acheson, Rusk, Dulles, the President and the 
State Department that we need to worry about,” Berendsen suggested, “it is the Senate, and my 
mind is on the Senate all the time.” Senate approval, according to Berendsen, was the “most 
difficult hurdle,” and trying to get further assurances from Dulles could “ruin the whole 
thing.”105 It certainly appeared that Berendsen had come around to the idea of a more binding 
commitment with the United States. 
The second issue was British objections to the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty. From 
London’s perspective, ANZUS demonstrated that Britain was incapable of protecting 
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Commonwealth countries in the Pacific and potentially threatened its positions in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaya. While British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kenneth Younger 
said publicly that the treaty was “a most useful contribution to Commonwealth strategy,” the 
British Government deeply resented the conclusion of ANZUS and was disappointed that it 
was not a member. “We are most certainly a Pacific power,” British Foreign Secretary Herbert 
Morrison argued, and “it would not have been unwelcome to us if we were included in the 
proposed pact.”106 
British efforts to stifle and undermine ANZUS came well before the treaty’s presentation to 
the Senate. While Dulles was in Tokyo finalising the peace treaty and post-occupied plans, 
Political Representative of the British Liaison Mission Sir Alvary Gascoigne told him that the 
UK Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to accept the US as Australia and New Zealand’s chief 
protector. “From the standpoint of the United Kingdom’s position as a world power,” he told 
Dulles on 2 February, the proposed Pacific Pact “would be interpreted in the Pacific and 
elsewhere as a renunciation of [Britain’s] responsibilities and possibly as evidence of [a] rift in 
policy between Britain and the United States.”107 He also argued that excluding Asian countries 
would encourage aggression in areas where Communist activity was highest. 
Then, during ANZUS negotiations, Britain went to great lengths to prevent the US signing 
a formal agreement with Australia and New Zealand by voicing its strong discontent in 
Washington. London “hated” the idea of the ANZUS Treaty and had been doing its best to 
“head the Americans off and get them to substitute a Presidential Declaration,” McIntosh 
suggested in March 1951. The British also played on Dulles’s concerns over the inclusion of 
the Philippines. As McIntosh described shortly after Dulles’s visit to Canberra, 
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The British are obviously doing their best to torpedo the whole thing and they 
want to represent to the Americans the undesirability of including the 
Philippines because of the adverse effect it would have on United Kingdom 
prestige, more particularly in United Kingdom territories like Borneo, 
Malaya, Hong Kong and so forth. The Australians are ropeable about the 
British. They say they have been doing everything they can before Dulles 
arrived and since he arrived to stop the treaty.108 
 
Although New Zealand still considered itself tied firmly to the Commonwealth and the British 
Empire, even the New Zealand External Affairs Department was upset with British efforts to 
stifle conclusion of the pact. Along with Britain’s sudden recognition of Communist China in 
January 1950 that caused a noticeable rift in Anglo-American relations, Berendsen argued to 
McIntosh in early April that Britain were “behaving like stupid children” and had done a “great 
deal of harm.”109 
Lastly, the final version and scope of the ANZUS Treaty had to be approved by the US 
military. Spender was particularly anxious about the military reaction to the ANZUS Treaty, as 
he hoped that it might provide a means for Australia to access US strategic planning and play a 
more direct role in global strategy. After Dulles left Canberra in February, Spender wrote to 
him on 8 March and said “I know you won’t mind me saying directly that we in this country 
are a metropolitan power in the Pacific and we hope that our view will be predominate.” He 
also hoped that closer ties with the United States might become a pretext for further US 
assistance in meeting Australia’s own defence production needs. In the same letter to Dulles, 
Spender wrote that “our objective is to get into full production, to increase our military forces 
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and to take steps necessary to ensure that defence needs have priority. The lead which the United 
States has given on these matters is an inspiration,” Spender added, but urged that Australia 
needed more assistance to deal with “serious industrial troubles.”110  
While the Department of Defense already indicated in January that the conclusion of the 
treaty was a favourable outcome for the United States, many top ranking US military officials 
now argued that the scope of American military and strategic consultation obligations should 
be as narrow as possible. In a combined State Department-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 11 
April, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman stressed the “value of informality in 
establishing joint planning” and indicated his preference for “leaving such arrangements out of 
the treaty.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley agreed with Sherman’s 
conclusions. In Bradley’s estimation, combined planning was “theoretically all right but 
practically objectionable” because those countries which had access to US strategic plans would 
become “too wide.”111 
Two days after this meeting, Secretary of Defense George Marshall even suggested at this 
late stage that from a military perspective any formal commitment to Australia and New 
Zealand’s defence was not an ideal outcome for the United States. “Any trilateral agreement 
with Australia and New Zealand should be made a simple understanding or public declaration 
rather than a formal pact.” Marshall wrote to Acheson on 13 April. At the very least, Marshall 
argued that “if political considerations are so overriding that a formal pact must be made, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the inclusion in the pact any reference to military plans, planning 
or organisations.”112  
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Recognising that a formal treaty was necessary for Australian and New Zealand 
acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles and Acheson refused to make a public 
declaration rather than a formal commitment. However, they accepted these military views and 
made sure to omit any reference to intimate military planning under the ANZUS Treaty. “In the 
case of the trilateral arrangement with Australia and New Zealand,” Dulles told Acheson, “we 
can, I think, make it clear that any organisation thereunder will not have the right to demand 
knowledge of and to participate in planning.”113 Issues surrounding Australian and New 
Zealand access to US and NATO planning through ANZUS will be explored further in Chapter 
Three. 
 
Conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty 
Despite these uncertainties, the US Senate approved the ANZUS Treaty. Several days before 
the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed formally, Acheson, along with Australian and New 
Zealand representatives Percy Spender and Carl Berendsen, signed the ANZUS Treaty at a 
ceremony at The Presidio in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. The treaty was planned to 
enter into force on 29 April 1952. Australia, New Zealand and the United States were now allied 
formally and agreed to respond to mutual dangers in the Asia-Pacific. As Acheson announced 
at the ceremony on 1 September, ANZUS represented “our common desire for peace” and 
suggested that “the treaty formally binds our peoples together in new ties of friendship and 
cooperation.”114 
After securing the agreement with the Americans, Spender similarly declared that ANZUS 
was a momentous landmark in Australian history. In his view, ANZUS did more than express 
formally the close ties of comradeship between the parties; it also marked "the first step in 
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building of the ramparts of freedom in the vast and increasingly important area of the Pacific 
Ocean.” He added that the treaty was "directed to regional security in the Pacific" and took the 
"first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening system of peaceful security 
in the vital area.”115  
Spender’s New Zealand counterpart, Frederick Doidge, also welcomed the conclusion of the 
treaty but appeared less convinced about its significance. The treaty represented “nothing new 
in the relationship of the three countries,” Doidge announced to the New Zealand House of 
Representatives on 13 July, as there was already “a deep and firm understanding on security 
between the United States and ourselves.” Unlike the other ANZUS powers, Doidge also 
alluded to the possibility of future British membership or consultation. In the same address, 
Doidge announced that “the New Zealand Government looks forward, in giving effect to the 
provisions of this treaty, to the closest consultation with the United Kingdom and other powers 
concerned with the security of the Pacific … both New Zealand and Australia have special 
obligations in defence as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.”116 The issue of 
British membership in ANZUS will be explored further in Chapter Three. 
Doidge’s comments aside, the ANZUS Treaty undoubtedly signalled a crucial new era of 
Australian-New Zealand-American relations. In finalising its conclusion, Spender achieved 
what most people thought might be impossible. Given the circumstances, he could not have 
secured a more binding commitment from the United States at the time. Dulles certainly meant 
what he said when he told Spender’s wife Jean that “there would have been no ANZUS without 
Percy.” Indeed, even in the face of active opposition in the United States, Britain and most of 
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the Commonwealth, it was probably the “most remarkable feat accomplished in the realm of 
international affairs by any Australian minister.”117 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty overshadowed the consistent disagreement between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States about mutual security issues and the overall 
nature of the relationship. The United States only seriously considered signing such a treaty 
after the outbreak of the Korean War and an increased need to secure trans-Tasman support for 
a Japanese Peace Treaty. Australia, on the other hand, wanted as binding a commitment as 
possible that was similar in scope to NATO. New Zealand preferably wanted a Presidential 
Declaration that outlined the United States was prepared to defend Australia and New Zealand 
if attacked. Even then, a formal defence pact allowed New Zealand to continue its military 
commitments to the British cause in the Middle East. Disagreement between the ANZUS 
powers, however, did not end with the treaty’s conclusion. The next chapter explores post-
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Conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty was a watershed moment in Australian and New Zealand 
history. After the 1944 Australia-New Zealand Pact, ANZUS was the first major international 
treaty that Australia and New Zealand signed which did not include Britain as a member. While 
policymakers in Canberra and Wellington stressed that its conclusion would not weaken their 
country’s ties to the British Commonwealth, ANZUS testified to Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s newfound security reliance on the United States during the early Cold War. Although 
it was a far less historic event in Washington, ANZUS enabled the United States to finalise the 
Japanese Peace Treaty and provide further support to its defence structure along the Pacific 
Rim. Even allowing for this difference, ANZUS was important for all three countries. 
This chapter examines relations between the ANZUS powers in the aftermath of the treaty’s 
conclusion from 1952 to 1954. The first section examines issues surrounding the treaty’s 
operation in-force, including its proposed machinery, the possibility of British membership, 
and potential multilateral treaties in Southeast Asia that could supersede ANZUS. It also 
explores changes in US national security strategies when Dwight Eisenhower replaced Truman 
as US President and how these changes affected ANZUS relations. An examination into these 
issues suggest that the ANZUS powers were still divided about the way in which the United 
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States would take a leading role in this relationship and where, if at all, Britain might play an 
intimate role in this partnership. 
The second section of this chapter examines responses to the 1954 Indochina Crisis. Recent 
historical works have outlined that the United States seriously contemplated intervening 
militarily during this crisis to stop the Communist advance in Southeast Asia. Yet in order to 
curb domestic concerns that the United States would become embroiled in another protracted 
and costly war, the Eisenhower Administration planned for military action through the guise 
of a multilateral intervention plan. Most historians suggest that this proposal was primarily 
directed towards gathering British support for military action (and in turn allaying domestic 
concerns about a potential US military response).1 Instead, this chapter argues that through 
additionally consulting with Australia and New Zealand on the plan for multilateral 
intervention, the United States (intentionally or otherwise) enabled these countries to play a 
more influential role in shaping US strategy than would otherwise be the case. During this 
crisis, US consultation with senior Australian and New Zealand ministerial officials not only 
aimed to gather support for the US plan but also aimed to get Canberra and Wellington to 
convince London to participate. As Fredrik Logevall pointed out in 2012, US Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles hoped that by “taking Canberra and Wellington into his confidence he could 
meaningfully alter London’s policy” during the crisis.2 
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By shifting the focus from US policy and Anglo-American relations to the Australian-New 
Zealand-American relationship during the crisis, this chapter also demonstrates that Britain’s 
unwillingness to participate in the “United Action” plan ultimately stifled agreement between 
the ANZUS powers on jointly responding with military action in Indochina. While Australian 
policies generally followed the US position, general elections scheduled for May prevented 
Canberra from committing to the proposal. Moreover, policymakers in Canberra were also 
reluctant to act in Indochina without British support. Across the Tasman, New Zealand policy 
toward the crisis hinged almost entirely upon the British position. Wellington repeatedly 
stressed that it could not contemplate sending troops to Indochina unless London also 
committed forces. When Britain, Australia and New Zealand all confirmed that they could not 
participate in the plan, the proposal fell apart. Finally, this chapter explores Australian-New 
Zealand-American views toward the creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) in the crisis’s aftermath. The failure of the “United Action” plan demonstrated to US 
policymakers that Britain must participate in SEATO. Moreover, as Australia and New Zealand 
both hoped for British participation, this section additionally argues that close trans-Tasman 
ties to Britain continued to shape the nature of the ANZUS relationship. 
 
Post-Treaty Issues 
Once ANZUS came into effect, there were still four key post-treaty issues that the signatories 
needed to address. Firstly, opinions were divided over the proposed machinery of the treaty. 
While New Zealand had no issues with the ANZUS consultation and discussion process, 
Australia wanted greater access to strategic and military planning done by NATO and the 
Pentagon. The Americans, however, were unwilling to provide such access. Secondly, opinions 
were also divided over the question of British membership. New Zealand wanted Britain to be 
included as a member of ANZUS, the United States opposed British inclusion, and Australia 
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remained ambivalent. Thirdly, once it was clear that Britain would not become a treaty 
member, planning began for a separate defence arrangement for Southeast Asia through the 
Five Power Staff Agency. Again hoping to include Britain, New Zealand thought that this new 
mechanism might be a means to merge ANZUS with Commonwealth defence planning in 
Southeast Asia. Australia, on the other hand, remained aloof until its diplomats received 
confirmation from Washington that ANZUS would not be superseded by these new defence 
arrangements. Washington did not intend to replace ANZUS with a broader defence 
mechanism in Southeast Asia, but major US commitments were put on hold until after the 1952 
elections. Finally, uncertainty over the future of ANZUS ensued after Dwight Eisenhower 
replaced Truman as US President in January 1953. In Australia and New Zealand, 
policymakers were concerned by new US national security strategies and whether the 
Eisenhower Administration viewed ANZUS as a serious commitment. This section explores 
Australian, New Zealand and American views towards these issues. 
 
The ANZUS Machinery 
After the ANZUS Treaty was finalised and presented to the public, Spender was replaced as 
Australian External Affairs Minister and reassigned as Australian Ambassador to the United 
States in April 1951. As he played an instrumental role in concluding the treaty, Spender 
thought he was best placed to influence decision making in Washington and look after 
Australian interests. “I believe the next two or three years will be critical years in the history 
of civilisation,” Spender wrote to former US Ambassador in Canberra Myron Cowen on 5 
April, “and it is in Washington that the decisions affecting the free world will be made.” 
Spender added that “I believe I can serve my country and the cause of peace in the world better 
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in the USA than I can in any capacity at the moment in Australia.”3 His replacement as External 
Affairs Minister, Richard Casey, was tasked with ensuring Spender’s efforts to secure the 
ANZUS Treaty was not in vain and worked to serve Australian interests; namely, greater 
Australian-American strategic co-operation and military information exchange from the 
Pentagon. He was a more than capable successor to Spender. Serving previously as Australia’s 
first Minister to Washington and a Cabinet Minister during the ANZUS negotiations, Casey’s 
thirty years of experience in international affairs made his appointment as External Affairs 
Minister a role “for which his whole life seemed to have prepared him.”4  
Even for Casey, it was not an easy assignment. ANZUS made no determination that 
American policymakers had to share its own strategies with Australia and New Zealand, nor 
did it specify that Canberra or Wellington must be informed of US intentions before any 
decisions were made. Annual ANZUS Council meetings between External Affairs and State 
Department officers as well as a small representation from the US military became the basic 
mechanism for trilateral discussions, yet these meetings were designed mostly for the 
Americans to outline already made plans rather than to consult with Australia and New Zealand 
over their perspectives, objections and interests. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson later 
recalled: 
 
Instead of starving the Australians and New Zealanders, we would give them 
indigestion. For two days we went over the situation in the world, political 
and military, with the utmost frankness and fullness. At the end they were 
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very happy with political liaison through the Council and military planning 
through the Commander in Chief Pacific.5 
 
At the insistence of United States military officials, discussions should be mostly political 
nor offer Australia and New Zealand any concrete information on military planning other than 
through the US Chief Commander in the Pacific. Joint military planning would mean “serious 
and far-reaching disadvantages to the present and projected state of United States planning for 
a global war,” the US Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Acheson, adding later that ANZUS should 
not “pressure the United States to a military effort which is disproportionate to its overall 
responsibilities and commitments.”6 
Members of the New Zealand External Affairs Department generally accepted this structure. 
As one adviser told Secretary McIntosh less than two weeks before the first ANZUS meeting 
in Honolulu during early August 1952, New Zealand “did not share the long-standing 
Australian objective of infiltration into the world’s policy-making hierarchy. Australia badly 
wanted to become the principal consultant of the United States,” the recommendation 
continued, “and at Honolulu her delegation [came] as near as demanding this outright.”7 
Instead, Frank Corner suggested that all that New Zealand was seeking from the United States 
was basic consultation in Far Eastern matters rather than the high level military and political 
discussions for which Spender had hoped. “What in fact we are all seeking to establish,” Corner 
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told McIntosh, is ANZUS as a kind of “Dominion status with the United States, [and] a right 
to be consulted in Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs.”8  
George Laking, another New Zealand External Affairs Officer, was not even convinced that 
ANZUS was in any way useful for New Zealand. “The plain fact is we are getting nothing at 
all from the Americans, who have a childish faith in their ability to fox one and all,” Laking 
complained to Secretary McIntosh on 25 June 1951. “The chances of our knowing the right 
answers before the press are five to four against,” he added, and “the secret of it all [was] that 
the Americans don’t know the answers themselves until it happens.”9 McIntosh certainly 
sympathised with Laking’s reservations. Along with Foss Shanahan and Joseph Wilson, two 
of New Zealand’s External Affairs Officers, McIntosh conceded that New Zealand “never 
wanted the damn Pacific Pact in the first place.”10   
Before the first ANZUS meetings even began in August 1952, Casey recognised the 
difficulties that ANZUS posed for Australia and New Zealand. “ANZUS represents [two] 
difficulties: the fact that there is one very strong partner and two others very much less strong, 
and that any threat to which [Australia] may be exposed must come from the southward 
expansionist ambitions of Communist China which must come by land,” Casey penned in his 
diary on 1 August. He added that “the fact that the US will not even consider any further land 
obligations on the Asian mainland makes for an obviously anomalous position.” Unfortunately 
for Casey, he knew that there was little Australia could offer the United States in return for a 
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greater commitment in Southeast Asia. “There are a many great things that we could ask the 
Americans for,” Casey conceded, but “few things that we could offer them in exchange.”11 
Spender, the architect of ANZUS, was having similar problems in Washington. He wrote to 
Casey in March that he had been “much concerned in the last two or three weeks by the obvious 
attempts which are being made at the Pentagon to diminish the importance of [ANZUS].” 
According to Spender, even Australia’s former enemies—Germany, Italy and Japan—had “the 
opportunity of consultation on vital matters in a manner which so far has been denied to 
Australia.”12 “We need to put flesh on the bones of the Pacific Pact,” Spender argued to Casey, 
suggesting that the powers needed to agree on a “wide flung strategy” and not ignore the needs 
of home defence.13 Much to Spender’s frustration, as Australia was not a NATO member, 
ANZUS was not allowing Australia to get its voice heard in any of NATO discussions. For 
Spender, this was important for Australia’s general strategic planning. “NATO decisions affect 
everyone and Australia should have the right to be heard, not only with respect to general 
strategic considerations but especially on matters directly affecting Australia,” Spender said in 
a State Department meeting on 20 May 1952. Spender, in other words, was “not content to be 
the hair on the tail of the dog.” He felt that Australia should at least be “part of the hide of the 
dog itself.”14 
Acheson was unprepared to meet Spender’s demands. Brushing off these concerns, Acheson 
proposed that “if the Australians wanted real contact with the American Government and its 
thinking on world problems, it was highly desirable that they keep in touch with the Department 
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of State and not continue to attempt to establish themselves in liaison with the Pentagon.” He 
added that “with particular regard to Pacific defence and its problems, the real planning was 
being done by Admiral Radford (US Chief Commander in the Pacific) and his staff in Hawaii. 
If the Australians and New Zealanders really wanted contact with US military planning 
operations, this was the place for it.”15 In short, Acheson advised that the Australians and New 
Zealanders should stick with their present contacts with the Department for information 
relating to global strategic plans. The ANZUS Council meetings were Australia and New 
Zealand’s supposed “door of entry” to information on US global planning, but not to NATO.16 
It was simply not possible for Australia and New Zealand to expect any greater access to 
the Pentagon through ANZUS. If the ANZUS meetings got through the organizational steps in 
good order, however, Acheson offered that he would present a total picture that would give 
them “plenty to think about and work on.”17 It was certainly not the consultation for which 
Australia had hoped. New Zealand diplomats, on the other hand, believed this method of 
consultation was appropriate. New Zealand delegates at the first ANZUS Council meeting in 
Hawaii described the trilateral talks as “a most successful one.”18 
 
British Membership of ANZUS 
ANZUS was complicated further by the question of British membership. For the first time in 
Australian and New Zealand history, the two former British colonies signed a major 
international defence treaty that did not include Britain as a member. London argued that its 
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exclusion was a blow to its international prestige, signalled a clear military weakness in the 
Commonwealth, and might cause a serious rift in Anglo-American relations. On these grounds, 
British policymakers ignored Australian and New Zealand representations and strongly 
objected to ANZUS. After the Foreign Office was initially unable to prevent the treaty’s 
conclusion in late early to mid-1951, British policy changed to press upon the ANZUS powers 
the need for British membership either directly as a signatory or indirectly as an observer to 
Council meetings. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden argued on 19 April 1951 that Britain 
should be included in the alliance because “any threat to either Australia or New Zealand must 
always be calculated as a threat to [Britain].” He went on to suggest that British interests in 
Malaya “make it essentially a Pacific Power.”19 
The Australians were divided over British membership. Given his long predisposition to 
support Britain and its policies abroad, Menzies was receptive to Eden’s reasoning and agreed 
that London should be included in ANZUS in some capacity. He told British officials on 5 June 
that he was “very much in favour” of closer association with the United Kingdom through 
ANZUS.20 He then told Casey and Spender that “[Australia] should not place any obstacle in 
United Kingdom efforts” to join ANZUS Council meetings as an observer … provided the 
Americans are willing to play and provided the United Kingdom request does not involve our 
acceptance of a string of other countries in the same capacity.”21 These last two points were 
crucial for Menzies. Firstly, Menzies recognised that American agreement to British observer 
status was a key condition. This suggests that Menzies had moved away from the idea of British 
leadership and recognised the need to rely upon the US position. Secondly, if the United States 
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agreed to British observer status, Menzies was willing to consider British consultation but 
feared that its inclusion meant that ANZUS might be expanded to include other Commonwealth 
countries. He did not want Australia becoming responsible for defending areas outside of its 
strategic interests. 
Spender was unconvinced. He feared British inclusion might strain Anglo-American 
relations and Britain’s relations with other Commonwealth countries. Most importantly for 
Australia, British inclusion might dilute the usefulness of ANZUS meetings to consult with the 
United States on matters of regional and global strategy. If the United States and Britain were 
both present at ANZUS meetings and squabbled over their own disagreements, Australia’s 
voice might become increasingly marginalised. Before Britain could be considered as an 
observer seriously, he told Eden that it was “absolutely essential that the United States and 
United Kingdom get their lines straightened out and agree upon a common approach” towards 
pressing disagreements between Washington and London.22 Spender also told Menzies on 6 
June 1952 that “while I appreciate the strength of [your observations] … before any questions 
of ‘observers’ or any extension of the Pact to include other nations should arise, the Council 
should be first established.”23 
Casey was more sympathetic to British concerns over exclusion from ANZUS. He 
recognised that the British were “very concerned about their being excluded from any official 
contact with the ANZUS Council.” He was also determined not to pursue closer US 
consultation at the expense of Australia’s relationship with Britain. Casey wrote at the outset 
of the first ANZUS Council meeting that “Australian relations with the US are close and 
confident, but I always have in mind the effect of any accord on the British. It would be counter-
                                                          
22 Spender to Eden, 15 March 1952, Spender Papers, NLA. 
23 Spender to Menzies, 6 June 1952, NAA, A1838/276, 686/6, part 1A. 
130 
 
productive if our good relations with [the] US were at the expense of bad UK-US relations.”24 
Along the lines of Menzies’s suggestion, he thought he might be able to work in “UK people 
into the ANZUS Council as British Liaison Officers,” even though he recognised that Australia 
must execute “caution in extending ‘observer’ rights to the United Kingdom or other 
countries.”25 Even if Britain did not become associated with ANZUS, Casey went as far as 
suggesting that Australia and New Zealand were already acting as British representatives for 
Commonwealth interests in the Asia-Pacific through ANZUS. “ANZUS [was] only a local 
manifestation of closer British-American relations,” Casey told the Australian Parliament in 
September 1952.”26 In other words, Australia and New Zealand would retain their roles as 
British outposts in the Pacific. 
While the Australians were overall divided over the question of British membership, the 
New Zealanders agreed almost unanimously that Britain must be included in some capacity. 
New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Clifton Webb thought that while “the 
Australians saw great difficulty for the United Kingdom to be associated with the Council,” 
New Zealand was “anxious to have the closest consultation with the United Kingdom on 
operation of [ANZUS].”27 Wellington had always been reluctant to adjust to American 
leadership in the Pacific because of its sentimental ties with Britain. Britain’s inclusion, even 
as an observer, was greatly appealing to Wellington.  
Including Britain also countered concerns in New Zealand that Australia and the US would 
dominate ANZUS discussions. “From New Zealand’s point of view,” a brief for the New 
Zealand delegation to the ANZUS Council meeting stated on 25 July 1952, 
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British participation would be a most useful counter-weight which would help 
to guard against [ANZUS] being influenced too much by Australia or the 
United States or both. United Kingdom would undoubtedly give a stability to 
the Council which might otherwise be lacking.28 
 
In short, while the Australians were primarily concerned that British inclusion might prevent 
closer consultation with the United States through ANZUS, the New Zealanders wanted British 
inclusion precisely because it would prevent Australia and the United States from dominating 
ANZUS discussions. 
After the first ANZUS meeting in August, McIntosh and Corner both expressed their 
concerns about British exclusion. On 3 October, McIntosh told Corner that he had “always 
wanted to have the United Kingdom in.” He even complained that during ANZUS meetings 
External Affairs Minister Webb “did not put up any fight whatsoever to have the United 
Kingdom in as observers.”29 In response, Corner replied that the real problem was US 
objections to British inclusion. “It seems to me,” Corner wrote to McIntosh in December 1952, 
that  
 
The American unwillingness to include Britain in ANZUS springs from a 
refusal to share real power in the Pacific with any other country. They will 
talk to Australia and New Zealand, and will be most forthcoming with us, 
because we are so unequal and represent no real challenge to their right of 
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decision. But the British are a different proposition and if they were admitted 
they would bring much greater weight and prestige and would require that 
America shared its power of decision.30 
 
Corner’s concerns about US opposition to admitting Britain into ANZUS proved to be correct. 
Casey told Acheson in the first ANZUS meeting in early August that he was under considerable 
pressure from the British to have them brought into ANZUS planning. He said that British 
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden “feels very deeply” on this question and had pressed Casey to 
push the British case. Acheson, in response, said he felt that this was “completely 
impossible.”31  
The United States, preferring to “go it alone” in the Pacific rather than including Britain, 
had no interest whatsoever in including it in ANZUS in any capacity. While Acheson told 
Menzies that he thought the ANZUS powers should “keep no secrets” from the United 
Kingdom, he was not prepared to offer them “any special consideration” through ANZUS.32 
After informing Eden of his decision in August 1952, Acheson’s stern comments ended any 
further serious discussion about British membership. Acheson was determined to assert that 
the United States was indeed the dominant power in the relationship and would not accept 
changes to the treaty that did not suit US interests. Unable to sway American opinion, British 
policymakers eventually conceded that “Australia and New Zealand had grown up” and 
London would not be directly associated with ANZUS in any capacity.33  
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The Five-Power Staff Agency 
After being rejected from ANZUS as an observer or otherwise, Britain instead pushed for the 
conclusion of a Five-Power Staff Agency between the United States, Britain, France, Australia 
and New Zealand for the collective defence of Southeast Asia. In December 1952, British, 
American and French representatives met in Paris and agreed in principle to a coalition for 
liaison on intelligence and other defence matters in the region. In a follow-up meeting in 
London, Churchill stressed that “it was unreasonable for ANZUS staff planners to deal with 
the Pacific and Southeast Asia without direct assistance from the British.”34 Then, in a separate 
meeting with Dominion representatives, Churchill told Australian and New Zealand Prime 
Ministers Robert Menzies and Sidney Holland that the Agency would essentially be a 
revitalised and widened version of previous ANZAM defence arrangements between their three 
countries. He handed both Menzies and Holland a newly revised British defence policy 
document called “The Future of ANZAM,” which outlined Britain’s plans for the Agency as 
well as a new focus on defending Malaya from Communist aggression.35 This plan, in short, 
aimed to expand previous Australian-New Zealand-British cooperation into a defence 
arrangement for Southeast Asia that also included the United States and France. In so doing, 
this arrangement would effectively “diminish [the] significance” of ANZUS and enable Britain 
to be as closely involved as possible in the defence planning for the region.36 
New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland was particularly excited at the prospect of 
creating a Staff Agency. If the United States agreed to take part in the Agency, Holland thought 
                                                          
34 External Affairs Memorandum, 16 January 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 434/8/1 Part 2. 
35 Meeting between Churchill, Menzies and Holland, 12 December 1952, NAA, A5954/1, 1424/1. 
36 Hiroyuki Umetsu, “The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: The UK Proposal to Revitalise 
ANZAM and the Increased Defence Commitment to Malaya,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 
4 (2004): 517. 
134 
 
it was a fantastic opportunity to incorporate Britain in Pacific defence planning after their 
attempts to join ANZUS were blocked by the State Department. It would be a “marriage of 
ANZUS and ANZAM,” Holland said, adding that the Agency could become a prelude to a 
joint machinery in the whole Pacific.37 In other words, Holland hoped to reignite discussions 
over including Britain as an ANZUS partner. 
Support for the proposal was less forthcoming in Wellington. For New Zealand, Frank 
Corner contemplated that French membership and the deteriorating situation in Indochina made 
the Agency appear primarily for multilateral defence discussions in Vietnam. He then 
questioned whether a focus on Indochina was in New Zealand’s best interest. The Agency 
aimed to deal primarily with the “vital problems in Indochina” and “raise French morale,” 
Corner told McIntosh, and similarly thought the Pentagon was only interested in the Agency 
for “considering practical problems relating to Indochina.”38 His greatest concern, in short, was 
that a joint Agency would increase the risk that New Zealand might become involved in an 
unwanted war in Indochina. 
In the Australian External Affairs Department, however, Casey and Spender were greatly 
concerned that the creation of a joint Staff Agency for the defence of Southeast Asia would 
undermine the importance of ANZUS. Similarly, they were also concerned that an Agency 
would prevent Canberra from consulting directly with Washington on security issues in the 
region. As Truman’s second term as US President was soon scheduled to end, Casey and 
Spender thought that Australia should push for an ANZUS Council meeting with the 
Americans shortly after new President-elect Dwight Eisenhower took office to gauge his 
Administration’s views on the subject. In order to “offset any danger” that the Agency might 
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undermine ANZUS military planning, Spender urged Casey to call an ANZUS meeting shortly 
after Eisenhower took office.39 
Fearing the political effect it would have in London, New Zealand responded unfavourably 
to an ANZUS meeting. Webb told the Australians shortly after the meeting was proposed that 
it was untimely “to press for an early ANZUS meeting at least at this juncture” because it might 
aggravate the British.40 Secretary in the Australian Commissioner’s Office in Wellington J.S. 
Cumpston then tried to urge New Zealand to reconsider. In meeting with Shanahan and 
McIntosh in late February, Cumpston attempted to persuade both men of the need for an early 
ANZUS meeting with the Americans. Their response, however, was again unresponsive due to 
concerns about the effect an early ANZUS meeting would have in London.41 Wellington 
dismissed subsequent Australian efforts to urge New Zealand to support an earlier ANZUS 
meeting in March. 
Meanwhile, after initial consultation with London, the United States agreed in principle to 
the establishment of a Five-Power Staff Agency for the defence of Southeast Asia. While the 
arrangement did not specifically commit any country to military action, it did provide a basic 
framework for joint-defence planning in the region. Delegates agreed that each country would 
appoint a military representative to coordinate defence plans with one another, as well as 
exchange all available intelligence information useful to the defence of Southeast Asia. As 
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs John Allison advised Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles in late January, “I cannot conceive how we can engage in efficient planning for the 
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military defence of the Pacific without engaging in some form of joint planning with our 
allies.”42 
Allison argued that the Agency must take a different form to ANZUS for two reasons. 
Firstly, he thought that an enlargement of ANZUS would entail an unwanted US commitment 
to Hong Kong, Malaya and Indochina. Secondly, he urged Dulles that the Agency was most 
because it would help prevent Chinese aggression in the region.43 US policymakers such as 
Allison, in other words, had no intention of expanding ANZUS nor merely mollifying British 
concerns about defence planning for the region. Instead, the United States primarily saw the 
Agency as a means to prevent Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. The Agency “offered the 
best prospect of causing Communist China to cease an aggression,” the State Department 
concluded on 17 February.44 
In Australia, policymakers continued to be concerned that the military function of ANZUS 
would be substantially absorbed into the Staff Agency. Australian Defence Minister Philip 
McBride told Menzies one week after the Conference that “the accent on planning for South 
East Asia has been transferred from an ANZUS to a Five Power basis.” He added that he was 
concerned that the Staff Agency might subsume ANZUS and ANZAM in the long-term 
future.45 Members of the Australian External Affairs Department were also anxious as to what 
the Agency would mean for the future of ANZUS military discussions. Assistant External 
Affairs Secretary Ralph Harry argued that the development of the Agency would lead to “the 
suspension by ANZUS of its military planning and concentration on political consultation,” 
mainly because the Agency’s proposed plan of studies would “seem to render redundant at 
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least some of the current ANZUS military planning.”46 Again, the primary Australian concern 
was that the Agency would make ANZUS obsolete. 
Given New Zealand’s great reluctance to hold an ANZUS Council meeting on the subject, 
Australia stepped up its own diplomatic efforts to obtain US views. In late May, Minister of 
the Australian Embassy in Washington Arthur Tange conferred with US Director of the Office 
of the British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Andrew Foster. Foster made it 
clear that given the Pentagon’s reluctance to underwrite the security of mainland Asia, the US 
did not think the Staff Agency should be “a formal and elaborate organisation.” The Agency 
should “rest on an ad hoc, on call-need-to-know basis.” He assured the Australians that there 
was no prospect that the Agency would supplant ANZUS and ANZAM machineries. In regards 
to the concept of an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage, Foster claimed the US could not establish a 
firm position until it “learn[s] of any ideas that may come out of conversations” among the 
Commonwealth states on the reformation of ANZAM.”47 At least for now, Australian concerns 
about the future of ANZUS had been allayed. 
 
The Eisenhower Administration and its Implications for ANZUS 
As discussions surrounding ANZUS and the Five-Power Staff Agency took place in late 1952 
and early 1953, major political changes in the United States complicated the future of defence 
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. President Truman’s second term as US President was 
scheduled to end in January 1953, and in turn, a US federal election was planned for November 
1952 to decide his replacement. After almost twenty years of Democrat control of the White 
House, the Republican Party’s Presidential candidate, Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower, won the 
election by campaigning on major changes to US foreign policy. While Ike strongly criticised 
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Truman for plunging the United States into a costly and protracted war, Eisenhower promised 
he would end the war in Korea and reduce the financial deficit from over-spending on the 
military. 
On taking office, Eisenhower’s first major foreign policy initiative was appointing John 
Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. Given his experience in international affairs, 
Eisenhower believed that Dulles was an “obvious” choice for the position.48 He even 
commented later that even though they did not always see completely eye to eye on all foreign 
policy issues, Dulles was a “truly great Secretary of State.”49 In Australia and New Zealand, 
Dulles’s appointment was especially important because both countries had experience in 
dealing with him during the ANZUS negotiations in early 1951. 
Eisenhower’s most immediate foreign policy problem was ending a protracted and costly 
war in Korea. “Of the manifold problems confronting me early in 1953,” Eisenhower penned 
in his memoirs, “none required more urgent attention than the war in Korea.”50 He had 
famously visited Korea in late 1952, but had no precise idea about how to end the war. 
Fortunately for Eisenhower, in March US negotiators achieved a breakthrough with their North 
Korean-Chinese counterparts over an exchange of prisoners of war. After restraining South 
Korean President Syngman Rhee from continuing the war and accepting a compromise 
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demarcation at the 38th parallel, an armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 which brought the 
Korean War to an end.51 
The Eisenhower Administration also needed new national security strategies. After much 
deliberation, the National Security Council produced the NSC 162/2 report in late 1953, a 
formal statement that outlined Eisenhower’s “New Look” approach to foreign policy.52 NSC 
162/2 aimed to achieve the same goals as Truman’s national defence policies, but would do so 
through more cost effective means; namely, through a reliance on nuclear weapons, an 
appeared willingness to use them and its subsequent deterrent effect on the belligerent Soviet 
bloc. It also relied on forming a number of defence pacts with Allied powers—often referred 
to as Eisenhower and Dulles’s “pactomania”—that aimed to ensure the United States would 
not again have to shoulder the burden of an entire military effort like it did in Korea.53 
Part of this plan encompassed a continued commitment to the ANZUS treaty. In September, 
the second round of ANZUS Council meetings were held in Washington. During these 
meetings JCS Chairman Arthur Radford confirmed this sustained commitment to the ANZUS 
partners, emphasising both his “continued interest in ANZUS” and the treaty’s overall 
“importance and value” to US defence planning in the Pacific. Commander of the US  Pacific 
Fleet Admiral Felix Stump expressed similar sentiments. He outlined that ANZUS military 
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discussions would be used as “background material to national plans” in the Pacific theatre, 
particularly in relation to Five-Power Agency defence discussions in Southeast Asia.54 
ANZUS, in other words, would provide one basis for US defence planning in the region. The 
Australians and New Zealanders welcomed this arrangement, yet similar issues to those 
presented during the first Council meetings one year earlier re-emerged. Casey again raised the 
possibility of British membership in ANZUS, asking whether “any link could be created” to 
satisfying British membership demands. Spender also continued to express his discontent at 
the “insufficient planning and coordination” between the ANZUS partners in the event of a 
worldwide war and suggested the smaller ANZUS partners should be privy to US global war 
plans. Both of these suggestions, however, were dismissed by US representatives.55 In short, 
the United States remained committed to ANZUS under Eisenhower, but it was not prepared 
to change the membership or consultative arrangements of the alliance. 
Outside of these ANZUS discussions, Australian and New Zealand policymakers were 
seriously concerned by the Eisenhower Administration’s new national security policies. On the 
one hand, an increased US commitment to its formal allies suggests Eisenhower and Dulles 
were prepared to take ANZUS and the Five-Power Staff Agency seriously and consult more 
closely with Canberra and Wellington. On the other hand, a reliance on nuclear weapons 
opened up further the serious possibility of another world war in which Australia and New 
Zealand would undoubtedly have been involved. New Zealand Ambassador in Washington 
Leslie Munro suggested that the new Administration would follow a “conservative line.” To 
his mind, this meant that Eisenhower was looking to cut military spending and reduce direct 
US military involvement overseas during the 1950s. Such a policy, according to Munro, was 
                                                          




not ideal for New Zealand, particularly for Western defence positions in the Pacific.56 In terms 
of broader US strategy, there were similar concerns in New Zealand that Eisenhower’s 
proposed brinkmanship foreign policy could be disastrous for the West. Many New Zealand 
diplomats regarded these policies as “misguided,” “misconceived” or “extreme.”57 
While still concerned about the potential for global nuclear war, policymakers in Canberra 
were more optimistic about Eisenhower’s new national security strategies. Many officers 
within the Australian External Affairs Department hoped that a new US reliance on its defence 
pacts would increase American involvement in the Asia-Pacific. If used cautiously, they were 
also optimistic that US nuclear diplomacy could prevent further Communist advances. Casey, 
for one, was hopeful that the “major re-appraisal of US foreign policy” would benefit Australia 
because it would involve greater US interest in defending a region close to Australian borders. 
He thought, in turn, that Australia must capitalise on this unprecedented US interest in 
Southeast Asia and demonstrate that Canberra was a reliable US ally. “It would be bad value,” 
Casey later wrote in his diary, “to give Washington the impression that it was “contemplating 
retreat from [its] obligations.”58  
 
Crisis in Southeast Asia: The Siege at Dien Bien Phu and the Formation of SEATO 
As Australian and New Zealand diplomats contemplated the repercussions of new US national 
security strategies during the early stages of the Eisenhower Administration, a Communist 
offensive in North Indochina threatened the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in early 1954 
and raised questions about US involvement in Southeast Asia. The United States seriously 
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contemplated military action through the guise of allied support for multilateral intervention 
through the “United Action” proposal. While Australia was especially excited that the United 
States was consulting more closely with Canberra and taking a greater interest in the defence 
of Southeast Asia, Australian policymakers suggested they could not agree to the proposal 
while the Menzies Government prepared for an election in May. The Australians were also 
reluctant to participate if Britain refused to join the multilateral intervention plan. Similarly, 
New Zealand would not commit until Britain confirmed its participation. Ultimately, after 
London refused to participate, the proposal fell apart. 
In the aftermath of this crisis, the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was 
formed. While the United States suggested it would only take part in this treaty if it specifically 
outlined that it was designed to respond to Communist aggression, US participation in SEATO 
confirmed that the Eisenhower Administration was prepared to build alliance networks in the 
Asia-Pacific and consult more closely with its allies in responding to mutual security threats. 
Australia hoped for a broader scope to the treaty, but was nevertheless pleased that the United 
States had committed to the defence of Southeast Asia in some capacity. Again, both Australia 
and New Zealand were excited that British participation in SEATO might lead to a convergence 
of Anglo-American interests in the region. New Zealand policymakers in fact specifically 
outlined it would not commit until Britain committed to the treaty. This section examines these 
policy differences on the Indochina Crisis and SEATO and suggests that British policy had a 
decisive impact on ANZUS relations. 
 
The 1954 Indochina Crisis and the Proposal for United Action 
Before the outbreak of fighting at Dien Bien Phu in March 1954, Communist revolutionaries 
and the remnants of French colonial forces had been locked in a power struggle over Indochina 
for almost one decade. To a large extent, Eisenhower’s policy options toward this struggle were 
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constrained by the choices of his predecessor. Under Truman, the United States had explicitly 
stated that France had a right to retake control of Indochina after the Japanese occupation after 
World War II. From 1950 onwards, the Truman Administration actively aided the French war-
effort after its position in the region looked increasingly unstable. After promising an 
unwavering commitment to stop the spread of Communist aggression during the 1952 election 
campaign, Eisenhower had little choice other than to continue supporting the French cause in 
Indochina even if Paris could not continue to hold its position alone. As Fredrik Logevall 
pointed out, the Eisenhower Administration opted to continue supporting the French and “hope 
for the best rather than face the unpleasant task of initiating a fundamental change in policy.”59 
Similarly, the Menzies and Holland governments had been long-concerned about the 
deteriorating situation in Indochina and outlined a firm commitment to defending Communist 
aggression. In March 1950, Australian External Affairs Minister Percy Spender thought that 
Indochina represented the “greatest present danger point” in Southeast Asia.60 Policymakers in 
Wellington reached similar conclusions. By 1953, New Zealand High Commissioner in 
London Frank Corner was convinced Indochina was the “key” to Southeast Asia. He argued 
that if the Communists were successful in Indochina, Malaya, Burma and Siam would also fall 
under Communist control. Corner was also hopeful that New Zealand might be able to work 
closely with Australia on Southeast Asian issues, even though he complained that “the 
Australians are often more interested in having a voice than solving practical problems.”61  
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On 13 March 1954, tensions in Indochina reached a climax after Vietminh forces led an 
assault against the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu. The siege caused a major strain in Anglo-
American relations, prompting Australia and New Zealand to seriously reconsider how closely, 
if at all, the respective External Affairs departments were prepared to align its policies with 
Washington. Moreover, even though the security of both countries rested on the future of 
Southeast Asia, there was no certainty that Australia and New Zealand could reach common 
ground as to the most appropriate response. To the contrary, two days after the first day of the 
siege, Frank Corner warned External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh that New Zealand 
should not involve itself in the conflict purely to protect Australian strategic interests. He also 
doubted whether the future of Southeast Asia was in fact a vital interest for New Zealand. 
Predicting that Australia would push for joint intervention in Southeast Asia, Corner wrote on 
15 March that New Zealand “should resist being dragged by the Australians … into premature 
involvement in Southeast Asia.” He concluded that he felt “very dubious about bustling into 
commitments in Southeast Asia … there is no good future for us there.”62 
In Washington, JCS Chairman Arthur Radford warned Eisenhower that the United States 
must be prepared to intervene militarily in order to prevent the loss of all Indochina. In 
Radford’s own words, the United States “must be prepared … to act promptly and in force 
possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for US intervention.”63 Dulles, however, 
disagreed with Radford’s proposal. He feared that the United States might get embroiled in 
another protracted and costly war. He also thought that even if the Administration wanted to 
act unilaterally, Congress would be unlikely to authorise such action. At the time, the 
Eisenhower Administration was under constant attack from hard-line democratic Senators such 
as Joseph McCarthy who argued strongly that the United States was not doing anywhere near 
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enough to combat Communism at home and abroad. Much to Eisenhower’s annoyance, these 
attacks separated the House of Representatives and Senate on almost every issue and often 
froze Congress into an impractical and unmanageable sector of government. In short, 
Congressional backing for any short-term policy in Indochina was close to impossible. “It is 
close to disgusting,” Eisenhower wrote angrily, “it saddens me that I must feel ashamed for the 
United States Senate.” Already in his own fight with Congress, the President wrote in 
frustration several days later on 18 March that the Indochina Crisis was “just another of the 
problems dumped on [his] lap.”64 
In an effort to alleviate any domestic criticisms of US inaction, Eisenhower outlined publicly 
that his government was committed to preventing the spread of Communism. He warned that 
the loss of French Indochina would have a “domino effect” that would leave the rest of 
Southeast Asia vulnerable to Communist control.65 In order to respond to this threat as well as 
curb domestic concerns of unilateral action, Dulles then proposed that the United States should 
act jointly with its allies in preventing the loss of Indochina to Communist forces. Advising the 
NSC that “there was no need” for immediate unilateral action, Dulles suggested making US 
multilateral intervention provisional on whether US allies would be willing to support 
multilateral action. After Eisenhower agreed to this approach, Dulles followed up the “domino 
theory” speech with his own public call for a multilateral response to Indochina. Privately, 
plans were also made between Eisenhower and Dulles to use ANZUS meetings as a means to 
consult with Australia and New Zealand. Knowing Canberra’s earnest desire for closer 
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consultation with the United States, Eisenhower commented that this plan would make the 
Australians “terribly excited.”66 
In an effort to convince Canberra and Wellington that their participation in Indochina was 
important, Dulles urged the respective Australians and New Zealand Ambassadors in 
Washington Percy Spender and Leslie Munro that the loss of Indochina would directly threaten 
the security of both of their countries. “If Indochina goes,” Dulles told Spender and Munro, 
“Australia and New Zealand will be directly threatened.”67 Concerned that London would not 
be willing to participate in multilateral intervention, Dulles also requested that American 
Ambassador in Canberra Amos Peaslee make similar efforts to persuade policymakers in 
Canberra to support the American plan rather than aligning with British policy. “I hope you 
will take appropriate occasion to spell out our views in discussions with top officials,” Dulles 
told the US Embassy in Canberra, as he was concerned that the Australians would take a 
“similar line to [the] British.”68 Dulles, however, remained hopeful that Australia and New 
Zealand could convince policymakers in London to participate. Whilst predicting there would 
be “great difficulties” in securing British support due to an upcoming public debate surrounding 
the production of the hydrogen bomb, Dulles thought that Australia and New Zealand would 
be “willing to urge the British in the right direction.”69 
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On 5 April, Dulles formally proposed the “ad hoc coalition” to Spender and Munro. Echoing 
Eisenhower’s earlier words, Dulles stressed that if Australia and New Zealand were not 
prepared to be “excited” by the coalition then the United States would not take action.70 Again, 
Dulles stressed that British participation in this plan was crucial. He told both Spender and 
Dulles that a new military force was needed in Indochina and it “had to include Britain.” That 
being the case, Dulles asked both men to meet with diplomats in the British Embassy in 
Washington and urge them that the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand must all 
unite for the defence of Indochina in order to repel the Communist advance in Southeast Asia.71 
As far as the Australian position was concerned, Spender told Dulles that he could not 
commit his government while it faced a general election for the House of Representatives 
which was set for 29 May. Another Australian concern was the recent development of the 
Petrov Affair in early April, an event that saw Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in 
Canberra Vladmir Petrov offer details of Soviet espionage in Australia in exchange for political 
asylum. The Petrov Affair sparked considerable public outcry in Australia that the Menzies 
Government must do more to combat Communist threats domestically instead of focusing 
solely on overseas developments in Indochina. As one American report concluded, Petrov’s 
defection was the “biggest story of its kind that has ever happened in Australia.” As a result, 
Indochina had been “all but shoved of [the] front pages of newspapers by [the] Petrov Affair.”72 
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Once Spender described his conversation with Dulles to Casey, however, he urged that 
Australia should accept this proposal as a means to ensure that US interest in defending 
Southeast Asia increased. As he told Casey, 
 
 
One of the primary aims of our policy over recent years has been, as I 
understand it, to achieve the acceptance by the USA of responsibility for 
[South East] Asia. It is for consideration whether, if we fail to respond at all 
to the opportunity now presented, what US reactions are likely to be if and 
when areas closer to Australia are in jeopardy.73 
 
 
Casey agreed it was crucial for Australia to support the US position in Indochina. As he 
penned in his diary one day after receiving Spender’s message, the United States “won’t go in 
alone” in Indochina and if “Australia and others don’t respond they may change their South-
East Asia attitude.”74 As the defence of Southeast Asia was crucial to Australian security, any 
decline in US interest in the region was a very serious concern. Casey tried to urge the 
seriousness of the Indochina situation to the Australian public in the event that Australia might 
have to follow the United States into a war in Indochina. Gathering public support was crucial, 
as a large segment of the Australian public were still “puzzled” about what United Action 
entailed and what Australia’s role would be in such a plan.75 “If Indochina were to fall to the 
Communists the whole of Southeast Asia would be threatened,” Casey proclaimed in the House 
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of Representatives on 7 April.76 This statement mirrored Eisenhower’s sentiments about the 
loss of Indochina having a potential domino-like effect on the rest of Southeast Asia. 
Yet despite how seriously Casey feared the deteriorating situation in Indochina and any 
decline in US interest in Southeast Asia, he was not convinced that the “United Action” 
proposal was the best course of action. After speaking with British Foreign Minister Anthony 
Eden on 15 April, Casey was convinced that Britain would not participate in the plan. 
Furthermore, Casey thought that were substantial risks involved if Australia participated in 
joint military intervention without Britain. Describing the American plan for mass intervention 
as “wrong,” Casey stressed that United Action would not stop the fall of Dien Bien Phu and 
risked putting Australia “in the wrong with world opinion particularly in Asia.” He also thought 
such action could potentially risk war with China.77 For these reasons, Casey thought that 
United Action should not be pursued. 
Casey’s arguments won the day and the Australian government agreed that it could not 
commit to the “United Action” proposal. While the Cabinet concluded that Australia should 
encourage the French to continue fighting and support US military involvement in the region, 
it could not commit to Dulles’s plan for multilateral intervention because of the political 
pressures leading up to a general election in May. The Cabinet also concluded that because 
Australia had defence arrangements with Britain in the region it would be unfavourable to join 
in a US military response if Britain did not participate. Overall, Cabinet decided Australia could 
not commit to the plan but still must somehow show the United States that it was “not lukewarm 
in supporting proposals designed to ensure that Communism in Southeast Asia is checked.”78 
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With regards to Indochina and US interest in Southeast Asia, Australia simply wanted to have 
its cake and eat it too. 
Meanwhile, policymakers in New Zealand wanted to know the British response before they 
made any decision. Writing to the New Zealand High Commission in London, McIntosh told 
Corner that his personal preference was New Zealand should “tell the Americans we will join 
them on the understanding that the British … come in also.”79 In Washington, New Zealand 
Ambassador Leslie Munro suggested that Dulles’s plea for “United Action” signalled a new 
course of American policy in Indochina that the United States could not accept under any 
circumstances that Indochina fall completely to the Communists. As a result, Munro concluded 
that New Zealand “had little alternative but to join the coalition” because New Zealand valued 
its close relations with the United States especially due to Indochina’s proximity to Australia 
and New Zealand. Munro, however, thought along similar lines to McIntosh and attached one 
very important condition to New Zealand participation: the United Kingdom “must also 
participate.”80 McIntosh also thought that New Zealand should encourage the French to commit 
to the US plan for multilateral intervention. He reasoned that this response would prevent New 
Zealand from falling out with the Americans while simultaneously stopping New Zealand from 
committing without British support.81 
On 7 April, Australia and New Zealand exchanged their policy conclusions with respect to 
Indochina. The Australian position determined that every effort must be made to strengthen the 
will of the French. It also determined that “Australia should also encourage Indochina 
governments to reach agreements with the French in establishing their independence and 
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continue the Communist resistance.” In order to achieve this objective, the policy document 
concluded that “Australia should participate in United Action because doing otherwise might 
compromise the present helpful trend of American policy towards the security of the Pacific.”82 
In short, Canberra outlined a two-fold objective in the Indochina Crisis: encourage the French 
to continue fighting, and assure the Americans that Australia was committed to the defence of 
Southeast Asia even though upcoming elections delayed an immediate public response. British 
participation was desirable for the Australians, but not essential. 
In contrast, the New Zealand policy document on Indochina revolved around British 
participation, UN involvement and avoiding a confrontation with China. It determined that 
New Zealand would only participate in United Action “under the condition that Britain [was] 
also a participant” and such a coalition fell under the “aegis of the United Nations.” Moreover, 
due to concerns that intervention might escalate into a wider war, the document outlined that a 
Western multilateral response must make “every effort to avoid confrontation with China.”83 
Australia and New Zealand greatly differed in their assessments about the possibility of 
Chinese intervention. The Australians knew that New Zealand was reluctant to defend 
Indochina because of fears that doing so may spark a war with China. New Zealand’s policy 
position was that “armed intervention in Indochina may lead to involvement with China and 
possibly even with the Soviet Union itself,” an Australian Joint Intelligence Committee report 
concluded, adding that Wellington was “more doubtful whether it could be possible to avoid 
conflict with China.” Australia predicted instead that it “was not likely that the Chinese would 
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abandon their profitable policy for one of open intervention which carries the risk of 
retaliation.”84 
Irrespective of whether China would act in Indochina after possible Western intervention, 
the British strongly opposed to the United Action proposal. As part of his initial pursuit of 
United Action, Dulles met with British Ambassador Roger Makins on 2 April. During the 
meeting, Anglo-American differences over supporting French action in Indochina were sharply 
exposed. While Dulles warned against the “dangers of a French collapse” and that “French 
accepting a settlement would be disastrous for the free world,” Makins responded that his 
government regarded “the deteriorating situation in Indochina in more pessimistic terms” and 
was inclined to accept a settlement in Indochina.85  
Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower wrote to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and 
declared that his Administration had no intention of searching for a peaceful solution. 
Churchill, however, was reluctant to commit to any action. Churchill told Eisenhower directly 
that he feared multilateral intervention would lead to a wider war and threaten British interests 
in Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. In short, Churchill said that the US plan for multilateral 
action simply “raised too many problems” for Britain.86 Privately, Churchill confessed that he 
had no interest in putting British troops “in the jungle” and thought that Malaya could still be 
held even if Indochina fell.87 
As the weeks passed and the US mustered little support for United Action, the situation in 
Indochina worsened. On 23 April, Eisenhower received a deflating brief of the situation in 
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Indochina, which stated that “the situation here is tragic. France is almost visibly collapsing 
under our eyes … if Dien Bien Phu falls, the [French] government will be taken over.”88 
Eisenhower again wrote to Churchill, hoping that the British might reconsider their position on 
Indochina as the Geneva Conference approached. “I am deeply concerned by the seemingly 
wide differences in the conclusions developed in our respective governments,” Eisenhower 
wrote to Churchill on 26 April, “especially as these conclusions relate to such events as the war 
in Indochina.”89 
Even though France was quickly losing control over Indochina, Eisenhower had problems 
convincing the French to consider multilateral support for their position. “For more than three 
years I have been urging upon successive French governments the advisability of finding some 
way of ‘internationalising’ the war,” Eisenhower confessed, but  
 
The reply has always been vague, containing references to national prestige, 
Constitutional limitations, inevitable effects upon the Moroccan and Tunisian 
peoples, and dissertations on plain political difficulties and battles within the 
French Parliament. The result has been that the French have failed entirely to 
produce any enthusiasm on the part of the Vietnamese for participation in the 
war.90 
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Eisenhower concluded that the situation in Indochina had gotten to a point where “the French 
have used weasel words in promising independence and through this one reason as much as 
anything else, have suffered reverses that have really been inexcusable.”91 
As American frustrations with British and French policies toward Indochina increased, the 
possibility of unilateral action resurfaced in Washington. During an NSC meeting on 29 April, 
Vice President Richard Nixon and Director of the Mutual Security Agency Harold Stassen 
argued that the United States “should not let the British have a veto over our freedom of action.” 
Eisenhower disagreed, believing that the United States was not in a position to be the non-
Communist world’s sole policeman and would be looked upon unfavourably by the rest of the 
world if it took unilateral action. “To go in unilaterally in Indochina,” Eisenhower said, 
“amounted to an attempt to police the entire world.” He added that if the United States 
attempted such a course of action, “we should everywhere be accused of imperialistic 
ambitions.”92 
Meanwhile, the Geneva Conference began on 26 April 1954. Two weeks into the 
Conference, after the US refused to act unilaterally and did not gather support for United 
Action, Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communists. Although American delegates continued to 
press the British for joint military action and urged the French to continue fighting, by June the 
Eisenhower Administration abandoned its plans for multilateral intervention and instead 
looked towards finding a diplomatic solution to Indochina. Similar to the post-war split-up of 
Korea, delegates at Geneva agreed that Indochina would be divided into two regions, with the 
Vietminh occupying the North and the French occupying the South. The decision awarded the 
Soviet bloc a major diplomatic victory in the face of French defeat. Likewise, the decision was 
a major blow to Western prestige. After having failed to defend Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower 
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Administration then turned its attention to the possibility of a collective defence arrangement 
in Southeast Asia. 
 
The Creation of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 
Having to resort to reaching a diplomatic solution in Indochina was disappointing for US 
policymakers. After sending the French $2.6 billion in military assistance between 1950 and 
1954, Washington’s failure to prevent a Vietminh victory in Indochina damaged Eisenhower’s 
credibility in fulfilling his promise to limit Communist expansion. Nevertheless, the end of the 
fighting and the formalisation of a North Vietnamese Communist state enabled the Eisenhower 
Administration to pursue a broader collective security pact for Southeast Asia, especially 
because the Five-Power Staff Agency talks had produced few tangible results since its 
inception a year earlier. As Dulles said, rather than dwell on the loss of Indochina, the United 
States should “seize the opportunity” to deter the enlargement of Communism in Asia through 
a regional defence arrangement.93  
Discussions for a regional defence arrangement in Southeast Asia began in the National 
Security Council. From a military point of view, questions were raised about the desirability 
of a pact when few states in the region were capable of defending themselves. At an NSC 
meeting on 23 July, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford said that “we [the 
United States] are now talking about an area where there are no developed military forces.” He 
added that the US could build military power in the region, but “only at considerable cost.” 
Overall, he argued that the United States “should take a good look at the idea of a defence 
                                                          
93 Johannes Lombardo, “Eisenhower, the British and the Security of Hong Kong,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 9, 
no. 3 (1998): 138-139. 
156 
 
alliance for this area to be sure we are not making a mistake … from a military point of view a 
Southeast Asia defence pact seems undesirable and unwise.”94  
The State Department, however, saw clear advantages in concluding a defence pact. Such a 
pact would signal a clear US willingness to prevent the spread of Communism and ensure that 
countries at risk of Communist subversion would be provided with American assistance. At a 
follow-up meeting for American policy toward Southeast Asia on 24 July, Dulles argued that 
a defence pact would have two clear advantages: it would give Eisenhower discretionary 
authority (which he did not already have) to use in the event of overt Chinese aggression in the 
area, and it would ensure that Washington had the support of other nations in any action it 
might be forced to take. Moreover, as a means to offset Radford’s concerns about an 
undesirable military commitment, Dulles suggested that the treaty would not be drafted in such 
a way “so as to lead other signatories to expect large amounts of US military assistance.”95 In 
order for such a pact to be effective, it would require support from other countries willing to 
enter into the agreement. 
Most importantly for the prospects of concluding a regional defence treaty, Britain quickly 
signalled its willingness to enter into a defence pact despite sharp differences with the 
Americans over Indochina in Geneva. Fearing that British bases in Malaya and Hong Kong 
were at risk, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower on 21 June stating that Britain and the United States 
should “establish a firm front against Communism in the Pacific sphere.” More specifically, 
Churchill suggested that there should be a Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 
similar in structure and purpose to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for Europe.96 
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Concerned that the Communist diplomatic victory in Geneva might spur further aggression in 
the region, there was a clear sense of urgency about Churchill’s efforts to secure the treaty. 
New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro reported to Wellington that at a 
luncheon meeting in Washington a week later, Churchill said that plans for the defence of 
Southeast Asia would be “pressed forward now, immediately.”97 
Meanwhile, an ANZUS meeting took place in Washington on 30 June. Dulles told Casey 
and Munro that as agreements for Indochina took place in Geneva, the United States was “very 
deeply concerned” about developments in the area. Moreover, he stressed that the United States 
could not “fight their own way into the area, alone, and under conditions by no means clear.” 
Dulles then suggested that it would be especially useful for the United States to be briefed on 
Australian and New Zealand views on Indochina, because France was “fading away” and 
Britain was “badly overextended.”98 
In response, Casey suggested that reaching a SEATO-type arrangement would be useful for 
Australia. Casey, however, thought that a temporary “ad-hoc SEATO” would be practical until 
a formal multilateral agreement could be agreed upon by Washington and London. He 
proposed a public non-aggression pact with as many Asian countries as possible. “Such a 
document would have no teeth and involve no obligations for its parties,” Casey conceded, but 
once a more binding agreement could be reached, he thought that “the teeth of an alliance 
would be in SEATO.”99 Casey, in short, was in favour of an immediate defence structure for 
Southeast Asia that included countries in that region and hoped both Britain and the United 
States would be involved. “We could not be belligerent while the United Kingdom was not,” 
Casey wrote in his diary after the meeting. He added, almost excitedly, that by Australia being 
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“poised rather delicately” between the United States and Britain in international affairs, 
Canberra was “in a position to exercise some influence on each.”100   
Speaking on New Zealand’s behalf, Munro mirrored Casey’s sentiments and suggested 
Wellington was in favour of an immediate defence arrangement in Southeast Asia. He noted 
New Zealand’s concerns about Communist aggression in the area and argued that his country 
would “firmly resist” any further advances. However, he made two unique points. Firstly, he 
thought that any immediate aggression before SEATO could be established should be referred 
to the United Nations rather than through Casey’s proposed temporary non-aggression pact. 
Secondly, he reiterated that New Zealand would only participate in SEATO if Britain was also 
a member. “It was a principle of our policy and negotiation that [Britain] should be a party to 
the SEATO arrangement.” Munro told Dulles on 30 June 1954.101 
Dulles, however, made it clear that the United States would only commit to an arrangement 
that specifically aimed to stop Communist aggression. “The United States would be prepared 
to take positive action if there were any substantial extension of Communist power,” Dulles 
said to Casey and Munro, but he stressed “there would be nothing in the nature of a blanket 
commitment.”102 He repeated these views later on 28 July to US Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom Roger Aldrich, requesting he make it clear to London that the United States “did not 
envisage the Southeast Asia pact developing into a NATO-type organisation with [a] large 
permanent machinery [and] substantial US financial support.”103 The US military supported 
this limited commitment. The SEATO machinery “should be similar to the ANZUS 
arrangements,” US Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson told the State Department, 
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insofar as it should function more as a “consultative arrangement” rather than definitive 
American military commitments in Southeast Asia. Anderson went on to suggest that these 
views reflected “the thinking of this Department at this time.”104  
While Australia and New Zealand reasoned that their influence on US policy was perhaps 
greater than it had ever been, neither government could convince Washington to sign a less 
specific defence treaty. The United States, in short, would only commit to respond to 
Communist aggression. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation was subsequently signed into 
effect on the 8 September 1954 at the Manila Conference between the ANZUS powers as well 
as Britain, France, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The three Associated States, South 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were also awarded observer status and included under the area 
protected. Its scope was very similar to ANZUS, stating that all signatories would respond to 
“meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”105 Overall, 
however, SEATO’s conclusion was ultimately born out of Western failure in Indochina and 
concerns about further Communist aggression in the area. It had a number of weaknesses: its 
scope was limited, and there was no clear machinery for intelligence cooperation or military 
consultation between the signatories.  
 
Conclusion  
This examination into post-treaty issues and responses to the 1954 Indochina Crisis 
demonstrated that the ANZUS powers were still divided about the way in which the United 
States would take a leading role in this relationship and where, if at all, Britain might play a 
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role in this partnership. In the treaty’s initial aftermath, Australia was hopeful that ANZUS 
might entail greater access to US military and strategic planning, whereas New Zealand hoped 
that Britain might be involved in ANZUS even as an observer to trilateral meetings. The United 
States, however, was unwilling to entertain these possibilities. Then, once Dwight Eisenhower 
took office and the French position in Indochina became seriously threatened in 1954, Australia 
and New Zealand were uniquely placed to play a more important role in US strategy. Australia 
and New Zealand were closely consulted during this crisis in the hope that they might exercise 
some influence on the British response. Washington also thought that Australian and New 
Zealand support for United Action and SEATO would be highly favourable. As Australia and 
New Zealand began to play more important roles in US strategy and the contours of the 
relationship slowly shifted, another crisis between Communist and Nationalist China broke out 
in the Taiwan Straits in September 1954. The next chapter explores the Australian, New 
Zealand and American response to this crisis, as well as broader considerations between these 





















While Australian, New Zealand and American delegates met in Manila to finalise SEATO in 
September 1954, another crisis broke out in the Taiwan Straits after the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) began shelling the Nationalist-held offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu. Unsure 
as to whether these attacks were a precursor to a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, the United 
States responded with the conclusion of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defence Treaty as well as the 
threat of nuclear retaliation. Possible escalation greatly concerned US allies such as Australia 
and New Zealand, both of which played unique roles throughout the crisis. Australia was very 
active diplomatically in both Washington and London, hoping to avoid a serious rift in Anglo-
American relations over China. New Zealand, on the other hand, was heavily involved in a US 
and UK sponsored United Nations resolution which called for a cessation of fighting in the 
Taiwan Strait.  
This chapter contains two sections. Firstly, in order to put Australian-New Zealand-
American responses into context, this chapter examines trilateral views over whether or not to 
recognise the PRC from late 1949 to mid-1954. While all countries shared similar ideological 
views that tended to oppose awarding recognition to mainland China, this section suggests that 
Australia and New Zealand were more willing to reconsider recognition as a means to prevent 
future Chinese aggression and reach greater policy solidarity with Britain (despite US 
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protestations, Britain formally recognised the PRC in early 1950). Following these 
disagreements, the second section explores Australian, New Zealand and American responses 
to the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. This section demonstrates that while the Eisenhower 
Administration consulted more closely with Australia and New Zealand during this crisis, the 
Tasman powers generally supported the British position and were extremely reluctant to 
commit to the US plan of defending the offshore islands. Overall, this chapter suggests that 
divergent policies between the ANZUS powers on China largely stemmed from tensions in the 
Anglo-American relationship over China. Tensions were also caused by concerns in Australia 
and New Zealand that the Eisenhower Administration’s brinkmanship-like approach to 
rebuffing Chinese aggression could spark a major war. Ultimately, however, continued 
Australian and New Zealand support for the US position on Taiwan and the non-recognition 
of mainland China demonstrated that the Tasman countries were not in a position to seriously 
challenge American policy on China. In other words, despite trans-Tasman concerns about the 
US approach to China and growing support for British views, Australia and New Zealand were 
unprepared to risk isolating themselves from the United States and compromise the US 
commitment to the ANZUS Treaty. This chapter analyses these complications, and in so doing, 
points out that there were clear limits to unequivocal Australian and New Zealand support for 
either US or British policies. 
 
A Prelude to Crisis: Australian, New Zealand and US Views towards the PRC and 
Recognition, 1949-1954 
After a protracted civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Republic of China 
(ROC), PRC Chairman Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China on 1 October 1949. The defeated Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to the island 
of Formosa (Taiwan). As Cold War tensions continued to rise between the United States and 
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the Soviet Union, a major Communist Government in Northeast Asia presented an uncertain 
and disruptive challenge for the West. Mao’s victory especially provoked extensive debate in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States over whether to continue supporting Chiang’s 
Government, or instead recognise the PRC by opening diplomatic relations in Beijing and 
supporting its claim for China’s seat in the United Nations. On the one hand, the ROC appeared 
fragile, corrupt, and struggled to justify seriously its claim to being representative of all of 
China while its government only controlled the island of Formosa. On the other hand, Western 
governments feared that awarding recognition to the PRC would strengthen the Soviet bloc and 
encourage further aggression from mainland China. 
For the United States, peaceful co-existence with the PRC and subsequent recognition 
remained a possibility in late 1949 to early 1950. This was because there was a lingering hope 
that Mao might avoid aligning China with the Soviet Union.1 However, in the immediate 
aftermath of Mao’s October 1949 announcement, the State Department looked set to shape its 
policies toward the PRC on the premise that mainland China was entrenched firmly in Soviet 
bloc and should not yet be awarded recognition. In an address to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on 12 October, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the “Chinese 
Government is really a tool of Russian Imperialism in China. That gives us our fundamental 
starting point in regards to our relations with China.”2 
While Acheson’s comments made prospective US recognition policies for China appear 
somewhat straightforward, the decision was complicated by many American policymakers 
(including Acheson) continuing to doubt whether US diplomatic support for Chiang was useful. 
In his own words, Acheson argued at a later Committee meeting that the United States had “got 
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to a point where in fact there is nothing more constructive that is coming out of this 
[Nationalist] Government.” As both a stalling tactic and short-term compromise between these 
options, Acheson suggested that the US should adopt a “wait, look, and see policy” toward 
China.3 In other words, the Truman Administration determined that immediate recognition of 
mainland China was not an option while the future of Taiwan appeared uncertain.4 
Australia and New Zealand held their own bilateral talks over whether or not to recognise 
the PRC in November 1949. During these discussions, New Zealand Secretary of External 
Affairs McIntosh noted with frustration that the trans-Tasman talks appeared aimed only to 
increase Australia’s international prestige and to encourage New Zealand to support Australian 
views on China. “It was a typical Australian show,” McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 18 
November, “the object was publicity for Evatt, External Affairs and Australia in that order.” 
According to McIntosh, Australian Secretary of External Affairs John Burton organised the 
talks as a “publicity stunt.” Burton, convinced recognition was “necessary and inevitable,” 
continually pressed McIntosh and the New Zealanders about supporting the Australian 
position.5 
Indeed, the Australians appeared entirely ready and willing to abandon the Nationalists and 
instead recognise Mao’s government on mainland China. Even before the Australian-New 
Zealand talks began in November, Canberra already recalled its diplomatic mission in Nanking. 
Some of the Australian staff returned to Canberra, while other staff members established a 
temporary post in Hong Kong that could be quickly moved to Beijing once recognition was 
granted. The Department of External Affairs also called a meeting shortly after its Nanking 
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Mission was recalled, agreeing unanimously that the PRC be recognised.6 “Personally,” 
Australian External Affairs Minister Evatt wrote to British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin only 
three days after Mao’s announcement, “I do not see why [mainland China] should not be 
recognised.” In Evatt’s view, Australia and the rest of the Commonwealth could take the lead 
in recognising Beijing. He told Bevin that Mao’s government could be recognised as the 
legitimate government of mainland China, whereas the Nationalists could similarly retain 
recognition of their government on Taiwan.7 
McIntosh did not think that Australia and New Zealand should take the lead in recognising 
the PRC. He did, however, think that there might be substantial benefits of recognition. He 
thought that doing so would prevent the PRC from acting aggressively and counter Russian 
influence in China. Moreover, if for no other reason, McIntosh concluded that on legal grounds 
the PRC should be awarded recognition because it already controlled mainland China. This 
view was similar to thinking in Britain, which was moving closer to awarding recognition to 
the PRC.8 Overall, McIntosh was inclined to “follow the British line” on recognition but the 
government stalled any decision because Prime Minister Peter Fraser was reluctant to recognise 
the PRC.9  
On 6 January 1950, Britain formally announced that it officially recognised the PRC as the 
legitimate government of China. However, despite suggestions that Canberra was preparing to 
recognise the PRC in mid to late 1949, Australia chose not to follow Britain’s decision. Robert 
Menzies replaced Ben Chifley as Australian Prime Minister after the 1949 Federal election and 
did not support immediate recognition. On 20 December 1949, the Menzies government sent a 
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cablegram to Britain that outlined Australia “was not in favour” of recognition. The main 
reason, according to the Australian message, was that the country was “not convinced that 
recognition would offer [Australia] any compensating advantages for what appear to be certain 
obvious disadvantages,” citing its belief that the PRC will act recklessly and in defiance of 
international law.10  
In New Zealand, policymakers concluded that Western countries and the United Nations 
should consider moral principles in addition to any legal grounds for awarding recognition. “I 
think it is time we abandoned the automatic recognition of a government merely because it has 
proved its capacity to govern … I think it is time we incorporate moral elements into such 
things,” Berendsen said to McIntosh on 12 January. As a result, New Zealand chose not to 
recognise the PRC even after the British announcement. The issue of Chinese recognition was 
an interesting instance where Wellington was decidedly in favour of the American position 
over the British position. Yet while moral considerations tended to push the New Zealanders 
towards the American line of thinking, supporting the US position also had clear security 
benefits for New Zealand. If New Zealand followed the British line on China, New Zealand 
External Affairs Minister Frederick Doidge feared that it could also “irritate and antagonise the 
United States, and increase American determination to strengthen Japan at the expense of the 
security of Australia and New Zealand.”11  
New Zealand’s major issue with the British announcement was its timing, which came just 
days before the scheduled Commonwealth Conference in Colombo. The British announcement 
stimulated significant intra-Commonwealth division on the question of China during the 
Conference: Britain, India, Pakistan and Ceylon all recognised the PRC, while New Zealand, 
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Australia and Canada did not. “The British did a very stupid and a very wrong thing in 
recognising the [PRC] when they did,” Berendsen complained after the Conference to 
McIntosh, “it was wrong, stupid and indeed insulting.”12 Australian External Affairs Minister 
Percy Spender made similar comments. “It had been embarrassing to us to be confronted with 
the United Kingdom’s decision [to recognise the PRC],” Spender wrote to Menzies during the 
Conference on 11 January.13 
American-Australian-New Zealand views against recognition hardened considerably after 
the Korean War began in June 1950, and further again when the PRC intervened later in 
November. It confirmed fears in Washington, Canberra and Wellington that Communism was 
an aggressive threat to free world nations. US President Harry Truman responded by 
completely rejecting any possibility of recognition and instead approved a National Security 
Council (NSC) recommendation to impose “strict political and economic sanctions” on the 
PRC. In addition, the Truman Administration threw its support behind Chiang as the legitimate 
government of China.14 Fighting alongside American forces in Korea, respective Australian 
and New Zealand Prime Ministers Robert Menzies and Sidney Holland enforced similar 
sanctions and publicly declared their support for Chiang’s embattled regime. 
The possibility of recognising Beijing in the short-term future was dismissed. In Australia, 
Spender feared that recognising the PRC after its intervention in Korea would encourage 
Beijing to act aggressively elsewhere. “If Communist Chinese demands for Formosa and 
recognition are accepted,” Spender asked fellow Australian diplomat Keith Officer rhetorically 
on 11 December, “what guarantee is there that she [China] will not press in Indochina or 
elsewhere?” In spite of these concerns, Spender thought that recognition should not be 
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completely ruled out. He told Officer that “on the question of ultimate recognition of 
Communist China, the door should not be barred.” In other words, Spender thought that “if a 
reasonable settlement can be arranged regarding Korea, the question of recognition will be 
reconsidered.”15 
Meanwhile, as the Korean situation worsened, a number of UN countries introduced a draft 
resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 12 December to form a separate 
committee that would work towards reaching a cease-fire. This committee also decided to vote 
upon whether the PRC should be admitted as a temporary UN member to assist in reaching an 
immediate cease-fire. During these negotiations, another tussle broke out between Australian 
and New Zealand representatives after Australia tried to pressure New Zealand into abstaining 
from voting. Berendsen, who was representing New Zealand, was “infuriated” when Australian 
delegate Keith Officer told him that “he (Officer) intended to vote for [Beijing’s] admission” 
temporarily to work towards reaching a cease-fire, and “hoped that I (Berendsen) would 
abstain.” “I could scarcely believe my ears,” Berendsen told McIntosh after hearing that 
Australia wanted New Zealand to simply step aside and not get in the way of its own decisions. 
“The long and short of it is I don’t understand the Australians any more than I understand the 
British” on Chinese matters, Berendsen complained.16 
Although his reasons for wanting to New Zealand to abstain while he voted for Beijing’s 
temporary seating are unclear, it is clear that Officer questioned whether hard-line US policies 
were prudent in mitigating hostilities in Korea and subduing Chinese aggression. “My own 
view is that the attitude of the United States at the moment is quite unreal,” he wrote to Spender, 
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“I can see few practical arguments against a cease-fire.”17 It is possible that Officer’s demands 
on the committee issue were part of a broader Australian concern that New Zealand, with strong 
British ties and a demonstrated propensity to consider PRC recognition, saw the committee as 
part of a step toward potential recognition without consultation with Australia. Any such move 
would be disastrous for Australia, especially because at the time Spender was working hard 
towards reaching a formal defence arrangement with the United States. “The question of 
recognition should not be included amongst the actual terms or conditions of a cease-fire,” 
Spender told Officer, as “it is necessary to make sure that the United States does not feel either 
that we do not stand with them in their difficulties or that we fail to understand them.”18 
Although Spender was eventually able to finalise the ANZUS Treaty, Australian concerns 
over a lack of trans-Tasman cooperation on Chinese issues increased after Thomas Clifton 
Webb became New Zealand External Affairs Minister in mid-1951. Webb thought that 
Australia and New Zealand should have recognised the PRC when Britain did in early 1950 
and hoped that the two countries might be able to change their stance toward the PRC once a 
cease-fire could be reached in Korea. “I think it is a pity all nations did not get into line and do 
it [recognise the PRC] a couple of years ago,” Webb wrote on 31 October 1951. In turn, he 
believed that recognition should be considered when a cease-fire was reached in Korea.19 
Australia’s real concern was that Webb might push New Zealand towards recognition 
without prior consultation with Australia and the United States rather than any serious objection 
to consider recognition. In Australia, views towards opposing recognising China had in fact 
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softened during 1951. Spender’s replacement as External Affairs Minister, Richard Casey, 
contemplated similarly after he took over the portfolio in April that Australian interests might 
be served better by recognising the PRC rather than continuing to support the Nationalists. “I 
think that [recognising the PRC] probably would ease the acid attitude of Beijing,” Casey wrote 
in his diary shortly after Chinese intervention in the Korean War.20 For Casey, Australian 
recognition of the PRC was unlikely because of the effect it would have on Australia’s 
relationship with the United States. This was a reflection in the shift in strategic thinking within 
External Affairs and more widely in Australian government circles. 
In Casey’s estimation, the United States was taking a hard-line towards the Chinese because 
of domestic pressures. “It seems impossible,” Casey penned on 8 December 1951, “that any 
State Department man of consequence still believes in Nationalist China … they are all bound 
up in the toils of domestic politics.”21 Truman’s domestic troubles with its China policy were 
indeed serious. Problems began with Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, who tirelessly 
charged that the Truman Administration was soft on China and facilitated Mao’s victory in the 
Chinese Civil War. Support for McCarthy’s tough anti-Communism stance was supported by 
the China Lobby, a loose coalition of businessmen, labor leaders, journalists, scholars, 
missionaries and politicians that opposed any form of recognition of the PRC and demanded 
strong support for Nationalist China. While McCarthy and the China Lobby continued to hold 
strong political influence in the United States, American recognition of the PRC appeared 
unlikely.22  
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Across the Pacific, the Menzies and Holland Government did not have similar problems 
with domestic opinion on China. There was simply no substantial public outcry in Australia or 
New Zealand to stand firmly against the PRC and support the ROC. Instead, like Casey, the 
Australian and New Zealand public appeared to support movement toward recognising the 
PRC in the hope that it might mitigate hostilities in Korea. For instance, Australian newspaper 
articles published in The Courier-Mail, Newcastle Morning Herald, Daily Advertiser, The 
Mercury and The Canberra Times between 1949 and 1953 suggested that PRC recognition was 
either “likely,” “expected” or even “inevitable.”23 
Much like public opinion on recognition, there were discernible differences between official 
Australian, New Zealand and American trade policies with the PRC. While the United States 
continued to oppose all trade with the PRC as part of its non-recognition policy, Australia 
traded with the PRC trade in the absence of diplomatic relations. The trade of strategic materials 
was banned under a 1951 UN resolution, but other major materials were traded including wool, 
wheat, kitchenware, toys and agricultural machinery. Henry Albinski described Australian-
Chinese trade without diplomatic ties as a “very successful exercise in realpolitik.” A stiff 
strategic materials policy helped “placate” the Americans and their hard-line position on China, 
yet the continued trade of non-strategic goods became simply a case of Australia “having [its] 
cake and eating it too.”24  
New Zealand, on the other hand, complied with US demands for a complete economic 
blockade of China. Along with non-recognition, Wellington publicly supported the American 
position on trade until the embargo was later lifted in 1956. Yet while official government 
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policy remained supportive of the US position, there were strong indications that New Zealand 
was open to changing these policies as Wellington became more accommodating of a 
Communist government on mainland China. As Anne-Marie Brady observed in 2008, 
government policies such as New Zealand citizens visiting China and the early resumption of 
New Zealand-China trade in 1956 show that “there was considerable divergence between the 
New Zealand position on China and that of the United States.”25 
After an armistice was signed in Korea on 27 July 1953, the United States continued to 
support Chiang in the hope that it would put further pressure on the PRC. The new Republican 
Administration—led by Dwight Eisenhower—followed the previous Administration’s 
example and remained steadfast in its determination to keep Formosa out of Communist hands. 
According to an NSC policy statement on 6 November, keeping Chiang’s regime afloat 
continued to be a high US priority for three important reasons: support for the Nationalists 
strained Sino-Soviet relations and put considerable pressure on the PRC, Formosa served as a 
vital base for both covert operations on the Chinese mainland and for the defence of South 
Korea and Japan, and continued American support for the Nationalists kept morale high on 
Formosa and in other non-Communist governments. With these considerations in mind, 
Formosa formed an “essential element” of the US defence position in Northeast Asia.26 
The Australians, however, did not consider Formosa to be a high strategic priority. So far 
as Canberra was concerned, any strategic importance Formosa held was because Chiang’s 
presence focused the PRC’s attention across the strait rather than near Australian defence 
interests in Southeast Asia. In other words, so long as Formosa remained in Nationalist hands, 
the PRC could not pose a significant threat closer to Australian borders. An underwhelming 
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brief for the Australian delegation at the 1954 Geneva Conference demonstrated this position 
clearly, concluding that Formosa was merely “of value,” and added that 
 
In enemy hands, Formosa would facilitate a Communist advance into the 
Philippines. In the hands of the Chinese Nationalists, it is a continuing threat to the 
Chinese Communists who find it necessary to retain substantial armed forces on the 
adjacent mainland.27 
 
In terms of recognition, Casey concluded that in light of the end of the Korean War, the 
prospects of recognising the PRC were more palatable. Within weeks of the signing of the 
Armistice, Casey discussed in the Australian Cabinet how to approach China. He felt that it was 
becoming increasingly important to open a dialogue with the Communist regime in order to 
prevent Mao from moving “closer into the arms of Moscow.”28 
Across the Tasman, Webb also thought that the end of the Korean War signalled a new 
chance to reconsider recognising the PRC and thereby reduce tensions in East Asia. He was 
“evidently so impressed with [China’s] conciliatory attitude” during armistice negotiations in 
Korea that he decided that the PRC was indeed “working its passage” to membership of the 
United Nations and that the West should now cease giving China the “cold-shoulder.” 
“Whether we like it or not, the PRC controls mainland China,” Webb said in mid-1953, adding 
that New Zealand and other countries had already in effect given de facto recognition to the 
PRC through participating in Korean cease-fire negotiations at Panmunjom during early to 
mid-1953.29 
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On 6 July, Webb made his thoughts on recognising China public. In an address to the New 
Zealand Parliament, he announced that the “absence of the Chinese Communists from the 
United Nations prevents the lessening of international tensions” and that admitting Beijing 
instead of Taipei to the United Nations should be reconsidered.30 Three days after Webb’s 
address, New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro reported that the speech had 
gravely concerned policymakers in Washington. The remarks “caused distress” in the United 
States, Munro told Webb on 9 July. Munro was especially concerned that it might affect New 
Zealand’s relationship with the United States and suggested that in the future New Zealand 
should publicly support the US position on China. As Munro warned, comments like Webb’s 
“gravely disturbed the Americans.”31 
Webb’s address was indeed perplexing. He certainly understood American opinion on 
China. Less than three months beforehand, US Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith told 
Webb on 13 May that American recognition of the PRC and admission into the UN was 
“absolutely politically impossible.”32 He also understood that if New Zealand showed signs 
that it was moving towards recognising the PRC it might compromise continued US support 
and protection for his own country. This reality was made clear on 15 June, when American 
Ambassador in New Zealand Robert Scotten gave Webb a memorandum that outlined the 
United States would oppose strongly any moves from its allies toward recognising the PRC 
after the conclusion of the Korean armistice. Webb was not pleased with American pressure 
                                                          
30 Webb Address to Parliament, 6 July 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 10. 
31 Munro to Webb, 9 July 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 10; Munro to Webb 31 July 1953, Archives 
NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 8. 
32 Smith to Webb, 13 May 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 8. 
175 
 
on New Zealand to fall into line on its China policy, responding that “sooner or later 
Communist China would have to be admitted to the United Nations.”33 
Webb was also displeased with a section in the US memorandum that declared the United 
States would veto any proposed UN resolution to admit the PRC instead of the Nationalists. 
Webb thought that this part of the memorandum was “very shaky.” “It was ridiculous to 
maintain the fiction that Chiang Kai-Shek … could be regarded as being representative of 460 
million Chinese,” Webb told several diplomats in the External Affairs Department, “if we 
persisted in deferring recognition, we would only tend to drive them further into the arms of 
the Russians.”34 Webb had undoubtedly put New Zealand in an awkward position with the 
United States. His efforts to convince the Americans and other New Zealanders to reconsider 
hard-line policies toward the PRC ultimately failed, and in the process had harmed New 
Zealand’s relationship with the United States. His comments even surprised the Australians. 
Although Webb thought that Australia was “inclined to take the American view” on China, 
McIntosh told Corner that his comments caused a “dislocation of the eyebrows in American 
and Australian circles.”35 According to McIntosh, Australia’s major concern was that Webb 
might push New Zealand towards recognising China without prior consultation.36 This suggests 
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A “Horrible Dilemma”: The 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis 
By mid-1954, there were clear differences of opinion between the ANZUS partners over the 
usefulness of continued isolationist policies toward the PRC, the possibility of future PRC 
aggression should it not be recognised, the timing of potential recognition in the future, and the 
importance of awarding recognition collectively if and when the time came. These trilateral 
differences on approaches toward China were further exposed during the 1954-55 Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis. The United States responded with the conclusion of the US-Taiwan Mutual 
Defence Treaty and a secret commitment to defend the offshore islands. New Zealand focused 
on submitting a UN cease-fire resolution codenamed Operation “Oracle” in a bid to end the 
crisis. As part of this resolution, New Zealand worked closely with British and US diplomats 
with the hope that a peaceful resolution could be reached despite Anglo-American 
disagreements. Australia, which was not privy to Oracle discussions, consistently opposed US 
plans to defend the offshore islands and instead favoured the British position of not committing 
to the defence of the offshore islands. Policymakers in Canberra also considered adopting the 
British position on PRC recognition as a possible means to reduce tensions in the Taiwan 
Straits. Intentionally or otherwise, British policy was again causing divisions between the 
ANZUS powers even though Australia and New Zealand did not go as far as publicly rejecting 
US policy on Taiwan and the PRC. 
On 3 September 1954 PRC forces began shelling Quemoy and Matsu, two small Nationalist-
held islands adjacent to the Chinese mainland. Even though by sheer geographical size and 
position alone it would be unthinkable that a global war might erupt over such small islands, 
there was a very real possibility that any miscalculation by the United States could spark a war 
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with China, and by extension, the Soviet Union.37 American policy long established its 
determination to prevent Formosa and the Pescadores falling into Communist hands, but to do 
this, Eisenhower’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thought it was important that these lesser offshore 
islands also remain in Nationalist hands. Others, such as Australia, New Zealand, Britain and 
the majority of the American public, were not convinced. US Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, for one, described them as “a bunch of rocks.”38 
Less than nine months before the PRC shelled Quemoy, Secretary of Defence Charles 
Wilson approved a JCS recommendation to loan US naval vessels to the Nationalists to assist 
in the defence of the offshore islands. These loans included two destroyers, ten patrol crafts, 
two landing repair ships, and less than one hundred small landing crafts. Approving these loans 
meant that, at the very least, Eisenhower and his military staff hoped that the Nationalists could 
hold these islands if hostilities broke out in the immediate future.39 Yet once the crisis began, 
Eisenhower was certain that the offshore islands could not possibly be defended by the United 
States. After Dulles presented the “horrible dilemma” that confronted the United States to the 
NSC on 12 September, Eisenhower stressed that “Quemoy is not our ship.” According to the 
former General, defending Quemoy by force would lead to war with China.  Public opinion 
seemed to support this position. Eisenhower went on to tell the NSC that he had constantly 
been receiving letters from the American public saying “please do not send our boys to war” 
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and “do we really care what happens to those yellow people out there?”40 Eisenhower shared 
this racist view toward Chinese people. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argued in 2012, 
Eisenhower views all “non-whites as underlings, not equals.”41 
Political opinion aside, most US military planners argued that the offshore islands were 
important to the defence of Formosa. A JCS report, submitted to the President on the afternoon 
of 3 September, recommended that current American policy towards the Taiwan Strait area be 
changed to assist in the defence of Quemoy as well as nine other offshore islands. The JCS 
Chairman Arthur Radford, a strong-minded former admiral with a wealth of experience in 
Pacific naval planning, argued particularly strongly for the defence of the islands. He 
recommended to the State Department that the United States commit to defending Quemoy and 
Matsu even with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Not all of the Chiefs of Staff agreed with 
Radford’s radical approach, but along with the Chief of the Air Force Nathan Twinning and 
Chief of Naval Operations Robert Carney, the JCS majority opinion concluded that defending 
the offshore islands was important and any withdrawal would have a considerable 
psychological effect on Nationalist morale.42 In opposition, Army Chief of Staff Matthew 
Ridgeway and Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson thought that any psychological effect did 
not outweigh the alarming consequences that could ensue if the United States committed to 
defending these islands. Ridgeway argued that defending Quemoy was “not substantially 
related to the defence of Formosa,” whereas Wilson simply saw no worthwhile reason for the 
US to defend those “doggoned little islands.”43  
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In Canberra, opinion was unanimous that defending the offshore islands was out of the 
question. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Casey drew a line between the defence of 
Formosa and the offshore islands. On 25 August he told Spender that there was a “distinction” 
between the two and “hoped that the US could see that.”44 Thomas Critchley, Head of 
Australia’s East Asia Section in the Department of External Affairs, echoed Casey’s concerns 
over American policy. According to Critchley, “[the offshore islands] problem was critical … 
because of the dangers of US involvement.”45 He was particularly concerned that ANZUS 
obliged Australia to respond if the United States was attacked in the Taiwan Strait. In this 
event, any Australian failure to respond would be catastrophic for its relationship with the 
United States, even if Canberra was “left free” of any strict military obligation to defend the 
offshore islands.46 
Casey and Critchley’s position did not change once the attacks began. In fact, Australian 
policy closely matched British policy toward the islands. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
told Dulles on 17 September that Quemoy and the other offshore islands had “no conceivable 
strategic importance,” and hoped to keep “as much water as possible” between the PRC and 
ROC.47 To achieve this, Eden argued that Chiang should evacuate Nationalist troops stationed 
on the offshore islands. Although the Australians did not express their disagreement as openly 
to the United States in mid-September, there was a strong feeling in Canberra that Australian 
interests were best served by following the British example. “We agree with the United 
Kingdom,” Attorney-General John Spicer told Casey on 16 September, “with the proximity of 
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the offshore islands to the Chinese mainland … fighting [for the islands] would be difficult to 
justify.”48 
 
New Zealand and Operation “Oracle” 
Although the United States and Britain did not agree on the defensibility or otherwise of the 
offshore islands, they did agree that war must be avoided at all costs. With this thought in mind, 
Eden and Dulles met in London during September to plan for a potential UN resolution that 
would call for a cease-fire in the strait. Eden felt that it would be best if the United States did 
not itself initiate action in the United Nations, fearing that the PRC might respond aggressively. 
Instead, Eden suggested that New Zealand might propose the resolution because at the time it 
was a temporary member of the Security Council. Moreover, as New Zealand was a much 
smaller power than the United States or Britain, a call for cease-fire from Wellington was far 
less likely to provoke a strong international backlash from China or the Soviet Union. Dulles 
agreed with Eden’s recommendation, believing that a UN resolution had substantial political 
benefits.49 He had told the NSC before he left for London that if a joint US-UK resolution could 
be reached in the Taiwan Straits, it may lead to a “coming together” of Anglo-American policy 
in the Far East.50 In Dulles’s view, it had an additional benefit. If the Soviet Union vetoed the 
resolution, it would demonstrate the aggressive and dangerous threat that Communism posed 
and spur allied support. If Moscow supported the resolution, it would mean the PRC was acting 
“against the will of the majority in the UN.”51  
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Dulles and Eden proposed a UN resolution codenamed “Oracle” to New Zealand’s Acting 
High Commissioner in London Richard Campbell on 29 September. Interestingly, they both 
stressed the “extreme secrecy” of the proposal. In other words, even with an ANZUS Council 
meeting scheduled in less than a month, the Australians were not to be told.52 Upon hearing 
about the proposal, New Zealand policymakers were excited by the opportunity to assist in an 
international crisis. They were also hopeful that a resolution might encourage US-U.K 
rapprochement vis-à-vis China. New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland believed that his 
government should accept responsibility and move ahead with the UN resolution as it presented 
New Zealand with an “opportunity of playing a constructive role in further joint US-UK policy 
in Far Eastern policy.”53 New Zealand External Affairs Minister Tom MacDonald agreed, but 
emphasised that New Zealand should not commit beyond the introduction of the resolution to 
the United Nations unless the United States and Britain were certain they could cooperate. 
Failing to do so, as MacDonald outlined, might place New Zealand in an immensely difficult 
position if the United States and British differences on China were exposed publicly once the 
resolution was presented to the Security Council. “We may find ourselves able to play a useful 
part,” MacDonald told Munro on 1 October, “but my inclination is not to commit ourselves to 
any particular course in the UN beyond initiation of the debate.”54 
Nevertheless, these concerns were put aside and the next day New Zealand notified the 
United States and Britain that it was prepared to assist in the project and propose Oracle to the 
United Nations. All states agreed to submit it under Article VI of the UN Charter, declaring 
that the crisis threatened international peace and security. As for when the resolution should be 
submitted, Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith told New Zealand Ambassador in 
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Washington Leslie Munro that the submission must wait until after the US mid-term elections 
in November.55 
MacDonald also asked Munro to find out whether the United States would object to briefing 
the Australians on the resolution. MacDonald suggested that it would be “highly embarrassing” 
if Casey found out at the upcoming ANZUS Council meeting in October that American-New 
Zealand discussions had been taking place without Australia even knowing about them. 
MacDonald, in short, thought that it might be best to include Australia in these plans before 
proceeding to the Security Council.56 When asked about informing the Australians, Dulles told 
Munro that he preferred that Australia not yet be told but would not object if New Zealand 
thought it absolutely imperative. On further reflection, Munro seemed to agree with Dulles that 
Australia should not be told until the last possible moment. “There is always the risk of 
Australian intervention at an inappropriate stage and pursued by Spender in his own peculiar 
style,” Munro told MacDonald, “I do not like the risks that involves.”57 
Despite reservations from Munro and Dulles, Casey was told about the Oracle project in 
mid-October as part of preparations for the ANZUS Council meeting in Washington. Upon 
being briefed by New Zealand, Casey had immediate objections. He did not understand why 
his American and New Zealand counterparts could not see that potentially serious issues could 
occur if a UN resolution was pursued. For one, Casey thought the prospects of a successful UN 
submission would be “so remote as to throw in doubt value of [the] exercise.” Even in the 
unlikely event that a resolution was passed, it was neither clear how the full co-operation of 
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the Nationalists in neutralising the islands could be obtained nor how it would be implemented. 
So far as Casey was concerned, there was also a disconcerting possibility that a Soviet veto 
could “stimulate pressure” in the United States to defend the offshore islands.58 In short, 
although Casey wanted a cease-fire in the Taiwan Straits as soon as possible, he did not agree 
that the New Zealand-American-British UN resolution was the most appropriate action to 
achieve that objective. 
 
The Mutual Defence Treaty, the Tachen Attacks and Revised U.S Policies 
By late 1954, the United States was also moving ahead with the conclusion of a binding 
commitment to defend Formosa and the nearby Pescadores. Due to the close US-New Zealand 
cooperation surrounding the Oracle project, the Americans told the New Zealanders about this 
plan before the Australians and left it to New Zealand to “keep Australia adequately informed 
if and when a decision seemed likely.” Once the Australians were briefed about this plan, 
Spender immediately called a meeting with Dulles on 31 October to express his dissatisfaction 
with the proposed treaty and the lack of consultation with Australia. During the meeting 
Spender “expressed some annoyance that the Australians had not been brought into these talks” 
for the mutual defence pact with Formosa. He also suggested that a pact would be “unwise” 
because it would “compel a clarification of the situation with reference to the offshore islands 
and that a somewhat indeterminate status was preferable.”59 In other words, Spender thought 
that the United States should avoid a clear-cut commitment and instead keep the PRC guessing 
as to American intentions in the Taiwan Straits. 
Nonetheless, a mutual security treaty between the United States and the Nationalist 
Government was eventually signed on 2 December 1954. This treaty guaranteed that the United 
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States would defend Formosa, potentially even with the use of nuclear weapons.60 It also 
required Chiang to consult with the United States before launching any attack on the Chinese 
mainland. This provision ensured that the Nationalists could not drag the United States into an 
unwanted war over mainland China. As Dulles had hoped, the wording over the commitment 
to defend the offshore islands was left unclear. Eisenhower stressed later that the decision to 
defend Formosa’s “closely related territories” would be decided by the President.61 Once the 
treaty was put into force, Dulles hoped to clear up this fuzziness with American allies. He spoke 
with New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Munro and British Ambassador Roger Makins about the 
US preparedness to commit privately defending Quemoy and Matsu even with the use of 
nuclear weapons. Neither government was pleased with this new American policy. Upon 
hearing about the new US policy, Eden went one step further and suggested that Oracle not be 
pursued until the United States gave up its proposal to defend Quemoy.62 
In Australia, once Eisenhower announced publicly his intention to defend Formosa—and, 
if he thought it necessary for Formosa’s defence, its “closely related territories”—Casey grew 
concerned that a war over the offshore islands may eventuate. For the mindful External Affairs 
Minister, it was just as dangerous as a possible UN resolution. “We are considerably 
concerned,” Casey told Spender, “it seems equally foolish and dangerous to contemplate [war] 
in the defence of islands whose security value is, to say the least, doubtful.” In summation, he 
“[did] not regard these islands as worth the risk of war.”63 Casey, a long-time advocate of a 
more realistic approach to China, explored alternatively the possibility of recognising the PRC 
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in an effort to reduce tensions. He wrote to Menzies on 10 December suggesting that on 
balance, the “majority of the Australian press seemed to be in favour for recognition” of the 
PRC. He also stressed that even though free world nations should not condone Communist 
aggression, current relations with Beijing were not on a satisfactory basis.64 
Casey’s connection between recognizing the PRC and tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
continued. When drafting an announcement on the current situation in East Asia, Casey 
reasoned that “the conduct of international affairs is made more difficult so long as the PRC is 
not recognised and so it would be logical to change this situation.”65 Although Casey concluded 
that the offshore island crisis should be settled first and then consider “recognition later,” he 
clearly thought that recognising the PRC might in some way reduce tensions or prevent future 
Chinese aggression. This part of his statement was never publicised, as Menzies opposed any 
suggestion that Australia was at the time considering changing its public opposition to 
recognising the PRC. Nevertheless, policymakers such as Casey appeared willing to consider 
the possibility of recognition far more openly than policymakers in the United States.  
There was strong support in Australia for Casey’s suggestion. From both the public and the 
federal opposition, Casey was encouraged to pursue recognition in exchange for a cease-fire in 
the straits. For example, an article written by journalist John Bennetts published in the Sunday 
Times in early 1955 suggested that Australia, the United States and Nationalist China should 
abandon any interest in the offshore islands as a quid pro quo for recognition of the PRC. For 
“assurances and demonstrations of goodwill and peaceful intentions” in the Taiwan Straits, 
Bennetts wrote that Communist China should be “offered eventual membership of the United 
Nations and general recognition as the lawful Government of mainland China in return.”66 
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Reports emerged later that Labor backbencher Allan Fraser accused Casey of not “seeking to 
exploit every opportunity for negotiation with Red China” while the offshore island crisis 
remained unresolved. Casey should be “prompting the recognition of the Chinese mainland 
Government,” Fraser told the press, “as a means to pave the way for a long-term settlement.”67 
On mainland China, Mao’s response to the recent US-ROC defence treaty was particularly 
aggressive. On 10 January 1955, he ordered an attack on the Tachen Islands. Eight days later, 
PRC forces also attacked and captured nearby Ichiang Island. The Tachens themselves were 
approximately 320 kilometres north of Formosa, far outside the original area the US considered 
strategically important for defending Formosa. Nonetheless, Eisenhower and Radford thought 
these attacks indicated the PRC’s “clear intent” to capture all offshore islands, with the ultimate 
purpose of taking Formosa and the Pescadores.68 To combat this, the US convinced a reluctant 
Chiang to evacuate the Tachens in exchange for a private commitment to defend Quemoy and 
Matsu in the event of a full scale attack. This drastic change in American policy confirmed that 
Dulles’s original plans had “backfired.” As Wilson told the NSC on 20 January, US 
“diplomatic efforts … had failed.”69 
With diplomatic efforts failing, military options were revisited. Earlier on 20 January, a 
meeting was held between the State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and several Congressmen 
to brief Capitol Hill on new developments in the Taiwan Straits. Dulles said that the situation 
in the Formosa area was developing “in an acute way which seems to call for a sounder 
defensive concept. There is no doubt in [my] mind that the ultimate purpose of the Communist 
Chinese is to try and take Formosa and the Pescadores,” Dulles stressed, “the problem had 
reached such magnitude that it had to be dealt with in a comprehensive way.” On the advice of 
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Admiral Radford, Dulles said that there would be a regrouping of Nationalists forces and with 
help from the United States they would hold the remaining islands (Quemoy and Matsu).  
Hoping to secure Congressional support for such action, Dulles argued that “it would be 
criminal folly on our part to sit and watch these islands be taken which could be held with 
minor help on our part.” Most of the Congressmen agreed with this approach, but they wanted 
Eisenhower to make it extremely clear that US military action was limited only to reorganising 
Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu and defending these islands in the possibility that 
they were attacked. As Senator Earle Clements told Dulles, the President must make clear 
“what we are willing to defend, where we will draw the line, and where we will retreat no 
further.”70 
In Canberra, the Tachen attacks presented an increasingly dangerous and uncertain period 
for Australian policymakers. Yet instead of making any immediate public statement, the 
Australian Department of External Affairs kept their policies behind closed doors in the belief 
that the State Department was best placed to handle the crisis. The ever tactful Casey reasoned 
that his Government’s interests were best served by simply staying quiet, because announcing 
that Australia saw a clear distinction between Formosa and the offshore islands could only 
complicate the situation for the United States. “The attitude I have been taking,” Casey penned 
in his diary on 28 January, “is not to talk unless it would do more good than harm.” He also 
recommended against an ANZUS meeting on the crisis, thinking that at the present time 
Australia had “nothing positive to suggest that had not already been considered by the US.”71 
 Escalating tensions, however, forced him to outline Australian policy publicly. In an 
address coming almost a month after the Tachens were first shelled, Casey stated the Australian 
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Government’s desire for “disengagement” from the offshore islands as these were clearly part 
of Chinese territory. This position sat uneasily with his US counterparts, who had determined 
so recently to hold Quemoy and Matsu. It was also no coincidence that Casey’s statement came 
after Eisenhower’s address to Congress on 24 January that outlined only the President had the 
power to decide whether the US would defend Formosa’s “closely related territories.” Though 
Casey recognized in his statement that the situation was “in the hands of President Eisenhower 
more than anyone else,” his timing affirmed Australian discontent over defending the islands.72 
Although New Zealand shared Australian concerns over the Tachen attacks and recent 
changes to American policy in the Taiwan Straits, the New Zealand External Affairs 
Department still believed that Oracle should be pursued rather than defending the offshore 
islands or pursuing recognition as a quid pro quo for the cessation of PRC aggression. “The 
Government has no intention of entering into any sort of commitment involving New Zealand 
in developments around Formosa,” New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas McDonald 
announced on 27 January. Instead, McDonald suggested that New Zealand was “anxious that 
the threat to peace which appears to be developing in that area should be dealt with by the 
normal machinery of the United Nations.”73 
In Washington, Munro agreed wholeheartedly with McDonald’s announcement. He 
certainly did not agree with the US decision to secure a formal defence treaty for Taiwan and 
its efforts to create uncertainty over a potential American response to attacks on the offshore 
islands, describing both responses as the “two worst courses of action.” “I must say I am 
seriously disturbed by the American course of conduct,” he told MacDonald on 21 January 
1955.74 Munro still believed Oracle could still serve a useful purpose, but could only proceed 
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if the US and UK could agree to support the resolution. This seemed increasingly unlikely once 
Britain signalled its complete opposition to America’s commitment to defend Formosa and 
possibly the offshore islands. After Dulles informed British Ambassador in Washington Roger 
Makins on 19 January that the United States would assist in the defence of Quemoy, Makins 
responded a day later with British views on the subject. Its message was clear: “the British 
government is disturbed by developments,” Makins told Dulles on 20 January, and “the Cabinet 
did not like the idea of a ‘provisional guarantee’ of Quemoy.75 
Upon receiving word that Britain was unlikely to support a UN resolution while the United 
States committed privately to the defence of Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles backed down and 
agreed to reconsider presenting Oracle to the UN instead of committing to defend Quemoy and 
Matsu. American, British and New Zealand delegates met on 23 January to decide how the 
resolution might be proposed. It was decided that Britain should inform Beijing and Moscow 
of Oracle, then New Zealand would invite China to attend UN discussions after the presentation 
of the resolution. On 31 January the United Nations invited China to attend the debate on the 
offshore islands, but Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai rejected the invitation. He stated that Oracle 
opened the door to the possibility of “two China’s” and was an illegal intervention into Chinese 
internal affairs.76 
Once the PRC declared that it was unwilling to discuss the offshore island problem in the 
United Nations, Commonwealth countries grew further concerned that the United States would 
defend the offshore islands if an invasion took place. These issues were discussed at length 
during the Prime Minister’s Conference in London from 31 January to 8 February 1955. Aside 
from discussions over the insurgence of Communist forces in Malaya, delegates discussed 
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reaching an agreement on the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. Menzies was especially determined to 
influence British opinion when relaying at the conference that his Cabinet agreed unanimously 
that the Nationalists should disengage from the offshore islands. Eden agreed firmly with 
disengaging from the offshore islands. A disengagement policy reflected what he told Dulles 
previously about the offshore islands holding “no conceivable strategic importance.” Feeling 
that this summarised neatly the “consensus of opinion” from the conference, Eden asked 
Menzies to write to Dulles and outline the position of the Commonwealth nations. The letter 
stressed that delegates at the Prime Minister’s Conference were convinced that “further 
resolutions and debate in the Security Council at present would do harm” and that “Australia 
and Britain were very much opposed to the risk of war over the offshore islands.”77 
Menzies’s letter provided the State Department with a clear warning that Britain and 
Australia were moving away from supporting a UN solution to the crisis. Even New Zealand 
Prime Minister Holland, who had been a strong supporter of Oracle and was concerned by 
American action in the Taiwan Straits, pledged his support to Australian and British efforts to 
at least delay Oracle.78 In response, Eisenhower wrote to Churchill and noted that while he 
appreciated British efforts to avoid a rift in Anglo-American relations, he argued that the British 
did not understand fully the Communist’s “constant pressing on the Asian frontier.”79 
Churchill, however, remained steadfast on his government’s position on China and later 
informed Washington that Whitehall no longer supported Oracle. With London no longer 
supporting Oracle, the United States could not realistically hope to find a long term solution or 
even a temporary cease-fire through the UN. 
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Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy with Dulles, February-March 1955 
During the Prime Minister’s Conference, Spender cabled Menzies on 6 February to offer a 
more detailed assessment of the situation as it stood in the Taiwan Strait. Even though he was 
unaware the importance the American JCS attached to holding the offshore islands, he told 
Menzies the problem was because of a continued Nationalist military presence on the islands 
rather than American insistence that they were essential. Believing that Chiang would be a 
difficult man to convince, he proposed that in return for a Nationalist withdrawal from the 
islands, Australia and other Commonwealth countries should declare their intention to defend 
Formosa if attacked. Although Menzies did not take up Spender’s suggestion immediately—
like many Australians, Menzies was reluctant to commit to Chiang’s defence and only 
considered doing so in the hope that it might prevent a wider war with China—it did form the 
basis for a later proposal Menzies submitted to the United States after the crisis came to an 
end.80 
In any event, Spender had more pressing matters on his agenda. Following the Prime 
Ministers Conference, Dulles held an important meeting with Spender on 11 February to 
discuss the Australian and Commonwealth position on Formosa and the offshore islands. 
Spender opened the meeting by first relaying the consensus of opinion reached in London. In 
outlining the Australian position, he stressed that: 
 
It is causing us deep concern … we cannot see that [the offshore islands] are either 
vital, or even important, to Formosa-Pescadores defence. It is, therefore, hard for 
us to see why they are made a policy issue. Our view is that the correct aim is 
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disengagement from the islands … these views are not dissimilar to those already 
expressed by Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.81 
 
Dulles appreciated Spender’s open yet firm expression of Australian and Commonwealth 
policy. He told Spender that “none of his colleagues had so clearly or so categorically” been as 
helpful on the offshore island issue. Australia was “more engaged in the area than others,” 
Dulles added, “Australia is not a country on the sidelines.”82 
Dulles was not surprised by the Australian position. It was, as he pointed out, not too 
dissimilar from the views reached in the NSC meeting in mid-September 1954. Nevertheless, 
he told Spender that the US now considered that withdrawing from the offshore islands would 
have a substantial psychological effect on Formosa and nearby areas. Dulles also shared with 
Spender that the JCS thought the islands held strategic importance because (1) it blocked two 
natural harbours and, (2) its proximity to the Chinese mainland made it a useful staging area 
for potential counterattacks. In short, Dulles stressed that the United States had been 
“reluctantly compelled” to move from its original position (which generally coincided with 
current Australian policy) to its present position.83 
Neither Spender nor Dulles wanted war in the strait. They both agreed on the strategic 
necessity of keeping Formosa and the Pescadores out of Communist hands, but disagreed on 
the way that it should be done. For Dulles, it was important to highlight that although the US 
had determined Quemoy and Matsu be defended, there was considerable flexibility in any 
decision to do so. In his view, the decision “was entirely ours.”84 Spender—and, for that matter, 
                                                          






almost all other Commonwealth nations—seemed unconvinced by this reasoning. Though 
Spender well understood Dulles’s arguments for the defence of the offshore islands and 
sympathised with his awkward position, Menzies’s recent letter to Washington best captured 
the majority of Australian opinion over American involvement in the strait. American 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom Winthrop Aldrich also informed Washington that 
Australia and Britain were deeply concerned that they might be dragged into an unwanted and 
unnecessary war. He told the State Department that a recent Walter Lippman article called 
“Towards a Cease-fire”—based on the agreements reached at the Prime Ministers 
Conference—argued that “sound American policy would be to do what is being done in the 
Tachens to Quemoy and Matsu.” In other words, Australia and Britain believed the ROC and 
US should evacuate all offshore islands. This, according to Aldrich, summarised the 
Commonwealth position to an “extraordinarily exact degree.”85  
Consistent with the summary Aldrich gave to the State Department, Eden rejected flatly 
Dulles’s view that evacuating the offshore islands would seriously affect Nationalist morale. 
Even if it did, he told Dulles on 26 February that “further deterioration in morale is preferable 
to breaking up the [Anglo-American] alliance.” This presumably meant that if push came to 
shove, London would not support Washington on the offshore island issue.86 Fearing further 
rifts between Washington and its allies, Dulles took the opportunity to remind Casey and NZ 
External Affairs Minister McDonald that “if fighting broke out in the future over Formosa 
(which he certainly did not exclude as a possibility), Australia and New Zealand would be 
concerned as partners of ANZUS.”87 It was a disconcerting situation for Australia to be in. If 
Canberra supported Washington, it risked isolating itself from Britain and the Commonwealth. 
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It also risked placing itself on the front-lines of a nuclear war over islands that Australians 
policymakers consistently determined were strategically insignificant. However, if Canberra 
supported London, it would both marginalise its relationship with Washington and question 
the usefulness of ANZUS. 
Prompted by these Australian-American-British divisions, Menzies visited Washington to 
discuss possibilities for bringing the crisis to an end. In a meeting with Dulles on 14 March, 
his first agenda item was to gather US financial and military support for the defence of Malaya, 
one of Australia’s most important strategic interests. As part of Australia’s forward defence 
policy in Southeast Asia, Australian and British defence talks had been moving recently 
towards creating a Far East Strategic Reserve (which came into effect later in April) that would 
entail a joint military force stationed in the region to protect Malaya and other Commonwealth 
interests. Unfortunately for Menzies, he convinced neither Dulles nor the American JCS to 
commit to Malaya’s defence or a broader defence scheme outside of SEATO.88  
Next, talks moved to the escalating situation in the Taiwan Straits. He first asked Dulles to 
explain the difference between his position and that of Casey and Eden’s. According to Dulles, 
there were two elements informing these differences: a misunderstanding of the US approach 
and questions of judgment as to the best way to achieve the same objective. Dulles stressed 
that the British House of Commons did not understand that psychological and political factors 
were just as important as military considerations and that these factors were shaping the US 
position. He also suggested that there could be no categorical assertion whether the US would 
or would not defend the islands.89 Menzies sympathised with Dulles’s difficult position. 
However, American ambiguity ultimately sat uneasily with Australian policy. There was little 
doubt in Canberra that efforts should be made to ensure Formosa did not fall into PRC hands, 
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but the offshore islands presented an entirely different question. Menzies, who believed that 
the “unconditional surrender of offshore islands would intensify Communist truculence,” asked 
Dulles about the possibility of a ROC withdrawal from the islands in exchange for a group of 
nations guaranteeing the defence of Formosa (Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and any other 
Commonwealth nation willing to commit to this scheme).90 Dulles quite liked this idea. He 
thought the suggestion had “merit” and would “give further thought” to the proposition. He 
even told Menzies that he had proposed a similar idea to Eden previously, but had received no 
response.91 The unfortunate reality was that Chiang was unlikely to agree. The Generalissimo 
had already secured a guarantee from the United States, and any offshore island evacuation 
would work against his plans to recover the Chinese mainland. Drawing upon new archival 
documents, Hsiao-Ting Lin confirmed in 2013 that Chiang’s primary goal was the “means by 
which to rearm his forces so as to strengthen his position to launch a military recovery of the 
mainland.”92 
Even if a Commonwealth guarantee could not be reached, Menzies wanted to make sure 
that Dulles understood how the Australian public viewed the situation. While the Australian 
public might support holding Formosa if a broader war broke out, he told Dulles that there 
would be no support whatsoever for a war fought over the offshore islands. In Menzies’s view, 
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there was only support for larger efforts to prevent aggressive Communist behaviour. “The 
Australian public would support a war in the defence of freedom,” Menzies stated, “but not of 
Governments per se (such as Chiang’s regime) or offshore islands.”93 Dulles could at least be 
certain of Australia’s commitment if war eventuated, but did not find the agreement on offshore 
island policy he was looking for.  
While Spender and Menzies met with Dulles in an attempt to find a resolution to the crisis, 
New Zealand policymakers continued to debate whether pursuing Oracle might still serve a 
useful purpose despite Zhou’s rejection in late January. In March, Ambassador Munro wrote 
to MacDonald and explained his thoughts on the project. In his mind, New Zealand could either 
introduce the Oracle resolution on its own or jettison the idea entirely. Munro appeared to 
favour the first option, fearing that if New Zealand postponed Oracle and then the United States 
went ahead with the resolution it would make New Zealand’s “position in the operation … very 
invidious.” Concerned by this prospect, Munro suggested to Dulles that while New Zealand 
was not prepared to abandon the Oracle project, it made sense to delay a decision to see whether 
tensions could be relieved on their own.94 
In response, Dulles suggested to Munro on 23 March that New Zealand’s role in the Oracle 
project was still important and that its presentation to the United Nations should not be delayed. 
He argued that there was while tensions had calmed in recent weeks there was no telling when 
the PRC might mount another attack, especially after Washington received intelligence several 
days beforehand that the PRC was installing approximately 250 new gun turrets near 
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Quemoy.95 Moreover, in April the Soviet Union would assume the Security Council 
presidency, making it even more difficult to proceed with Oracle.96 Pressure from Dulles to 
introduce the resolution concerned Munro. According to Munro, it forced New Zealand to 
“choose between the British and American points of view in an area where action by the United 
States, our chief bulwark in the Pacific, might not be supported by the United Kingdom.”97 
Fortunately for the Oracle sponsors, tensions eased on 23 April 1955 when PRC Premier 
Zhou Enlai announced that China did not want war with the United States and was willing to 
enter into negotiations. Zhou’s announcement meant that Oracle would not have to be 
introduced in the United Nations in order to resolve the crisis. Though sceptical of Chinese 
intentions, the Americans agreed and entered into ambassadorial talks in Geneva from August 
1955. Realising the weight of domestic and international opinion against any American action 
in the defence of the offshore islands, President Eisenhower was surely relieved that he never 
had to decide between whether to intervene militarily or concede defeat to a Communist 
government. At least for now, the United States had avoided the “inevitable moment of 
decision between two unacceptable choices” in the Taiwan Straits.98 
 
Aftermath: An Australian Proposal and Revised China Policies 
Alongside American trepidations, Menzies could not be certain whether Zhou’s offer to 
negotiate was genuine or not. Either way, he thought that future hostilities with the PRC were 
still likely. Similar to when Casey considered recognition might prevent recurring PRC 
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aggression, Menzies thought future tensions in the Taiwan Strait could be settled if the PRC 
was part of an international discussion towards recognition. He took this idea one step further, 
proposing to the State Department that the PRC attend a Four Power Conference to address 
current Sino-American differences. Menzies’s proposal outlined that there was a clear “danger 
of fighting over the offshore islands [because it] could develop into a major war.” Due to “the 
difficulty of doing anything about the offshore islands while an atmosphere existed of 
Communist threats to attack the offshore islands and Formosa,” recognising the PRC should 
be reconsidered.99 Washington, however, was not convinced that Menzies’s proposal addressed 
its own interests. Dulles first told Spender on 3 May that the idea was “unfavourable” and the 
American public would be very much opposed.100 US Ambassador to Australia Amos Peaslee 
was even more vocal about his dislike for the plan, stating that he was “astonished” and 
“disturbed.” According to Peaslee, the Australian Government was “180º off course” with this 
idea.101 
After Menzies’s failed proposal, the Australian Joint Planning Committee (JPC) 
reconsidered formally Formosa’s strategic importance for future defence planning. Offshore 
island policy was not in question: as late as May, the Australian Government continued to draw 
a distinction between Formosa and the offshore islands, claiming that the latter were “not 
regarded as important.”102 Yet as far as Formosa was concerned, the JPC report concluded it 
was now more strategically important because of its proximity to China and the control it 
afforded over the Formosa Straits. More importantly for Australian strategy, the report 
reasoned that the PRC could only “concentrate their military effort at one point at a time.” In 
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other words, as long as the PRC’s attention was drawn to Formosa, it acted as a “constant 
deterrent to further Chinese Communist adventure in Southeast Asia.”103 These JPC findings 
saw several reasons why Formosa was, in fact, an important regional base that had to be kept 
out of Communist hands, but its strategic importance was considered only in light of Australian 
interests in Southeast Asia rather than from co-ordinating defence policy with the United 
States.  
Moreover, the Department of External Affairs did not agree with American policy or that 
even continuing to hold Formosa was in Australia’s best interests. Casey, for one, told Plimsoll 
on 13 April that “we’re not as convinced as the Americans are of Chiang and his forces.” He 
suggested further that American policy was based on a “lie” and that they were “prisoners of 
their past attitudes.” “For Chiang and his Formosa forces,” Casey stated bluntly, “common-
sense prompts one to believe that they must be a factor of declining importance in the scheme 
of things … as time goes on, Formosa will decline.”104 Convinced that the External Affairs 
Department should reconsider its China policy, Casey commissioned a major study for the 
Cabinet in June 1955 titled “The Situation in East Asia: Formosa and Recognition of China.” 
Although the report concluded that Australia was not yet in a position to recognise the PRC 
due to the US position, it stated that the prospects of finding long term peace in the Far East 
through potential recognition were now greater than they had ever been. This was due at least 
in part to Beijing’s recent softer diplomacy, which suggested a “genuine [Chinese] desire for a 
policy of live and let live.” In other words, Casey thought that even after the PRC initiation of 
the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, Mao’s Government was beginning to act more responsibly and 
Western powers should award recognition together accordingly in the short-term future. “So 
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far as recognition and representation in the United Nations is concerned,” Casey’s report 
concluded, the issue was “perhaps now one of timing rather than of principle.”105 
 
Conclusion 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, Australian, New Zealand 
and American policymakers were certainly relieved that the crisis did not escalate into a wider 
war. Nevertheless, there were heightened concerns in these countries that their respective 
relationships with Beijing were not working and that opposing recognition might in fact be 
encouraging further aggression in East Asia. This was especially true in Canberra and 
Wellington, where recognition was discussed before, during and after the Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis despite much stronger opposition to recognising the PRC in the United States. Even then, 
trans-Tasman views vis-à-vis China were by no means identical. As this chapter pointed out, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States differences in views toward China stemmed from 
both the British position and general concerns in Australia and New Zealand that the 
Eisenhower Administration might act recklessly in the Taiwan Straits. Nevertheless, despite 
trans-Tasman concerns about the US approach to China and growing support for British views, 
Australia and New Zealand were unprepared to risk isolating themselves from the United States 
and compromise the US commitment to the ANZUS Treaty. This demonstrates that there were 
clear limits to unequivocal Australian and New Zealand support for either US or British 
policies in regards to China. Policy differences between the ANZUS powers, however, soon 
manifested elsewhere. As the next chapter explores, Australian, New Zealand and American 
views toward the Middle East and the 1956 Suez Crisis were similarly divergent. In this regard, 
it will demonstrate that the ANZUS relationship was strained due to trans-Tasman British ties 
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Shortly after an uneasy peace settlement was reached in the Taiwan Straits, longstanding 
tensions erupted into open conflict between Egypt and Anglo-French-Israeli forces during the 
1956 Suez Crisis. Responding to Western pressure, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser 
nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956 which prompted an Israeli invasion in late October 
that was followed by an Anglo-French intervention plot. The American response, which 
condemned military action, pressured Britain and France into an embarrassing withdrawal. The 
crisis publicly exposed a bitter rift in Anglo-American relations and essentially confirmed the 
end of British world leadership. It also exposed noticeable policy differences between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States over Britain’s role in world affairs. 
This chapter contains two sections. The first examines Australian, New Zealand and 
American security interests in the region prior to the Suez Crisis. While Australia was 
originally committed to the defence of the Middle East (depending on the situation in Southeast 
Asia) and agreed in principle to the formation of a Middle East Command (see Chapter Two), 
by the mid-1950s Australian defence and strategic policy centred increasingly away from the 
Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific. New Zealand followed a similar trajectory, except 
Wellington remained more committed to the defence of the Middle East and strongly supported 
British dominance in the region. Across the Pacific, US post-war interests in the region 
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increased gradually. By the mid-1950s, the United States had two primary interests in the 
region: defending the Middle East from Soviet control, and maintaining a free flow of resources 
(primarily oil) through the region to the West. 
The second section examines responses by the ANZUS powers to Nasser’s nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal and the Anglo-French Israeli invasion in mid to late 1956. While US 
President Dwight Eisenhower condemned Nasser’s actions and wanted the Suez Canal to 
remain under international control, he hoped to achieve this through peaceful means. In 
contrast, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden favoured a more direct and aggressive 
approach. In collusion with France and Israel, Eden secretly planned to invade the Sinai 
Peninsula in order to topple Nasser and retain international control of the Canal. Australia and 
New Zealand held similar views by publicly supporting British action even though in private 
many diplomats were horrified by British recklessness. The invasion ultimately failed after 
American pressure forced a British, French and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. In this context, 
Australian-New Zealand-American responses to the crisis provide an interesting insight into 
contrasting views between the ANZUS powers toward Britain’s post-war role in world affairs. 
Moreover, it demonstrates a turning point in alliance diplomacy for both Canberra and 
Wellington. In this instance, Australia and New Zealand held similar views and were not 
prepared to defer to US leadership (as in the case of  non- recognition of China discussed in 
the previous chapter) when vital British interests were at stake. For the trans-Tasman countries, 
Suez starkly exposed the limitations to supporting Britain when London’s views were at odds 







The Middle East Command and Trilateral Defence Interests in the Middle East before 
the 1956 Suez Crisis 
Australian, New Zealand and American interests in the Middle East changed quite considerably 
over the years between the end of World War II and the 1956 Suez Crisis. In the immediate 
post-war period Australia was prepared to defend the Middle East and participate in a Middle 
East Command, yet its participation hinged on the situation in Southeast Asia. Across the 
Tasman, New Zealand’s post-war defence plans centred on sending its forces back to fight for 
the British cause in the Middle East. Its participation in a defence arrangement in the region 
also hinged upon British inclusion. By the mid-1950s, policymakers in Australia and New 
Zealand had turned their focus to the Asia-Pacific instead of the Middle East. US interest in 
the Middle East grew gradually and in accordance with an increased threat of Soviet influence 
and the waning of British influence. US interest also stemmed from a perceived need to deny 
the Communist bloc access to key war-related resources in the region such as oil. 
Australia and New Zealand shared similar post-war interests in the security of the Middle 
East. For both countries, the Suez Canal was the major shipping route to Britain and the rest of 
Europe. Access to the region’s oil reserves was also especially important for both country’s 
post-war industrial development schemes. As discussed in Chapter One, over and above these 
economic interests, Australia and New Zealand also had secret contingency plans to send forces 
to the Middle East in the event of another world war. In New Zealand’s case, defence plans in 
the event of global war were made in conjunction with British Defence Chiefs.1 Canberra was 
also prepared its own forces back to the Middle East, but only if there was no immediate threat 
from Southeast Asia.2 
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Across the Pacific, the United States had vital post-war interests in the Middle East. As the 
Cold War escalated in the late 1940s, policymakers in Washington concluded that the region 
had to be defended in order to protect Western interests and prevent Arab countries from falling 
under Soviet influence. “The fact is that because of clear Soviet aspirations in the Middle East,” 
the State Department concluded, “it is essential that Soviet expansion in that area be 
contained.”3 Washington was also concerned by waning British influence in Egypt. Successive 
post-war Egyptian Nationalists had threatened to terminate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
that outlined the terms of a continued British military presence near the Suez Canal. If the treaty 
was terminated, the West would be denied access to military facilities in the region. 
Against this backdrop, in the late 1940s and early 1950s the United States and Britain 
considered forming a Middle East Defence Command. Under this arrangement, the United 
States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Egypt and several other countries would 
jointly commit to the defence of the Middle East. The United States was primarily determined 
to support this Command in an effort to deny Soviet access to the region and prevent further 
aggression in Europe. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs George McGhee 
outlined on 27 December 1950, the Soviet Union “could never consolidate a conquest of 
Europe” without access to Middle Eastern oil reserves. Moreover, Washington was determined 
to participate in the Command to prevent the “loss of American prestige in the area” and to 
ensure that American firms could continue to access oil regional reserves.4 In short, US 
participation in the Command would project a positive image of the American commitment to 
defending Communism while simultaneously supporting US regional economic interests. 
Despite these interests, US participation aimed to award primary responsibility for creating 
and implementing the Command to Britain. This strategy suggests that the early identification 
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of the Middle East as a primary US interest was somewhat rhetorical or perfunctory. The United 
States concluded it would only provide “token amounts” of arms to the Command in an effort 
to “minimise the cost” to the greatest extent possible. Most importantly, London must gather 
Commonwealth support for the Command on its own accord. The Command structure, in other 
words, would not alter the fact that the “UK and the Commonwealth have primary 
responsibility for the defence of the area.”5 It was London’s responsibility to convince 
Canberra and Wellington to participate. 
Britain contacted Australia and New Zealand about the possibility of forming a Middle East 
Command in mid-1951. Given that its global war defence plans already centred on sending 
forces back to the Middle East, New Zealand unsurprisingly supported the proposed 
arrangement in principle. For both its own survival and the general survival of the West, the 
Holland government had outlined clear benefits in defending the Middle East through a 
Command-type structure as early as late 1950. A report from a Commonwealth Conference in 
December 1950 concluded that the Middle East lay “in a direct line of communication between 
the United Kingdom and the Pacific Dominions.” Moreover, the region was “economically 
vital to the West and to the British Commonwealth as a source of oil, particularly as American 
oilfields [became] exhausted.”6 The Middle East, in other words, was the “frontier zone” 
between East and West. The Holland government concluded it must be denied to the Soviets 
at all costs. 
Much to the concern of diplomats in Wellington, once New Zealand was officially 
approached about the Command in August 1951 the proposal did not offer small powers (such 
as New Zealand) an opportunity to influence policy and defence decisions. For New Zealand 
Deputy External Affairs Secretary Foss Shanahan, this was unacceptable. It was important for 
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New Zealand to ensure that such an arrangement allowed its own officers to be a part of the 
Command structure and influence the decision-making process. A report produced by 
Shanahan listed these concerns very clearly: “though the Command arrangements are from a 
military point of view generally acceptable,” Shanahan said, “New Zealand authorities would 
first wish … to have assurance that [an] opportunity will exist for the appointment of selected 
and suitably qualified New Zealand officers.”7 
Shanahan was also concerned that there was no clear political structure or consultation body 
to discuss policy problems between the Command powers. “The New Zealand government are 
concerned by the lack of a higher political direction for the Middle East Command 
Organisation,” Shanahan argued, “there should be more adequate opportunity for consultation 
for other foreign powers participating in the Command arrangement.”8 Shanahan expressed 
these concerns to Acting British High Commissioner in New Zealand Alexander Morley on 18 
September. Morley reassured New Zealand officials that Britain would work towards 
accommodating New Zealand concerns, responding that New Zealand indeed “had a part to 
play in overall strategy” in the Middle East.9 Once Britain told policymakers in Wellington that 
their voices would be heard in the arrangement, New Zealand accepted a formal British 
invitation to participate in the Middle East Defence Command.10 
Australia, on the other hand, was far less forthcoming in its support for a defence 
commitment to the Middle East. While Canberra “agreed in principle” to the Command and 
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was willing to participate in discussions, the Australian External Affairs Department stressed 
that its agreement “[did] not involve any commitment to provide forces to the Middle East.” 
Its final position on the Command would be “substantially affected by arrangements for higher 
political direction and by views which are worked out as to the place of Southeast Asia in those 
elements of strategy which are relevant to Australia.”11 Australian military planners agreed 
with this assessment. It was desirable for Australia to observe planning efforts in the Middle 
East, but in the event of a global war, deploying Australian defence forces to Southeast Asia 
was more important than assisting in the defence of the Middle East. As the Australian Defence 
Committee concluded after the Commonwealth Defence Ministers Conference in June 1951: 
 
The Australian authorities consider that as Australia’s main defence effort in 
war would be in the ANZAM region and the general area of Southeast Asia, 
full participation in the military planning studies for the defence of the Middle 
East is not necessary … Australia’s primary objective in global war should 
therefore now be in the security of Malaya.12 
 
It was especially revealing that, even after both governments saw similar problems relating 
to the Command, there was no trans-Tasman consultation on the matter. “No advice had been 
received as to the views of the Australian government,” Shanahan pointed out as late as 
September 1951.13 Australia and New Zealand did, however, express similar concerns about 
Egypt’s role in the Command. London had told both Canberra and Wellington that it was 
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desirable to associate Egypt with the Command in order to make the Suez region available as 
a base and break the deadlock in negotiations over the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. While the 
Foreign Office made it clear to Australia and New Zealand that the United States and Britain 
only meant for Egypt to take on little more than an advisory role in the Command, both 
governments responded that they did not support such action. New Zealand was far more vocal 
in expressing its dissatisfaction, especially after the Egyptian government signalled it refusal 
to participate in the Command in October 1951 and instead terminated the 1936 Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty. After hearing about the Egyptian response, Holland addressed the New 
Zealand Parliament on 9 November and declared New Zealand fully supported the creation of 
the Command regardless of the Egyptian reaction: 
 
The New Zealand government supports and accepts the proposals for the 
Middle East Defence Organisation. This area of the world is of vital 
importance not only to the security of the Commonwealth, but to the fortunes 
of the free world. Historically, it is an area of special interest to the United 
Kingdom and to New Zealand also as was demonstrated by the actions of our 
forces there in two world wars. The Middle East has been and will remain one 
of the decisive theatres.14 
 
Australia, on the other hand, chose not make a similar statement. Australian External Affairs 
Minister Richard Casey told his New Zealand counterpart Thomas Clifton Webb that doing so 
would be “taken publicly as involving Australia in a commitment to the Middle East … such a 
decision could not possibly be made on such short notice.”  He explained Australia’s reasons for 
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choosing not to publicly back the Command: Australia’s participation was “inevitably affected 
by future circumstances in Southeast Asia and the general strategic position which may exist in 
the event of global war.”15 That being the case, Casey and the Australians were not prepared to 
publicly commit the country to the defence of the Middle East. Privately, however, Casey did 
make contact with Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs Salah El Din to stress that Australia 
generally supported British action in the region. “I got across [to El Din] that we were just as 
British as the UK” and supported British action, Casey penned in his diary on 31 October.16 
After Egypt refused to participate in the Command and abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty, the United States continued to contemplate the formation of a Middle East Command. 
“The Command is important to the achievement of our political goals in the Middle East,” the 
State Department concluded in January 1952, and to “delay in its establishment will further 
prejudice the Western political position in that area.”17 As far as the formation of a Command 
was concerned, the NSC concluded that the United States should still “persuade other nations,” 
in conjunction with Britain, to provide armed forces for the defence of the Middle East. More 
specifically, Washington expected that Australia and New Zealand would be active contributors. 
An NSC report concluded that in order to achieve this objective the United States should make 
“every appropriate effort to obtain at least a token force from Australia and New Zealand.”18 Top 
level US military officials agreed. US Army Chief of Staff Joseph Collins suggested later at a 
Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 18 June that 
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We have committed ourselves to the defence of Australia and New Zealand. 
We have guaranteed them against an invasion. We have done all of this 
precisely to free up Australian and New Zealand forces for the Middle East.19 
 
Indeed, while ANZUS was originally designed to protect mutual security threats solely in the 
Pacific theatre, US military planners began to suggest that Australia and New Zealand should 
also be prepared to commit their forces to defending the Middle East. During another joint State 
Department-JCS meeting in late November, JCS Chairman Omar Bradley concluded that it 
would be “good performance” for Australia and New Zealand to commit infantry divisions to 
any future hostilities in the Middle East.20 By JCS estimates, this trans-Tasman contribution 
would assist in meeting the “ground force deficiencies” under current American contingency 
plans for war with the Soviet Union in the region. For Bradley, Australian and New Zealand 
military contributions to the Middle East (as well as contributions from other countries) should 
still come under the guise of a joint defence Command. There was a “need for the early 
establishment” of the Middle East Defence Command, Bradly concluded, as this organisation 
would undertake the joint military planning required to defend the region from Soviet control.21 
By this stage, however, the Australians had cooled even further towards the idea of the 
formation of a Command. Australian External Affairs Secretary Alan Watt expressed serious 
reservations about the Command because it offered Australia absolutely no method of 
influencing the decision-making process. According to Watt, the proposed Command structure 
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did not give Australia “an adequate political voice in [the] political direction of the Middle East 
Command.”22 There was also little Australian support for a commitment to the Middle East 
because policymakers in Canberra believed that the security of the Pacific region was far more 
important. As New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh reported from his trip 
to Canberra on 6 May 1952, “the Australians felt that there was a large element of unreality about 
the Middle East Command.” He suggested that the Australians “preferred a Pacific approach, 
and the construction of a relationship with the Americans, through a Pacific Defence Council.”23 
For different reasons, New Zealand began to reconsider the usefulness of a Command. 
McIntosh and Shanahan conceded on 13 June 1952 that “there will probably be some military 
secrets from which we will be excluded,” but did not think this prevented New Zealand from 
actively supporting the Command. According to McIntosh and Shanahan, there were other more 
pressing issues about the arrangement that brought its usefulness into question. For one, they 
both thought that “serious differences in views between the United States and Britain” in the 
Middle East—such as the make-up of the Command personnel, US policies toward Egypt and 
the Suez Canal, and British intentions for nearby Sudan—made the proposed Command a 
potential disaster for Western interests in the region. They also concluded that tense relations 
with Egypt over British bases near Suez presented a complicated situation to address for the 
Command powers, especially in the wake of Cairo’s rejection to participate.24 
By the time of Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, Egyptian General Gamal Abdel 
Nasser had already overthrown the Egyptian government led by King Farouk and later declared 
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Egypt a Republic in June. These dramatic events convinced the Eisenhower Administration that 
a Command structure was no longer an appropriate means for the defence of the Middle East. 
“We had decided to put the [Command] concept on the shelf,” US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs John Jernegan told Counselor of the British Embassy in 
Washington Harold Beeley on 17 June, citing political instability in the region as the major reason 
for US reluctance to participate.25 Beeley replied that the British Foreign Office had a similar 
view and supported the idea to instead work closely with individual countries that appeared 
willing to defend Western interests in the region. At Beeley’s insistence, this included Australia 
and New Zealand.26 
In a NSC meeting, American policymakers confirmed that a formal multilateral defence 
arrangement was no longer the best way to protect US interests in the Middle East. The Command 
was “no longer played up as a likely defense arrangement in the future,” US National Security 
Advisor Robert Cutler told the NSC on 9 July, and “Egypt was no longer considered to be the 
nucleus of an area defence organisation.” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed. “The 
[Command] was too complicated, too much like NATO, and it obviously would not work,” 
Dulles said to Cutler, adding that “something less formal and grandiose was needed as a 
substitute.”27 The meeting concluded by agreeing that the United States should support Britain 
“to the greatest extent practical, but reserving the right to act with others or alone.”28 In other 
words, the United States remained committed to the defence of the Middle East, but it wanted 
greater flexibility in a future response if a serious crisis developed. 
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By 1953, New Zealand likewise reconsidered its commitments to the region. Secretary of 
External Affairs Alister McIntosh thought that it was useful for New Zealand to continue its 
commitment to the Middle East but only because it provided an excuse not to commit its forces 
to the Far East. As he told Frank Corner on 30 March, “one of the reasons why we welcomed the 
Middle East commitment was that we really did not want to get involved in dangerously unwise 
hostilities in the Far East, and, to that extent, the Middle East provided a useful alibi.” He added 
that “it may well be that we will prefer to stick to our Middle East commitment as a bargaining 
counter until we can make terms on the acceptance of some alternative sphere of action.”29 
Corner, on the other hand, was convinced that it was becoming increasingly impractical for 
New Zealand to continue its commitments to the Middle East. Writing his own thoughts on the 
subject in a lengthy letter back to McIntosh in July, he made some astute points about the future 
of New Zealand’s defence and foreign policies. “Some years ago it was reasonable, helpful, and 
indeed inevitable for New Zealand to agree that her forces should be disposed in the Middle East 
in war,” Corner told McIntosh on 13 July 1953. Yet, as Europe stabilised and tensions grew in 
the Far East, this situation was now changing.30 
In no uncertain terms, Corner concluded that the Middle East should not be a primary New 
Zealand interest. “The Middle East is of no direct importance to New Zealand,” he argued, adding 
that even continuing to defend the Suez area might be unnecessary because other shipping routes, 
such as the Panama Canal, could be just as useful. As far as New Zealand’s continued defence 
interests in the Middle East were concerned, Corner concluded that it was completely 
unsatisfactory “to be committed to fight in an area where we have no representation, no way of 
making an independent appraisal of conditions in the country where our troops will be placed  
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[and] no way of influencing the governments.” Overall, for these reasons, Corner concluded that 
New Zealand should “loosen its commitment to the Middle East.”31 
In similar circumstances, Australian policymakers began a marked strategic shift away from 
the Middle East. At Prime Minister Robert Menzies’s request, the Australian Defence 
Committee produced a report called “A Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy” on 8 
January 1953 to review this new direction in strategic thinking. The Australian report 
concluded that “the threat to Southeast Asia is greater than that to the Middle East … Southeast 
Asia should be given priority.”32 After Menzies approved these new defence plans, the 
Australian Embassy in Washington notified the State Department that Australia would no 
longer assist in the defence of the Middle East. “Australian troops would not be required in the 
Middle East theatre,” Australian Counsellor in Washington Frederick Blakeney told US 
Deputy Director of Near Eastern Affairs Stephen Dorsey on 22 January 1954, adding that 
“Australian troops in such an emergency was to be restricted to Southeast Asia.” Dorsey 
accepted these Australian plans, remarking that “Washington’s recent aid to Pakistan would in 
any case diminish the need for Australian troops in the event of a global war.”33 It appeared, at 
least from Dorsey’s remarks, that US policymakers had no issues with Australia accepting a 
greater military responsibility in the Pacific instead of committing to Middle East. 
While Australia and New Zealand reorientated its defence commitments to the Middle East 
in favour of the Asia-Pacific, the United States and Britain continued to be heavily involved in 
the region. Such involvement came in a number of capacities: in August 1953, Eisenhower 
authorised a covert CIA operation (with British assistance) to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddegh after he nationalised British oil reserves in the country and threatened 
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to align Iran with the Soviet bloc.34 US aid was also offered and accepted by Iraq in April 1954 
in an American bid to maintain political influence over King Faisal II and the Iraqi government. 
Similarly in Egypt, Washington agreed to fund the construction of the Aswan Dam in late 1955 
in order to gain political influence and gather diplomatic assistance in mediating the Arab-
Israeli conflict. For its part, Britain was eventually able to reach a breakthrough in Anglo-
Egyptian negotiations over British forces in the Canal area through the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement. Under this agreement, Britain agreed to withdraw all of its troops out of Egypt by 
June 1956 on the understanding that the Suez Canal would remain under international control. 
Over and above these developments, Winston Churchill’s retirement as British Prime 
Minister in April 1955 had serious ramifications for the immediate future of the Suez Canal 
and the broader region. His replacement, Anthony Eden, adopted a much more aggressive 
foreign policy towards Egypt that seriously strained Anglo-American relations and prompted 
one of the most serious international crises during entire the Cold War. Subsequent British 
action in Suez bitterly exposed the divergent views between the ANZUS powers on policies 
toward the Middle East and Britain’s role in world affairs. 
 
Nationalisation of the Canal: The 1956 Suez Crisis 
By mid-1956, Australia and New Zealand had begun a clear strategic shift away from the 
Middle East and toward their own immediate region. Meanwhile, the United States had become 
more closely involved in the Middle East. Yet once Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez 
Canal in July 1956 and the British planned for a military response, Australian, New Zealand 
and American policies changed dramatically. While privately concerned about British action, 
Australian and New Zealand diplomats publicly supported Britain. The United States instead 
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refused to entertain the idea of military action and became infuriated with the British once they 
intervened with the French after the Israeli invasion in late 1956. During this crisis, the ANZUS 
powers were not thinking along similar lines and were certainly not working cooperatively. 
These differences stemmed from trans-Tasman British ties and contrasting views about the US 
response which categorically rejected military action. 
 
Escalation of the Crisis: March-August 1956 
Throughout 1956, Eisenhower and Eden grew increasingly concerned about Egyptian leader 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. After overthrowing the Farouk government in 1952 and declaring Egypt 
a republic, Nasser frequently condemned British action in Egypt and publicly advocated a Pan-
Arab movement against the West in the Middle East. The Britons and Americans, however, 
had very different views on how to deal with Nasser. Eisenhower hoped to encourage local and 
international political resistance against Nasser through a secret operation called Operation 
Omega, which aimed to use both diplomacy and covert action to thwart his ambitions in the 
Arab world.35 Eden, on the other hand, wanted to take a much more direct approach. In 
conjunction with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Eden worked on plans to 
assassinate Nasser either covertly or through a large-scale invasion. In his eyes, Nasser was 
comparable to Hitler and needed to be eliminated as soon as possible. In letters to Eisenhower 
and in discussions with the SIS, he made frequent comparisons between Nasser, Hitler and 
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Mussolini.36 “I feel myself that we can no longer safely wait on Nasser,” Eden wrote to 
Eisenhower in early March, “a policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt.”37 
In response, Eisenhower told Eden that he feared Nasser might work closely with the 
Soviets. “I share your current concerns over the current developments in the Middle East,” 
Eisenhower wrote on 9 March, “we face a broad challenge to our position in the Near East … 
[as] the Soviets have made it abundantly clear even in their public statements their intentions 
toward the Near East. He added that “some moves by Nasser have assisted the Soviets,” and 
under these circumstances, “it may well be that [the United States and Britain] shall be driven 
to conclude that it is impossible to do business with Nasser. Yet for all of his concerns, 
Eisenhower was not willing to completely dismiss finding a peaceful solution with Nasser. “I 
do not think that we should close the door yet on the possibility of working with him,” he 
argued in a letter to Eden.38 Eisenhower, in short, wanted to explore all options to maintain the 
US position in the Middle East in order to stop Soviet expansionism in the region and protect 
American access to regional oil reserves. 
By mid-1956, prospects for finding a peaceful solution with Nasser evaporated quickly. On 
19 July, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the United States was formally 
withdrawing aid for the Aswan Dam Project. In a meeting with Egyptian Ambassador in 
Washington Ahmed Hussein, Dulles suggested that there was “little goodwill toward Egypt on 
the part of the American public,” so much so that Dulles doubted whether the Administration 
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could obtain the funds from Congress. “For the time being,” Dulles told Hussein, “the Dam 
project should be put on the shelf while we tried to develop a better atmosphere and better 
relations.”39 One week later, Nasser announced Egyptian plans to nationalise the Suez Canal. 
Nasser declared his plans were the “answer to American and British conspiracies against 
Egypt” and a response to “imperialistic efforts to thwart Egyptian independence.”40 Nasser’s 
decision greatly concerned Eden, who immediately began plans to intervene militarily in 
Egypt. He believed that Nasser’s action was not only a threat to Britain’s economic interests 
but it was also a provocative attack on British power and authority. Eden immediately 
established an Egypt Committee (an inner circle of British Cabinet members that planned for 
a Suez operation) and warned Eisenhower that Britain was prepared to use force in Egypt. “My 
colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring 
Nasser to his senses,” Eden told Eisenhower on 27 July.41 
The Americans were not willing to consider the use of a force. Instead, policymakers in 
Washington preferred a peaceful diplomatic approach. US Under Secretary of State Herbert 
Hoover Jr. urged Eisenhower not to consider military action as there were “grave dangers” in 
such a response. “While [a] strong position should be taken in order to preserve Western status 
in [the] Middle East,” Hoover told Eisenhower on 28 July, the “confiscation of the Suez 
company was not sufficient reason for military intervention.” Hoover added that “unless we 
(the United States) can introduce an element of restraint, Eden will tend to move much too 
rapidly and without adequate cause for armed intervention.”42 Eisenhower agreed with 
Hoover’s assessment. “I cannot over-emphasise the strength of my conviction,” Eisenhower 
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wrote to Eden on 31 July, that all diplomatic routes must be explored “before action such as 
you contemplate should be undertaken.”43  
Four days later, Eisenhower met with Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies and 
Australian Ambassador Percy Spender in Washington. Eisenhower hoped that the Australians 
might assist US efforts in advising London against the use of force in the Middle East. As 
Eisenhower told Menzies, he “hoped that the United Kingdom and France would continue to 
exercise restraint.”  He added that London should be careful not to succumb to the “tyranny of 
the weak,” a term he used to describe “the difficulty that arises when weak nations are in a 
position to challenge great powers by taking advantage of certain situations.”44 
Even though Australia had withdrawn from its defence commitments in the Middle East, 
Nasser’s nationalisation of the Canal prompted Menzies to pledge his support for British efforts 
in the region. On 30 July, Menzies suggested to the External Affairs Department that military 
action might be necessary in order to ensure that Nasser did not “get away with such an act of 
brigandage.”45 One day later, Menzies made similar comments in a meeting with British 
Ambassador in Washington Roger Makins and US Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover. 
“I made it clear (to Makins and Hoover) that in my opinion Nasser’s action was illegal,” 
Menzies recalled, “and unless his prestige could be materially diminished, [the United States 
and Britain] would be exposed to trouble after trouble in the Middle East.”46 
This view, however, was challenged by several policymakers in Canberra. Australian 
External Affairs Minister Richard Casey, Defence Minister Philip McBride and Deputy Prime 
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Minister Arthur Fadden all urged Menzies against military action, suggesting that they all saw 
“substantial arguments against the use of force.” If force was used, they claimed that trading 
vessels in the region would be in danger, the participating powers would be brought before the 
UN Security Council, and relations with Arab and Asian countries would be jeopardised.47 
Adding to these concerns was the complete lack of consultation between Australia and Britain 
especially in relation to the possibility of resorting to force. “We have had nothing from the 
UK about their intentions in respect of the use of force nor their appreciation of its military and 
political effects,” Casey penned in his diary on 7 August.48 
Although Casey, Fadden and McBride did not advocate the use of force to retain 
international control of the Canal, military recommendations suggested that Canberra should 
support London if a decision was made to intervene. The Australian Defence Committee 
produced a report on 9 August that concluded that Western control of Suez was of “major 
importance” to Australia because it relied heavily on regional oil reserves and free access to 
the shipping route. The report also concluded that total Egyptian control of the Canal would 
affect “the flow of reinforcements and supplies from the United Kingdom to the Far East in an 
emergency.”49 In this regard, Australian defence interests in the Middle East and the Asia-
Pacific became intertwined. 
From a military standpoint, Australia fully supported British intervention despite its limited 
potential to contribute to military action. The “immediate military objective should be to seize 
and occupy the canal,” the Defence Committee report advised Menzies, even though it 
conceded that only a token Australian force might be available for deployment while most of 
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its troops were stationed in Malaya.50 The report outlined that “if the situation was to deteriorate 
in Southeast Asia or the Far East, it may be necessary to bring back any Australian forces 
deployed in the Suez Canal area.” In short, Australia was prepared to support Anglo-French 
military action in Suez. However, an Australian commitment to the region should “be small 
and limited to the navy and air force.”51 
New Zealand reached similar conclusions. Like Australia, Wellington was unable to proffer 
any significant number of defence forces in the event of an armed intervention (although a New 
Zealand warship called the ‘Royalist’ was stationed in the Mediterranean). Diplomatically, 
Wellington was fully behind any British action in the region in order to protect Commonwealth 
interests. As New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland told British Foreign Minister Selwyn 
Lloyd on 30 July, “you may be assured that New Zealand will as always fully support any steps 
which the United Kingdom feels obliged to take to ensure that vital British rights are fully 
protected.”52 Holland’s conviction that New Zealand should stand fully behind Britain was no 
secret. He made very similar comments in the New Zealand Parliament eight days later. 
“Where Britain stands, we stand; where she goes we go, in good times and bad,” Holland 
announced on 7 August. In his estimation, that was the “mood of the New Zealand people” on 
the topic.53 After Holland’s speech, External Affairs Minister Tom McDonald made a similar 
speech that was particularly scathing of Egyptian action in the Canal: 
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The manner in which the Egyptian government has acted … has given Britain 
and other European countries no ground for comfort at all. Egypt has waged 
over the air against the United Kingdom a constant propaganda campaign 
which has at times been vicious and virulent. She has endeavoured to create 
trouble by turning neighbouring countries against the countries of Europe … 
Egypt gives us no reassurance at all concerning Egyptian intentions, and the 
unheralded and arbitrary method of this latest seizure gives no promise of 
future harmony and can only be deplored. 
 
For these reasons, McDonald argued that New Zealand must stand wholeheartedly behind 
British action against Egypt, even with the potential use of force. “Britain has every justification 
for preparing to meet any eventuality,” McDonald declared. “As to mobilisation,” he added, “I 
think it has been overlooked, and it should not be.”54 New Zealand support for the use of force, 
however, was not unanimous. Much like the way in which Casey, Fadden and McBride urged 
Menzies to renounce the use of force as a means to respond to Nasser’s nationalisation, New 
Zealand High Commissioner in London Thomas Clifton Webb hoped Britain would not 
respond with military action. “Let us hope they have not committed themselves to something 
which … cannot be carried out,” Webb wrote to McDonald on 31 July, “either because of lack 
of support from [the] USA … or even from their own public here.”55 
 
Menzies and the Suez Committee: August-September 1956 
While Britain and France contemplated the use of force in Egypt, an international conference 
was held in London during mid-August in the hope that a diplomatic solution might be found 
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to return the Canal to international control. Before the Conference, Menzies made a television 
address to the British public on 13 August to outline his views toward the developing crisis. 
Menzies, in no uncertain terms, placed the blame for the crisis squarely on Nasser. “Nasser’s 
actions in respect of the Suez Canal Company has created a crisis more grave [sic] than any 
since the Second World War,” Menzies concluded. Menzies did not trust Nasser at all and was 
convinced that it would be “suicidal” to leave the Commonwealth’s vital trading interests in 
Suez solely in his hands. Moreover, he stressed that Nasser’s nationalisation of the Canal was 
illegal under international law and would encourage further aggression if left unchecked. By 
nationalising the Canal and rejecting the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Menzies argued that 
“Nasser violated the first principle of international law” and this grievance “will encourage 
other acts of lawlessness if not resisted.”56 
At the Conference, Menzies maintained that his country was unprepared to accept anything 
less than a return to international control of the Suez Canal. “Australia has a great interest in 
freedom of transit” in Suez, Menzies said in a speech in London. According to Menzies, the 
“essential factor” was the establishment of an efficient administrative body in the Canal so that 
all nations could benefit from the free operation of the Canal.57 New Zealand External Affairs 
Minister Tom McDonald made a similar statement in London. The Suez Canal, McDonald 
argued, “must, in our view, be on an international basis … it should be able to assure free transit 
of the Canal, it should be efficient, and it should not be subject to financial instability.”58 In 
other words, both Australian and New Zealand representatives in London thought that 
international management of the Canal was essential. 
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Even though Menzies announced that his government completely supported British action 
in Egypt, Australian External Affairs Minister Casey continued to urge him to renounce the 
use of force as an appropriate solution. “I recommended to Menzies that he should speak 
against the use of force to Anthony Eden, [as] it would put us completely in the wrong with 
public opinion in practically every part of the world,” Casey penned in his diary on 17 August. 
He added that “I recommended that he should seek to get an appreciation from the UK of the 
military side, of which we were entirely in the dark. I failed to see what could be achieved by 
action of this sort.”59 
Casey’s New Zealand counterpart, Tom McDonald, was suspicious that Australia and New 
Zealand were purposefully “left in the dark” at the Conference in order to prepare for Anglo-
French military action. Suspecting a secret invasion plot, McDonald now thought that military 
action would be disastrous for Britain and Western interests in the region. These views were 
“shared by a majority in the New Zealand Cabinet.”60 Writing to the New Zealand Prime 
Minister on 23 August, McDonald advised against supporting British military action. He 
suggested that the entire conference was designed to prepare an unacceptable proposal to 
Nasser that he would reject in order to make resorting to force appear more reasonable. This, 
in McDonald’s view, was “one of the main reasons for the conference.”61 McDonald’s 
suspicions proved to be correct. Eden had planned to take back the Canal regardless of the 
outcome of negotiations. As one British Foreign Service Officer Anthony Nutting recalled later 
about the crisis, “Eden hoped that the conference would produce a solution unacceptable to 
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Nasser.”62 In other words, the outcome of the Suez Conference was destined to fail. Eden had 
already authorised French troops to be stationed in Cyprus and asked British subjects to leave 
the Middle East area on 29 August, days before any diplomatic approach was made to Nasser.63  
Nonetheless, a Committee was appointed in London comprised of representatives from 
Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the United States in order to present a number of 
proposals to Nasser agreed upon by eighteen of the twenty-two participating powers at the 
Conference. These proposals revolved around returning the Canal to international control. On 
strong insistence from Dulles and Eden, Prime Minister Menzies agreed to lead this Committee 
and present the agreed proposals to Nasser. Menzies surely felt complimented that he might 
play an instrumental role in resolving a complex international situation. Unaware of Eden’s 
actual plans, Menzies was especially enthusiastic about leading the Committee because he was 
concerned that the outbreak of war in Egypt was “an even money chance.”64 There was a “very 
distinct prospect,” Menzies feared, that Britain and France would use military force should a 
diplomatic solution not be reached.65 
Menzies and the Suez Committee met with Nasser in Cairo on 3 and 4 September to present 
the agreements reached in London. While making clear that there was “no spirit of hostility” 
about the agreements being proposed, Menzies emphasised to Nasser that the use of force was 
completely possible should he choose to reject the proposals. As he warned Nasser, it would 
be “a mistake for you to exclude the possible use of force from your reckoning.” Nasser, 
however, did not budge in the face of this possibility. “President Nasser took our proposals 
apart, tore them up, and metaphorically consigned them to the wastepaper basket,” Menzies 
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recalled.66 Nasser then rejected the proposals formally on 9 September, claiming that they were 
a form of “collective colonialism.”67 
Menzies returned to Australia disappointed and frustrated by Nasser’s stubbornness. 
Fending off media criticism that he ultimately failed in his efforts to convince Nasser to agree 
to the Committee’s proposals, he stressed that Nasser was uncooperative and entirely to blame 
for this crisis. “This repudiation by the President of Egypt was committed without notice, 
without consent, and in fact, by force,” Menzies said at a press conference in Sydney on 18 
September, “those things are worth remembering.” “It is quite true that I was appointed as chief 
spokesman for presenting these matters to the President of Egypt,” Menzies added, but “I don’t 
think anyone could challenge the fairness or indeed the generosity of one item in the 
proposals.”68 He also rejected Nasser’s claim that the Suez Committee’s proposals were a form 
of collective colonialism. “I hope it will be remembered that under the proposals put forward 
Egypt’s position as landlord was recognised completely,” Menzies argued, stressing that 
“Egypt was to be the only nation deriving any profit from the Canal at all.”69 
Paving the way for military action, Eden was surely pleased by Nasser’s rejection of the 
Committee’s proposals. Eden, however, placed the Committee’s failure squarely on 
Eisenhower, who during the conference told the media that he hoped for a peaceful solution to 
the crisis while the British were threatening Nasser with the use of force.70 This, in London’s 
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view, completely undermined their negotiating position with Egypt. “We must … show that 
Nasser is not going to get his way,” Eden urged in a letter to Eisenhower on 6 September.71 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower continued to stress publicly that he would not use force in order to 
find a resolution to the crisis. “This country will not got go war ever while I am occupying my 
present post unless the Congress declares such a war,” Eisenhower said at a press conference 
on 11 September. Dulles made similar remarks in a press conference the next day, suggesting 
that even if the United States had a right to intervene militarily “we (the United States) did not 
intend to shoot our way through.”72  
Many policymakers in New Zealand, who continued to be very supportive of the British 
during negotiations over Suez, similarly placed blame on Eisenhower and the Americans for 
doing little to support British diplomatic efforts. As New Zealand External Affairs Secretary 
Alister McIntosh told his former Deputy Foss Shanahan on 24 August, 
 
How infuriating the British must find the Americans over Suez … when it 
comes to ostriches I am sure that bigger birds never stuck their heads into a 
bigger expanse of sand than Dulles is now doing in the undignified spectacle 
they present near the Pyramids.73 
 
In reality, there were no major differences with respect to US and British views about the 
threat Nasser posed. Anglo-American tensions were rather a result of differences about how 
these countries should respond to this threat. As Eisenhower described in a letter to Eden on 8 
September, the United States and Britain had a “grave problem confronting Nasser’s reckless 
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adventure with the Canal” and did not differ from British “estimates of his intentions and 
purposes.” The main point of Anglo-American disagreement, according to Eisenhower, was 
resorting to force and “the probable effects in the Arab world of the various possible reactions 
by the Western world.”74 The possibility of a Western military response clearly concerned 
Eisenhower, which in his estimation would be a disaster and hurt US prestige in the Arab world. 
According to Eisenhower, resorting to war “when the world believes there are other means 
available for resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the years to 
come, to the most distressing results.75  
Eisenhower and Dulles were especially fearful that after the failed Menzies mission, Eden 
was even more likely to pursue military options in Egypt. On 6 September, Dulles held a 
Congressional meeting with Senators Hubert Humphrey, Mike Mansfield and William Langer 
to brief them on the Suez situation and gather bipartisan approval for renouncing the use of 
force in Egypt. Dulles warned that the British and the French thought that it was necessary to 
“begin military operations to curb Nasser.” “The British feel that if Nasser gets away with it,” 
Dulles said, “it will start a chain of events in the Near East that will reduce the UK to another 
Netherlands or Portugal in a very few years.” Dulles told the Senators that he and Eisenhower 
were doing everything in their power to “strongly discourage” the use of force, as they felt it 
would be “disastrous for the French and the UK militarily to intervene at this point.”76 There 
were no criticisms or partisanship injected during the meeting. All three Senators agreed with 
Dulles’s efforts to prevent the use of force in Egypt. 
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Meanwhile, Eisenhower sent several letters directly to Eden in the hope he might convince 
him to reconsider military action. Eden was, however, unconvinced by Eisenhower’s 
reasoning. Instead, Eden argued that anything other than the use of force would be 
appeasement, a policy that could lead to catastrophic results.  “There is no doubt in our minds 
that Nasser, whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian hands, just as Mussolini 
was in Hitler’s,” Eden said to Eisenhower. He argued that “it would be as ineffective to show 
weakness to Nasser now in order to placate him as it was to show weakness to Mussolini … 
that is why we must do everything we can.”77 Seemingly out of touch with British thinking on 
the matter, Dulles also turned to Australia to express his concerns. “I am beginning to feel 
concerned,” Dulles wrote to Menzies and Casey on 27 October, “I am not myself in close touch 
with recent British-French thinking but in view of [the] leading role Australia has played, I feel 
it appropriate to express my concern.”78 
 
The Crisis Erupts: October-November 1956 
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s messages to London and Canberra could not prevent the escalation 
of the crisis in the Suez Canal. Despite American efforts, Eden remained inclined to use 
military action in order to topple Nasser and re-internationalise the Suez Canal. Tensions in 
Suez reached a climax on 29 October when Israeli forces, in collusion with Britain and France, 
invaded the Sinai Peninsula. None of the ANZUS powers, nor other Commonwealth countries, 
were informed beforehand of this secret Anglo-French plan. “For a long time the Middle East 
had been simmering,” Eden said in a message to all Commonwealth Prime Ministers a day 
later, “now it is boiling over.”79 In the message, Eden outlined plans for an Anglo-French 
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response, omitting entirely that London and Paris secretly supported the Israeli invasion in the 
first place. He described that unless the Israelis and Egyptians withdrew within twelve hours, 
Anglo-French forces would seize the Canal and overthrow Nasser. Nasser predictably rejected 
the ultimatum, which ultimately led to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 5 November. 
In Washington, the Eisenhower Administration was shocked and angered by Anglo-French 
action without American consultation. “I think the British made a bad error,” Eisenhower told 
Senator William Knowland on 31 October, “I think it is the biggest error of our time.” In a 
meeting with Dulles, Eisenhower said he was “astonished” that Eden avoided informing 
Washington of its decision. “They are our friends and allies (Britain and France),” Eisenhower 
said, “and suddenly they put us in a hole and expect us to rescue them.”80 At an NSC meeting 
on 1 November, Eisenhower and Dulles outlined that the United States must do all it can to 
push for a peaceful resolution through exerting the greatest possible pressure on Britain and 
France. “Recent events are close to marking a death knell for Britain and France,” Dulles 
described, and the United States had to decide whether it would side with its oldest allies or the 
Arab world. Eisenhower made his choice clear: in his eyes, the action Eden had taken was 
“nothing short of disastrous.” “How could we possibly support Britain and France if in so doing 
we lose the whole Arab world,” Eisenhower asked rhetorically.81  
In discussing the international reaction, Dulles outlined that there was so far very little 
support for British-French action in Egypt. He stressed that the “verdict of the rest of the world 
[was] altogether unanimous” in its opposition to the use of force in Egypt. There was, however, 
two exceptions to this opposition to British-French action: approval for the attacks had only 
come from Australia and New Zealand. Secretary Dulles told the NSC that Australia and New 
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Zealand were indeed the exceptions at this stage, yet there were extenuating factors in these 
cases. In Australia’s case, there was “much unhappiness” amongst the public about British 
action. Moreover, at the political level, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen 
Dulles (John Foster Dulles’s younger brother) suggested that there was “a wide split of opinion 
between Menzies and Casey.” In New Zealand’s case, John Foster Dulles simply suggested 
that “it was virtually a colony and almost invariably followed the lead of the United 
Kingdom.”82 
Meanwhile, angered by Eden’s betrayal, Eisenhower wrote to the British Prime Minister to 
express his concern about the Anglo-French ultimatum. “I feel I must urgently express to you 
my deep concern at the prospect of this drastic action,” he wrote, “even at the very time when 
the matter is under consideration in the United Nations Security Council.”83 Privately, 
Eisenhower followed the decisions reached at the NSC meeting on 1 November and put severe 
economic and military pressure on the British, hoping that it would sway London to agree to a 
UN cease-fire and withdraw from the Canal area. The US Sixth Fleet harassed the Anglo-
French invasion fleet in the Mediterranean and delayed its arrival into Egypt, while in 
Washington, Eisenhower approved a series of economic sanctions on Britain to compel the 
British to withdraw.84  
Eisenhower likewise put diplomatic pressure on Britain and France through the introduction 
of a UN ceasefire resolution. After consultation with Dulles and the NSC, Eisenhower argued 
that the United States must present a cease-fire resolution in the United Nations as soon as 
possible. In his estimation, the United States must lead this cease-fire resolution before the 
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Soviet Union presented its own resolution in order to prevent Moscow from “seizing a mantle 
of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations.” 
Overall, in an effort not to embarrass the British and French by specifically naming them, US 
action in the UN aimed to avoid “singling out or condemning any one nation, but should serve 
to emphasise to the world our hope for a quick ceasefire.”85 An emergency United Nations 
session was then called on 1 November. Dulles introduced a cease-fire resolution that passed 
by a margin of 64-5. Along with Britain, France and Israel, Australia and New Zealand were 
the only other countries to oppose the resolution. 
 
Australian and New Zealand Responses to the Israeli Invasion 
As Dulles predicted, Australia and New Zealand both publicly supported British action in the 
Suez Canal. While disturbed by conflict in the Middle East, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Holland wholeheartedly supported British action. To his mind, such a response protected 
Commonwealth interests and was necessary in order to preserve Britain’s vital interests in the 
region. “We are naturally gravely concerned,” Holland wrote to the New Zealand High 
Commission in London, yet he added that “there is no need for me to stress New Zealand’s ties 
of blood and empire and our traditional attitude of standing by Britain in her difficulties. He 
added that “I can assure you of our deepest sympathy for the United Kingdom in the situation 
now confronting her. It is our desire, as always, to be of the most utmost assistance.”86 Holland 
also shared these thoughts to the New Zealand public. In a statement on 1 November, Holland 
announced that “I have the full confidence in the United Kingdom intentions in moving forces 
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into the Canal area” and declared New Zealand would do all it could to assist Eden and the 
Britons in their hour of need.87 
In Canberra, Menzies pledged similar public support for British action. “Australia accepts 
that Anglo-French intervention was a necessary emergency measure by two great democratic 
powers,” Canberra reported to the Australian High Commission in London on 1 November.88 
Later that day, Menzies wrote to Dulles and outlined that his government supported Anglo-
French action. “Quite frankly I do not believe that it would in the interests of any of us to have 
[the] Canal closed for weeks and possibly months,” Menzies said, “from this point of view my 
colleagues and I see considerable merit in police action which is involved in Anglo-French 
ultimatum.”89 He made a similar statement to the Australian public on 3 November, stressing 
his opinion that Anglo-French action was necessary. “The action taken by the United Kingdom 
and France was the only quick and practical means of separating the belligerents and protecting 
the Canal,” Menzies announced.” He also argued that it was “wrong and absurd” to consider 
Nasser, the “author of the Canal confiscation and promoter of anti-British activities in the 
Middle East,” as an “innocent victim of unprovoked aggression.”90 Put another way, Menzies 
clearly thought that Nasser had caused military action against Egypt and on some level 
deserved it.   
Privately, however, policymakers in the Tasman countries expressed grave concerns about 
British action. Canberra and Wellington were also concerned that pledging public support for 
Britain compromised their security relationship with the United States. New Zealand reports 
from Washington confirmed these concerns shortly after the Israeli invasion on 29 October. As 
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the crisis escalated, New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro met with US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Rountree in Washington to 
discuss the American reaction to the crisis. He reported to Wellington on 31 October that the 
situation was of the “utmost gravity, both from [the] point of view of [an] Anglo-American 
breach and in terms of general security in the Middle East.” Munro warned that the situation 
could develop to a point where the Western position in the Middle East became 
“irretrievable.”91 In a subsequent cablegram to Prime Minister Holland later that day, Munro 
stressed that Anglo-French action “put New Zealand in a difficult position vis-à-vis its ANZUS 
partner, the United States, and confronts us with a critical choice between British and American 
policies in the Middle East.”92 
Australia was caught in a similarly difficult position. In Canberra, Menzies stressed that a 
rift in Anglo-American relations was deeply concerning to Australia. “I have myself urged 
upon both British and American leaders that consultations should speedily occur to reconcile 
any differences of opinion,” Menzies said to the House of Representatives on 1 November. He 
added that “it is a great misfortune that there have been public differences between those great 
democracies whose friendly cooperation is so vital to us all.”93 Nonetheless, despite this rift in 
Anglo-American relations, Menzies remained supportive of British action. Menzies echoed this 
belief in an address to Parliament on 3 November, stating that Anglo-French action was “the 
only quick and practical means of separating the belligerents and protecting the Canal.”94 He 
then wrote to Eden, reassuring the British Prime Minister that he had Australia’s full support: 
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You have indeed had a difficult decision to take but I am sure that you are 
right. Under these circumstances, an abandonment of operations by [Britain] 
and France would have left the Canal unprotected, would have given fresh 
heart to Egypt and would have meant a lot of destructive fighting around and 
over the Canal itself … our support remains undiminished and that we think 
that you were and are right. It is tragic at a time like this you should have to 
encounter such intemperate and stupid attack.95 
 
It is indeed telling that even without any consultation from London Australia chose to place 
its support behind British action. As far as Canberra was concerned, Britain’s vital interests 
came before any possible diplomatic backlash in Washington. “I believe that Anglo-French 
action was correct,” Menzies later told Eisenhower, “in Australia I believe that approval of the 
British action is widespread.”96  
Even then, choosing sides between the United States and Britain was quite difficult for 
Australian policymakers. Casey, fearing the effect this crisis would have on Australian-
American relations, did not stand completely beside Menzies in his support for British action. 
For Casey, it was greatly concerning that a rift in Anglo-American relations was so publicly 
exposed. During discussions for a ceasefire in the United Nations, Casey reported to Menzies 
that “I was greatly distressed by atmosphere at United Nations.” He added that “the almost 
physical cleavage between United Kingdom and United States was one of the most distressing 
things I had ever experienced.”97 
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Casey was not alone. Many Australian and New Zealand diplomats were privately 
concerned by an Anglo-American rift over Suez because it put Canberra and Wellington in a 
very difficult position between its two most important allies. To this end, Australian and New 
Zealand diplomats agreed that they faced the same dire situation. Writing about a meeting he 
had with New Zealand High Commissioner in London Clifton Webb as well as other British 
Ministers on 2 November, Casey recalled that  
 
There is great deal of doubt, to put it mildly, in most people’s minds, about 
the wisdom of the enterprise on which the UK has launched. The fact is that 
I have met no-one (apart from senior Ministers) amongst the many friends 
with whom I have been in contact, who are in favour of it, and many of them 
are genuinely and greatly distressed. Their fears are not on account of the 
outcome of the military operation, but for the effect on the position and 
prestige of Britain and as to whether the operation will not have a 
longstanding effect the reverse of what is intended.98 
 
In Wellington, the New Zealand External Affairs Department expressed deep concern about 
London’s decision to intervene. In a letter to Foss Shanahan, External Affairs Secretary Alister 
McIntosh compared the Suez Crisis to the outbreak of the Second World War. “The last few 
days have been all too reminiscent of 1939,” McIntosh told Shanahan, “we in the Department 
have been horrified at the implications of British action, but Cabinet as a whole and the Prime 
Minister have been thoroughly in favour of backing the United Kingdom.”99 
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McIntosh was particularly alarmed by British action. Writing to Under Secretary Frank 
Corner, McIntosh described Eden’s decision to intervene in the Suez area as “criminal.” “In 
my view,” McIntosh concluded, “he (Eden) ought to be impeached.”100 He was particularly 
concerned that the crisis had developed so suddenly and without any consultation with 
Wellington. In another letter to Corner, McIntosh wrote that “one of the features about this 
Middle East Crisis that has shaken me most is not only the lack of consultation between the 
United Kingdom and the Dominions but also the slackening flow of information as the crisis 
has proceeded.”101 Corner agreed with McIntosh’s grim assessment of the deteriorating 
situation and criticised the lack of information that came from London, suggesting that Eden 
must be quite mad. “It is said that the Arabs have enormous respect for madmen,” Corner said 
memorably, “because Allah is supposed to reveal himself through them. If only the doctors 
would confirm the diagnosis of Whitehall and certify Eden.”102 
 
Aftermath: Eden Resigns 
In the end, enormous diplomatic, economic and military pressure eventually forced Britain and 
France to agree to another UN cease-fire and an emergency peace-keeping operation on 6 
November, enabling an Anglo-French withdraw from the Canal. For all their efforts in Suez, 
London and Paris had nothing to show for it except failure and embarrassment. As the US 
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Embassy in Cairo reported to Washington, the British and French “gained nothing except loss 
of prestige and increased hatred of Arabs.”103 Shouldering the brunt of the blame and 
embarrassment for the crisis—as well as struggling with a number of health issues—Eden 
resigned as Prime Minister on 9 January 1957. For all the shock and surprise surrounding 
events in Suez, his resignation was predicted. “Eden has had a physical breakdown and will 
have to go on vacation immediately … this will lead to his retirement,” the US Embassy in 
London cabled Washington on 19 November. His replacement, Harold Macmillan, quickly 
asked the United States to provide a “fig leaf to cover our nakedness” in early January so that 
British troops could finally withdraw from Egypt.104 As Anglo-French forces withdrew, even 
those in Australia and New Zealand who wholeheartedly supported British policy recognised 
that the crisis signalled the end of Britain’s claim to major power status. As New Zealand 
External Affairs Officer Frank Corner told Secretary Alister McIntosh, “the centre of effective 
power and decision has, I think, passed away from London. Washington and New York are 
likely to be the most interesting places from now on.”105  
 
Conclusion 
After a failed invasion of the Sinai Peninsula due to American diplomatic, economic and 
military pressure, the end of the 1956 Suez Crisis publicly exposed a bitter rift in Anglo-
American relations and essentially confirmed the end of British world leadership. It also 
exposed noticeable differences between Australia, New Zealand and the United States over the 
control of the Suez Canal, defence policy in the region, and Britain’s role in world affairs. 
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While all of the ANZUS powers had defence interests in the Middle East, Australia and New 
Zealand decided to publicly support British military action during the 1956 Suez Crisis despite 
strong private reservations. The United States, in contrast, bitterly opposed British action and 
forced London to withdraw from Egypt. As this Chapter argued, defence interests the Middle 
East and responses to the Suez Crisis demonstrated clear policy differences between the 
ANZUS powers that stemmed from trans-Tasman British ties and views surrounding US 
leadership. It also demonstrated a turning point in alliance diplomacy for both Canberra and 
Wellington. During the Suez Crisis, Australia and New Zealand held similar views and were 
not prepared to defer to US leadership when vital British interests were at stake. In short, five 
years after the conclusion of ANZUS, Australia and New Zealand were still prepared to pledge 
support for vital British interests instead of aligning all strategic policies with their chief 
protector, the United States. For Canberra and Wellington, Suez starkly exposed the limitations 

























The eleven years between the end of World War II and the end of the Suez Crisis wrought 
many changes in how Australia, New Zealand and the United States approached each other and 
the wider world. Evolving from a wartime alliance during WWII, these countries shared 
common interests in defending against Communist aggression, preventing a revival of Japanese 
aggression and broadly preserving the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific. As this thesis has 
argued, however, the ANZUS powers were far less united on these issues than the conclusion 
of the treaty suggested. Moreover, as Australia and New Zealand maintained close ties to 
Britain throughout this period, ANZUS policies did not revolve completely around US policy.  
As Chapter One argued, initial Australian post-war policy centred on strategic and military 
cooperation with Britain and the United States. This policy gave little thought to New Zealand’s 
role in cooperation with these powers. Canberra also hoped to conclude a defence arrangement 
with the United States through the joint control of island bases in the Southwest Pacific. Again, 
New Zealand was barely consulted. Overall, Australia saw its primary task as maintaining the 
closest ties possible with the British Commonwealth while developing a new strategic 
relationship with the United States. New Zealand policymakers also recognised that the security 
of their country rested on protection from the United States, but they instead decided to 
cooperate with British plans to send New Zealand forces back to the Middle East in the event 
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of war between 1945 and 1953. Wellington, in contrast to Canberra, saw its role as a small but 
loyal member of the British Commonwealth and an active supporter of the United Nations as 
an instrument for world peace. Meanwhile, other than obtaining Australia and New Zealand 
cooperation for its plans in Japan, the United States took no major interest in its relationship 
with the British Dominions in the South Pacific. US post-war policy was global in nature, 
prioritised Europe and the Middle East as key regions, and aimed to prevent an expansion of 
Soviet influence. Put another way, President Truman’s early post-war strategies in the Pacific 
theatre generally hinged upon US preponderance and the state of affairs in other regions of the 
world. As a result, the United States did not cooperate closely with Australia and New Zealand. 
Events in late 1949 and 1950—such as the beginning of conservative anti-Communist 
governments in Canberra and Wellington, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, 
and the outbreak of the Korean War—brought Australian, New Zealand and US foreign 
policies into closer alignment, culminating in the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Yet 
while this treaty committed each country to meet a “common danger” in the Pacific region, 
Chapter Two demonstrated that ANZUS meant different things for different countries. For 
Australia, ANZUS provided formal protection from the United States. In Canberra, ANZUS 
was a necessary security measure in order to offset Britain’s inability to protect Australian 
defence requirements. Policymakers in Canberra also hoped ANZUS would be a gateway to 
accessing information on US global strategic planning.  
Across the Tasman, New Zealand also accepted that their country must rely on US 
protection but policymakers in Wellington wanted a less formal arrangement. These 
policymakers hoped instead that President Truman declared that the United States would 
defend New Zealand if attacked. For New Zealand, this declaration would secure US protection 
without binding New Zealand to defend American interests. Moreover, a non-binding 
commitment was less likely to signify jeopardise New Zealand’s relationship with Britain. This 
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at least in part explains why New Zealand wanted to include Britain as either a treaty signatory 
or observer to ANZUS Council meetings once its plans to secure a Presidential Declaration 
failed. The United States, however, was unwilling to entertain this possibility. The State 
Department had no intention of sharing power in the Pacific with Britain and opposed British 
membership in ANZUS in any capacity. For the United States, conclusion of ANZUS was a 
trade-off for Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty. It also 
served as further support for the American position in Northeast Asia. In short, conclusion of 
the ANZUS Treaty papered over the consistent disagreement between Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States about mutual security issues and the overall nature of the relationship. 
During the Eisenhower Administration, ANZUS evolved into a more complex and 
meaningful relationship. Australia and New Zealand began to view Southeast Asia as the most 
vital region for their own security. As a result, these countries looked to maintain close ties 
with both the United States and Britain in order to protect their security interests in this region. 
In the United States, Eisenhower’s global strategy addressed the same issues as under Truman: 
the Soviet Union was the major threat, the United States must prevent an expansion of Soviet 
power and influence, and a containment strategy would apply to most world regions including 
Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The manner in which these objectives were achieved, 
however, changed substantially. In contrast to Truman, who sought to contain the Soviet Union 
through military and financial assistance to those countries threatened by Moscow, Eisenhower 
relied on nuclear brinkmanship as a more cost-effective means of containing the Soviet Union. 
He also valued defence pacts with Allied powers, as these generally procured support for US 
policies in exchange for military protection. In this way, ANZUS was an increasingly important 
component of Eisenhower’s plans to maintain American control in the Pacific. 
Against this backdrop, Australia and New Zealand were uniquely placed to play more 
important roles in US foreign policy during the 1950s. This became especially important once 
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a series of crises broke out in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. Yet, as Chapter Three 
suggests, the ANZUS powers still struggled to find common ground on these pressing security 
issues. Once Vietminh forces began a siege at French-held Dien Bien Phu in March 1954, 
Washington announced that US intervention in Indochina relied on multilateral support 
(especially Britain) for a “United Action” plan. In response, New Zealand suggested its 
participation hinged upon British participation and Australia suggested its participation hinged 
upon upcoming general elections. Once Britain declined to participate and Australia could not 
commit, the proposal for united action fell apart. Britain’s unwillingness to participate in the 
“United Action” plan, in other words, ultimately stifled agreement between the ANZUS powers 
on responding jointly in Indochina. Subsequently, when SEATO was created in late 1954, 
Australia and New Zealand wanted this treaty to be broadly defined in order to defend their 
interests in Southeast Asia. The United States, on the other hand, sought to limit the treaty’s 
scope to defend only Communist aggression. A lack of interest in multilateral intervention in 
Indochina also demonstrated to US policymakers that Britain must participate in SEATO. 
Moreover, as Australia and New Zealand both hoped for British participation, this section 
additionally argued that trans-Tasman ties to the British Empire continued to shape the nature 
of the ANZUS relationship. 
Chapter Four argued that similar issues occurred during the 1954-1955 Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis. Once PRC forces shelled Nationalist-held offshore islands in September 1954, the 
United States responded with the conclusion of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defence Treaty as well 
as the threat of nuclear retaliation. Possible US escalation greatly concerned its allies, 
particularly Australia and New Zealand. In an effort to avoid the crisis escalating, Australia 
was very active diplomatically in both Washington and London hoping to avoid a serious rift 
in Anglo-American relations over China. Meanwhile, New Zealand was heavily involved in a 
US and UK sponsored United Nations resolution which called for a cessation of fighting in the 
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Straits. While all three ANZUS powers hoped to defend against Communist aggression and 
avoid an escalation of the crisis, there was no sense of unity in the most appropriate response. 
To this end, Chapter Four argued that divergent policies between the ANZUS powers on China 
largely stemmed from contrasting Anglo-American views over recognising and containing 
Beijing. Tensions were also caused by concerns in Australia and New Zealand that the 
Eisenhower Administration’s brinkmanship-like approach to rebuffing Chinese aggression 
could spark a major war. Nonetheless, as Australia and New Zealand ultimately supported the 
US position on China due to concerns it would compromise their security relationship with the 
United States, this chapter exposed that there were clear limits to unequivocal support for either 
US or British policies toward China and the Taiwan Straits Crisis. 
Finally, Chapter Five exposed similar policy differences between Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Again, Britain continued to play a key role 
in shaping the nature of the ANZUS relationship. This crisis publicly exposed a bitter rift in 
Anglo-American relations and highlighted the end of British world leadership. British Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden ignored Eisenhower’s pleas against the use of force and secretly 
planned with France and Israel to invade Egypt in order to reclaim control of the Suez Canal 
in late 1956. The United States, in contrast, bitterly opposed British action and forced London 
to withdraw from Egypt through heavy diplomatic and economic pressure. Meanwhile, 
Australia and New Zealand took an almost identical course of action by publicly supporting 
British intervention even if many of their diplomats privately questioned Britain’s decision to 
resort to force. In this context, Australian-New Zealand-US responses to the crisis provide an 
interesting insight into contrasting views between the ANZUS powers toward Britain’s post-
war role in world affairs. The United States saw no major role for Britain without Anglo-
American cooperation, whereas Australia and New Zealand erroneously thought that Britain 
was still capable of wielding enough influence in the Middle East to take action without 
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American support. The Suez Crisis ultimately demonstrated a turning point in alliance 
diplomacy in Canberra and Wellington. Australia and New Zealand held similar views and 
were not prepared to defer to US leadership when vital British interests were at stake. In short, 
Australia and New Zealand were still prepared to pledge support for vital British interests 
instead of aligning all strategic policies with their chief protector, the United States. For these 
countries, Suez exposed starkly the limitations to supporting Britain when London’s views 
were at odds with those in Washington. 
In exploring these issues between the ANZUS powers, this thesis advances two major 
conclusions to explain why these foreign policy and strategic differences regularly occurred. 
Firstly, close Australian and New Zealand ties to Britain caused friction in their respective 
relationships with the United States. Despite Australian and New Zealand policymakers 
accepting that their post-war security relied upon the United States due to a fleeting British 
presence in the Asia-Pacific, Canberra and Wellington maintained close strategic ties with 
London. As a result, when British decisions clashes with US policies, the Tasman countries 
were forced to choose between aligning their policies with one of their two most important 
allies. When Australia and New Zealand adopted positions that supported British policies—
such as those taken during the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis and the Suez Crisis—there was little 
policy agreement between the Tasman countries and the United States. 
Even then, policymakers in Canberra and Wellington did not always agree on how closely 
to align their respective policies with the United States and Britain. This was due in some 
measure to mutual distrust, but it also stemmed from trans-Tasman differences over Britain’s 
proper role in the post-war Pacific and Middle East. Canberra continued to cooperate and 
consult closely with London, yet the Anglo-American power shift caused Australian diplomats 
to pursue actively a much closer relationship with the United States in order to meet their own 
security requirements. New Zealand also recognised the need for US protection but remained 
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sceptical of American intentions and aimed, wherever possible, to align their policies with 
Britain in order to counteract US dominance. In short, while both countries maintained close 
British ties, active Australian efforts to pursue closer US-Australian strategic cooperation—
often at the expense of cooperation within the British Commonwealth—caused significant 
discord in the trans-Tasman relationship. The Anglo-American rift that developed during the 
early to mid-1950s—arising initially out of different views over the question of recognition of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and then deepening in the wake of crises in Indochina, 
the Taiwan Straits and Suez Canal—further exposed trans-Tasman differences over whether or 
not to prioritize US or British policies. 
Secondly, the United States proved unwilling to consult closely with Australia and New 
Zealand until at least the mid-1950s. This lack of consultation created significant discord in the 
relationship. In the early years of the Truman Administration, US foreign and defence policies 
were global in nature. Moreover, these policies centred on containing the Soviet Union in 
Western Europe and gave little consideration to Australia’s and New Zealand’s role in the US 
containment strategy. While Australia and New Zealand also identified the Soviet Union as a 
serious threat, their primary strategic interests lay in the Pacific. Ultimately, the Tasman 
countries simply had little ways in which to encourage the United States to take Australian and 
New Zealand views more seriously in this region. Australian-New Zealand-American interests 
did overlap in the post-war occupation of Japan, yet the United States envisioned no significant 
role for Australia and New Zealand other than for these countries to cooperate with American 
plans. In this regard, amidst strong Australian and New Zealand objections to a soft or speedy 
Japanese Peace Treaty without some form of reassurance that Japan would not again be a 
menace to the world, US relations with Australia and New Zealand were generally frosty. 
As the Cold War escalated in Asia (especially after the establishment of the PRC, the 
outbreak of the Korean War and the Communist threat in Southeast Asia), it became wholly 
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practical for the United States to reach a peace treaty in Japan as quickly as possible and secure 
Allied support in the region. As a result, the United States gave far more attention to 
developments in the Asia-Pacific and Washington began to consider new ways in which to 
combat the spread of Communism in this region. This greater attention could only bring it 
closer to Australia and New Zealand. From this shared vision of responding to mutual security 
threats in the Pacific theatre, the ANZUS Treaty was concluded. Although the ANZUS powers 
still disagreed over a number of strategic issues, Australia and New Zealand were given a 
greater—albeit still minor—role in US global strategy. Over the following years, Australia and 
New Zealand participated in Five Power Staff Agency Talks for the joint defence of Southeast 
Asia in 1953, contemplated the practicality of multilateral intervention after the Dien Bien Phu 
Siege in March 1954, and became key SEATO members. Similarly, New Zealand was heavily 
involved in the pursuit of the secret US-UK sponsored United Nations resolution to reach a 
ceasefire during the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, and Australian Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies led the US supported diplomatic mission to Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis. 
Looking more broadly, this thesis demonstrated that the early Cold War period was one of 
great change and consequence for the future of relations between Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States. For instance, Australia and New Zealand began to agree more consistently 
over defence and foreign policies in their region, highlighted by joint participation in the 
Vietnam War during the 1960s and 1970s despite British non-participation. Later, amidst New 
Zealand protestations over harbouring American nuclear vessels during the mid-1980s, the 
United States suspended its security guarantee to New Zealand in 1985. It was perhaps fitting 
that New Zealand, the country that often questioned its close relationship with the United States 
during the early Cold War, was later suspended from the treaty that it initially did not want. 
Meanwhile Australia, the keenest country to conclude a security arrangement in the first place, 
became the first signatory to formally invoke ANZUS in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
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on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. Strategic and diplomatic issues 
between Australia, New Zealand and the United States during the early Cold War certainly had 
a decisive impact on the future of the relationship between these countries and their interactions 
with the wider world. Yet, as this thesis has explored, US policymakers were not only unwilling 
to originally share leadership with Australia and New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific, but were in 
fact unwilling to consult on matters both great and small until at least the mid-1950s. Moreover, 
the trans-Tasman countries struggled to cooperate closely during this period due to difficulties 
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